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ABSTRACT
An evaluation is presented in this volume which, for the purpose
of this studyt is defined as the adequacy of system design with known,
functional chd performance requirements. The proposed Rockwell
Internatiocal AIDS III card, document and data flow are presented to
summarize -ghe concepts involved and the relationships between
,unctions.' The analysis and evaluation includes a study of system
c'ompati;bi.lity., processing rates, search requirementsp and response
accuracy as well is a consideration of operational components and
hardware integration. Operational availability of the system (i,e,,
the probability that the equipment will be able to perform the
function when required) will not be confirmed until specific hardware.
is identified and empirical data can be obtained. Results of the
	 {
study indicate that the AIDS III System concept is operationally
feasible if production capacity is slightly enhan lued, but that
operational complexity, hardware intergration, and a lack of
conceptual data pertinent to some of the functions are areas of
concern. For a synopsis of this entire report, see the Executive
Simseary in the Compendium (Volume I).
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
Operational feasibility is define$ as tN a adequacy of system
design, process control procedures, and s ystem performance when
compared with known functional and performmoc requirements. This
definition is used to distinguish between operational and technical
feasibility, which determines whether the existence, status, and
development risks of the technologies employed in
 the system lead to a
technically feasible approach.
System design and performance can be gr,!rsidered as either a
technical or an operational issue. For the purposes of this evalua-
tion, system design is considered an operational issue. System
performance includes .issues of accuracy and completeness, of searches
and responses, as well as system availability and processing rates.
Process control includes the monitoring of ,system performance,
queues and work Mows, to effectively ensure that processing rate
requirements are achieved.
A. SCOPE/OBJECTI *
The objective of this AIDS III Subtask was to eva tuate the
operational feasibility of the AIDS III System Concept developed by
Rockwell International.
The January 1980 issue of the Rockwell AIDS III System Concept
document (Ref. O f the Rockwell April - May 1980 response to the data
dictionary (which augmented the January 1980 report), and the docu-
ments referenced were used as the basis for evaluation. Supplemental
briefings received before May 1980 were also used. No additions or
changes to the January 1980 system concept except for those in the
April - May 1980 addendum are reflected in the evaluation.
B. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ANALYSIS
To decide whether or not the AIDS *III System is operationally
feasible, four basic questions were asked:
(1) What are the system's functional requirements?
(2) What are the system's performance requirements?
(3) Does the system concept meet -these requirements?
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(4) Do the designated hardware and software meet these re-
quirements in terms of availability, compatibility :end
adequacy?
Recognising the varying levels of the AIDS III system
development, and the depth to which some areas of the system have been
explored; not all questions could be answered with the same decree of
compiatea►^^la.
1SECTION It
SCARY
While there art concerns regarding final des ign and implementation,
the indications are that the AT08 III System concept is operationally
feasible if production capacity is slightly ineraassd. The operational
complexity, the status of work station devialopment, the hardware
integration of critical functions, and a lack of conceptual support
data are the primary areas of concern.
Simulation modeling of the. fingerprint card flow ]Indicated that,
with the addition of a total of five work stations in four functions,
the system will handle 95% of the 1993 work load in lest than 3 hours
(99.9X within 4 hours). Further analysis indicates, however, that the
system is sensitive to volume surgets, and functions within the system
have a low tolerance for equipment failure. A seven percent increase
in the work load will saturate the system at three points. With single
unit failures # many of the functions could not handle the projected
work toad. Since many functions are operating with limited spare
capacity, additional stations or overtime will ^5e required to work off
backlogs created by equipment failure or increases in volume. The
potential film processing backlogs related to uneven workflow asn
identified by Rockwell must be resolved, since this component ispn the
critical path in the ideatfication process.
	 s
The high volume of data (66,000 messages with 5.1 million byt'l,s
of data per hour) and interdependency of the computer subsystems cri,wte
a complex data network with a single point of control (the System
Supervisor). All of the subsystems exhibit some degree of
interdependency. If there is a failure or degradation of one
subsystem, most of the others will be affected. When the System.
Supervisor is down or degraded, all functions in AIDS III will be
degraded or cease functioning. A properly sized configuration using
available computer and storage technology will support AIDS 111, but
software and hardware configurations still require additional
development to ensure that cost-effective and workable computer
subsystems area selected.
Since the final computer hardware configuration has not been
selected, it was impractical to do a dynamic simulation of the computer
subsvatems. As an alternative, a summarisation and analysis of the
operational component/'computer subsystem data transfer rates was-_:&e
in order to scope the computer configuration requirements. Sated,'on
the avail.4ble data, tiff-the-shelf technology would support the AIDS III
System.
Development of a full set of performance requirements as w611 as
a model of the computer data ftow'is recommended to, "assist in determine
ing the most effective hardware and software configuration. In
addition, since the dina base structure and its management is an
integral part of the AIDS III and the development and msirn,tenance costs
to support the informaeion processes are significant, it is recommended
2-1
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that a make/buy evaluation of a commercially available general-purpose
Data Base Management System (IYAMS) be Made.
Analysis of the search performance of the Automated Technical
Search Pilot System indicates that it performs better (provides a
lower miss rate of 5% vs 24%) than the manual technical search
system. The search performance of the AIDS II Automated Name Search,
compared with the manual system, also indicates that a lower miss rate
will be achieved.
The processing of documents was not adequately covered. There
were omissions of key processing functions, location of work stations
was not diseusse,4 p and the number of documents to be returned to the
manual system var&*ad greatly from present procedures without
explanation. This area was notable for its inconsistency and lack of
complete concept development.
An analysis of the AIDS III System showed that by not microfilming
the "rush" requests and walking them through the system, these requests
could be processed within 30 minutes, thus meeting this requirement.
There is a high degree of operational complexity involved in the
Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader, fingerprint classification, image
comparison, and search review functions. These functions require a
coUcentrated effort, demanding accuracy, knowledge, 4'iid reliability
throughout the operational day. It is recommended that prototypes of
the fingerprint classification, image comparison, and search review
terminals be developed and tested prior to making a full commitment to
these concepts.
While the Minutiae Master File and Computerized Criminal Name
File and Record Files will not generally require new data, they will
require file restructuring and conversion when implementing AIDS;^III.
In ndditionp a major, 15-month effort will be required to converi"the
14`.5 million fingerprint master cards to microfiche for use in the
automatic retrieval system.
Additional development of facility requirements for the AIDS III
System is ne,:essary, as the latest AIDS III concept is not fully
reflrr..ted in the current facilities plan.
Table 2-1 summarizes the areas of study that were evaluated in
the oper``ational feasibility task of the AIDS III evaluation study.
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SECTION III
METHODOLOGY
The methodology that was developed and utilized to evaluate AIDS
III's operational feasibility is reflected in Figure 3-1 and described
below.
A.	 DATA GATHERING
First, the study team gathered system concept design
j documentation consis "ling of Rockwell reports, engineering memoranda
and simile materials (all references are listed at the end of this
volume). The data gathering proress ',ncluded technical discussionsI	 with the FBI and Rockwell AIDS i^,I }-x ► 'lect personnel. Tours of the
F81 Identification Division in WA,1Ji *-. ,&ton D.C. were )!lso a source of
information.
Specific operational and design data were gathered and
documented for each operational component * of the AIDS III System
Concept. This included the five subsystem computer configurations and
System Supervisor. Whenever applicable, information in the following
areas was collected for each component: 	 -
(1) Description of'the components
(2) Service rates.
(3) Number of units proposed.
(4) Availability;.
(S)	 Operability.
(b) ` Component status.
(7) Interfaces.
(8) Search performance and/or accuracy.
(9) File conversions
(10) Design and implementation approach.
I'	 (11) Issues and concerns.
f
i
s	 -
*The term "operational component" refers to an operation or `^ocessing
step (manual, automatic, computer-aided, or combination thereof)
required to perform a specific function.
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Had data been available, the next step would have been the
development of functional and performance requirements at the system
and subsystem levels. Using these requirements as standardep the
design would then have had a basis for comparison in evaluating its
adequacy. The fact that the new system improves performance of a
particular function is not necessarily a benefit unless the existing
system fails to met the some requirements. This subject is discussed
further in Section V.
B.	 STATIC AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The third major step in establishing operational feasiblity of
the AIDS III concept was to perform static and dynamic analyses of tb4
system to determine whether it was sufficiently robust to accommodatip
both changes in work load volume and changes in its mixture (e.g., tide
ratio of criminal ve civil inquiries).
Based on the data collected, each operational component was
statistically analyzed for availability and service rate capabilities.
This process identified potential, problem areas in the fingerprint card
system flow." it also highlighted those components that would fail to
meet their throughput requirements as a result of a single unit failure.
0
The dynamic simulation of the AIDS III system under varying work
loads established a more thorough test of its operational feasibility
(the static analysis being only a "quick look" technique). A computer
based simulation model was developed using General-Purpose Systems
Simulation (GPSS) software. Using this high-level simulation language
on the Univac 1108 computer, the AIDS III System was nodeled to
evaluate the system capacity and analyze the concepts of queueing and
card flow. The flow of card images for automatic retrieval and
verification was also simulated. The lack of sufficient data
prohibited the development of a dynamic simulation of the system data
flow through the computer.
The model was designed in a parametric manner, allowing the
variation of v►ork load volume and criminal/civil card mix. Variations
in component service rates and numbers of units was also modeled. The
data gathering and analysis activity produced the primary data for the
components within the model. System bottlenecks were identified and
resolved by increasing the number of service units. Once the baseline
'W6del had been established, it was enhanced by JPL to meet the FBI
Guidelines.
Throughout the building, testing, and operation of the model,
reviews were held to ensure that the model was valid and reflected the
AIDS III System Concept. Detailed discussions of the simulation model
can be found in Section VI, Paragraph B.
The Environment Analysis (Volume VI of this report) provided work
load volume ranges and various mixes of criminal and civil fingerprint
cards for sensitivity testing These work load volumes were ant red
into the model, and the resulting card throughput was evaluated.
S-3
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7C.	 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
li
Data transfer requirements for the System Supervisor and each
computer subsystem were summarized. Analysis of this information was
used in an attempt to evaluate the proposed hardware configuration.
Because of the lack of specifics about the final hardware
conf .brat on (and sows ambiguity in the subsystem functions) the data
processing requirements of the AIDS III system could only be analyzed
at a conceptual level.
In addition to analyzing each operational component and computer
subsystem and developing a simulation models general areas such as
data base management, search performance, system ibmplementation, file
conversion, and system work flow control s ,qre reviewed and evaluated.
D.	 DATA DICTIONARY
The original schedule called for the completion of the
operational feasibility evaluation in February, 1980. At that time,
however, the subtask realized that there was insufficient data to
completely evaluate the AIDS III System Concept. The deficiency was
most prevalent in the areas of process control queueing stratagy,
computer configurations/capacities, data management/handling and
system monitoring. The missing data was documented and transmitted to
the FBI.-through the Data Dictiont y (see appendix to Volume I). The
Data Dictionary indicate the unspecified or insufficiently specified
data olements requi,d to complete the AIDS III Operational
Feasio`ility evaluat' n. It was prepared in matrix format, with the
rows reflecting the data elements required and the columns identifying
the data needed for each element (i.e., area of data deficiency, data
required, it4 format, and the subtask requiring the data). The
additional harts received from Rockwell as a result of this effort,
plus the data previously gathered, was combined and used as the.data
base for the Operational Feasibility evaluation.
SECTION IV
AIDS III SYSTEM CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
The Rockwell AIDS III card, do-ument, and data flow are
presented in this section. The intent is to summarize the concepts
involved, to indl.4ate the relationships between functions, and to
provide the reader with a basic understanding of each concept. A
diagrammatic view is shown in Figure 4-16 The names and abbreviations
used throughout this volume Were derived from Rockwell's documentation.
Details of the Rockwell AIDS III System Concept are described in
their January 1980 document {Ref. l), the technical memorandum
prepared by Rockwell in response to the JPL Data Dictionary (sec
appendix to Volume I) which augmented the January 1980 report, and
related documents. A list of these documents can be found in the
Reference List at the end of this volume.
A.	 FINGERPRINT CARD PROCESSING
The fingerprint cards and other documents enter the AIDS III
system from the FBI mailroom (MAIL) as shown in Figure 4-2. The
mailroom -operation consists of opening the mail and separating the
fingerprint cards from other documents, Documents are forwarded for
processing as described in Section B, Document Processing. The alien
registration and personnel identification cards are accumulated
throughout the day. At the end of the day they are counted, date
stamped for statistical reporting purposes, and logged (DATE STP).
They are then classified (CLASS-C) and routed to the civil file with
no further interface with the automated system. The criminal and
civil (applicant) cards are forwarded for coding with a process
control number (PCN). If a criminal/civil priority scheme is needed,
the cards are separated at this point.
r>
Rush request' for fingerprint card searches enter the system at
the process control number (PCN) function. Processing of these
requests is described in Section C, Rush Request Processing.
1.	 Process Control Number ,Application,
When criminal and civil fingerprint cards arrive at the PCN
printers, a unique, machine-readable, dated and sequenced process
control number is _printed on each card. The process control number is
used as the primary accounting index. It is used to maintain an audit
trail for associating the data on the card with the processing
performed by the system computers.
l
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t2.	 Microfilm
From the PCN application # the cards move to the microfilm
cameras (MVILM) for fingerprint image capture. All cards are filmed,
although some may not be used in the imag e rompariaon systems, The
objective is to convert cards into film images as soon as possible in
order to minimise the impact of film procesaing delay on response
time. Cards designated for temporary file update and for permanent
file update are also sent to the microfilm cameras.
Roll film from the cameras is processed 01.AS) and converted
into ultramicrofiche Two copies of each fiche are generated for each
of the 19 image comparison and 13 verification terminals. The
microfiche are distributed (PLOAD) to the image comparison
identi-f cation and verification ( ICI and ICY) terminals.
3.	 Quality Check
After the fingerprint cards are filmed (MV114 9 they are routed
for a quality check (QC) and a separation of those cards to be removed
from the AIDS III automated processing system. Cards are removed from
automated processing when:
(1) Necessary information is missing - returned to contributor.
(2) Year of birth is less than the Automated Subject Search
cutoff year (1959) - sent . to the annual systems.
(3) Card ,has a non-AIDS FBI number - sent to the manual system,
(4) Card has only four fingers - sent to the manual system.
Also entering the QC function are cards returned from the manual
system which were originally received with a non-AIDS FBI number, or
were not identified (non-idents) in the manual system and are being
resubmitted for an automated search. Cards that do not continue in
the automated process are passed from quality control (QC) to wand
out* (WAND) and removed from the system. Contributor data and status
designation are recorded with a data entry keyboard which allows the
sys=t^rA to retain contributor and work load statistics while monitoring
_	 cards status.
4.	 Enced ipX and Encode Checki1
Most of the cards are passed from QC to the encoding function
(ENC)Y Where data input formats are checked and criminal artest data
are encoded. Also entering the encoding function ar(" c^irda for AIDS
yx: subjects that were: l) identified in the manual ^,oiim and now being
ii
*The PCN is read with an optical character reader (OCR) wand.
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returned for file update and response ger4oration. in the automated
system; 2) not identified in the manual name search (Card index
Section) and now being returned for automated technical search, or 3)
not identified in the manual fingerprint search and now being added to
the automated technical search Minutiae Master file.
All cards leaving the encoding function (ENC) are passed to
encoding check (ENCK) for an independent verification of the encoded
data. The cards are than separated by type into separate processing
streams.
S.	 Data Entry, Blocking Out and Classification
Cards with an AIDS FBI number (either contributor-supplied or
through the manual identification process) are routed directly to data
entry (DENT-A). The remaining cards must receive a fingerprint
classification before the automated subject search. Criminal cards
are sent to blocking out (aLO), where a high-level., Henry
classification is performed. The BLO function also flags criminal
prints which are probably illegible, so that arrest data are not
entered in the data entry process.
At the classification function (CLASS-A), civil, regular
military and Coast Guard cards from ENCK receive full NCIC fingerprint
classification. Civil cards receive full classification because most
(90X) of the cards are not identified in subject search and ultimately
require full classification prior to automated technical search.
Military and Coast Guard cards receive full classification as required
by the civil file. At the time of full classification, the data are
entered into the system using special data entry terminals which
complement the classification function (finger block display layout
similar to the fingerprint card, and single purpose keys representing
finger classification symbols). The finger classification is also
written on the card.
At the data entry work station (DENT-A)v subject search \`'
parameters and arrest data are entered into the system and held for
verification. At the data entry verification function (VDENT-A) the
data are checked, character ••by-character. After the subject search
parameters are verified, the search is initiated. While the search
takes place, the arrest data are ve ;fied. The results of the
computer subject search (i.e., whether a candidate has been
identified) are indicated on t yre CRT terminal screen to inform the
VDEN -A operator of proper routing of the card as follows:
(1) Criminal cards with no candidates to classification
(CLASS-b).
(2) Civil cards with no candidates to classification check
(CLQ 
(3) Cards with candidates to search review (SEAR).
(4) Military with no candidates to the civil file.
4-6
Criminal cards that had candidates from subject starch but were not
identified and verifie4 when checked against the fingerprint card are
returned from SSAR for a technical search and are also sent to the
classification function (CLASS-$).
After classification, all cards are processed in the classifi-
cation check function (CLCK) using the same type of terminal used in
classification. This function verifies the classification previously
made. In checking, the stored classification is recalled to a CRT
display using the PCW. If necessary, changes are and* and legible
cards ave routed to canterline sort (CSORT). Those cards determined
to be illegible are rowved from the process and sent to automatj+d
correspondence (AUTOCOR) to be returnee-to the contributors.
Also sent to CLCK are civil cards with no subject search
candidates, and those civil cards that had non-identification
candidates from subject search but were not positively V,Bhtified by
fingerprint check. These cards were fully classified (CLASS-A) prior
to subject search, and therefore bypass the classification process
(CLASS-B) of the criminal cards. The classification check of civil
cards is similar to, but less extensive than, that for criminal cards.
6.	 Fingerprint Reading
0
At CSORT, the cards are inspected to determine the approximate
centerlines. The prints may vary from high to low in each of the
fingerprint boxes and some portions may even be outside the boxes.
The cards are sorted into groups having the some centerline, and are
routed in batches to the Automatic Fingerprint Reader System (AFRS)
for minutiae extraction. Eased on the fingerprint minutiae data from
AFRS, together with the classification data and other descriptive
information previously entered into the system, the automated
technical search is initiated.
Those cards rejected by the AFRS require computer-aided, manual
minutiae encoding on the Semi-Automatic Reader (SAR). The computer
saves all the AFRS data on rejected cards so that only prints of the
rejected fingers need to be manually encoded. When the rejected
conditions are corrected at the SAR operation, automated technical
search for the card can proceed. A very few cards may have
fingerprints that cannot be successfully reconstructed by the SAR
terminal (designated as rejects to be returned to the contributor).
Following the AFRS and SAR operations, the fingerprint cards are
routed to the search review function (SEAR).
7.	 Page Comparison
The microfiche fingerprint images for the automated technical
and subject search candidates are available to the image comparison
identification (ICI) and verification (ICY) functions. Here the
identification process is performed using microfiche images rather
than actual fingerprint cards. These functions are under computer
4-7
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control and are initiated when two conditions are satisfied. First,
the fingerprint image of the inquiry search card in microfiche format
is displayed on the image comparison terminal. Secondly, a candidate
list from either the automated subject or technical search function is
available. All image comparison terminals receive a copy of all
inquiry search images ego that any terminal (each one of which has
access to only a segment of the master fingerprint image file) can
make ,omparisons with file subjects in its particular segment.
When the above conditions are satisfied, search candidates are
reviewed ( 'ICI) to determine tentative candidates by either the
automated subject or technical .search. This is accomplished by
comparing „ current-search fingerprint images (received on microfiche)
with =star files microfiche images. The retrieval of all images is
under computer control. Tentative identifications are designated by
th4 (,^erator to be revieur*d by an Image comparison verification
oporator ( ICV).' Searches with no tentative identifications are
designated as such and bypass the verification step. Results of the
image comparison are then available at search review ( SEAR).
8.	 Search Review
Search review ( SEAR) reviews all fingerprint cards except those
previously removed because of poor quality or illegibility, and
military cards with no subject search candidates. SEAR performs two
functions: search process evaluation and card routing. As the cards
arrive at SEAR, the PCN is entered into the system and the search
results are displayed on a CRT terminal. For process evaluation, SEAR
provides the final measuve of quality control: the final human
acceptance of no identifications based on automated search results.
Those searches that have been designated as identifications by
image comparison (ICI/ICV) require no further decisions, and the
search results (displayed on the console CRT) indicate the proper card
routing. Some fingerprint cards are returned to the contributors per
their request, and the remainder are retained in original hard copy
form. A few are ,returned to the manual system for file update.
Inquiry cards designated as subject search candidates but which
were not positively identified by image comparison ( ICI/ICV) are,_,
routed to the classification function (CLASS-B) for preparation for an
automated technical search. -Those cards with contributor -supplied FBI
numbers that were not identified require a subject search. This is
initiated by SEAR without routing of the -card because all necessary
data have been entered, These cards are set aside awaiting search
results and subsequently handled the same as cards with or without
subject search candidates.
Searches designated as automated technical search with: no
identifications undergo a process evaluation wherein the SEAR
operator, having a display of search results and search conditions and
a detailed understanding of the search process, decides if a second
search should be performed using different search arguments or
characteristics.
4-8
i
r
i
sa^	 _ ,
If the inquiry search card is a new criminal addition to the
file, an FBI number is assigned to that card at SEAR. The new
criminal cords to be retained are routed back to image capture (MFILM)
for temporary image file additions on a daily basis. Temp.)nary file
additions are similar to current work, since each image comparison
terminal receives duplicate copies. Permanent file additions occur
when enough (approximately 2000) additions accumulate to fill a
microfiche sheet for a single segment of the file. Following
permanent microfiche imagl file additions, the cards are filed (some
civil cards are routed tobthe civil file for retention)'.
9.	 Response Generation
The automated response generation (AUTORESP) and automated
correspondence, (AUTOCOR) functions are the remaining functions in
fingerprint search processing, ViAese functions are concerned with the
accumulation and sending of data-io the contributor.
Responses are run on high-speed line printers in batches to
allow the grouping of responses to the same contributor for reduced
postage costs. The printed responses are generated at AUTORESP and
sent to AUTOCOR for assembly. The high-speed printers at AUTORESP
also produce name index cards to update the CARD Index name file foe
AIDS subjects prior to 1961.
AUTOCOR associates responses with those cards to be returned to
the contributor and submits the envelopes to the mailroom for stamping
and mailing.
B.	 DOCUMENT-PROCESSING
The processing of documents (i.e., dispositions and miscellaneous
requests) is reflected in Figure 4-2 (page 2). In the mailroom (MAIL)
the documents are separated from the fingerprint cards and sent to
have a process control number assigned (PCN APPL). Since documents
are of various sizes, the process control number assigned (PCN) is
applied with a simple sequential number stamp either by hand or an
electrically driven stamp triggered by document insertion.
Following the PCN APPL function, the documents are routed to a
quality control and sorting function (READ). At READ, the documents
are reviewed, checked for quality and annotated. The dispositions are
separated and-sent for encoding (ENCDOC). The various remaining forms
and letters are read, and the required processing is determined before
encoding. All documents are„subjected to a quality ` control review to
assure that information for data entry (DENT'-B) is correct. A few
requests are separated for processing in the manual system or returned
to the sender because no action is required or possible.
E
	
	 At the ENCDOC function, the search and disposition data to be
used for updating of the automated files are prepared for data entry
(DENT-B). The encoding is then verified (ENDOCK), prior to data
4-9
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entry, and sent to VDENT-B for data entry verification and initiation
of a subject search. Identifications are determined based on the
information available from the criminal history files. No fingerprint
comparisons are attempted for these documents. Data entry is verified
(VDENT-B) and the appropriate action is initiated. Further activities
related to documents have not been specified at this time. The
current system includes: 1) for,identifications, files are updated
with the appropriate data or resp onse outputs are initiated for record
requests and 2) for no identifications, a response is initiated as
appropriate. All documents are now sent to the manual system for
disposition or returned to the sender.
C. RUSH REQUEST PROCESSING
Rush requests are those that are hand-carried through the system
to obtain the shortest possible response time. Some rush requests
require card searches, and some are merely requests for records when
no finge ;Kprints are available.
RVish requests achieve the quickest response time when the card
is hand 'carried to each function in the process. As 01',, card is pre-
sented at each station, the operator is expected to finish the card
currently in process and accept the rush request as tha next item of
work. The entire process allows a_rush request to be handled in an
estimated 30 minutes, and should not disrupt the normal work load if
rush request percent4ge volumes are comparable to those currently
experienced.
Requests for records requiring immediate action or telephone
query are handled at the on-line query function (QUERY) as shown in
Figure 4-2. This function through an on-line data entry terminal has
access to the criminal history files. A hard copy of the records can
be obtained using on-line printers.
li
D. COMPUTER DATA PROCESSING
All card routing and data flow are under the control of the
System Supervisor, as are all data that flow between the various
computer subsystems. The subsystems do not interface directly with
each other but rather through the Systems Supervisor as ref l (kc ted in
Figure 4-3. The key control data element is the process control
number (PCN) which is assigned to each fingerprint card and document
as it enterer the system. The PCN is the audit and control identifier
,of es card through its processing in AIDS III. After the PCN number
has been assigned and is recorded by the System Supervisor (SS) in the
Master Transaction Record (MTR) and Transaction Record (TR) files, the
card is processed as described in Paragraph A above. At each function
that interfaces with a computer, the PCN number is recorded and an
indicator is placed in the MTR as to the last location of that card.
During 'the capture. of the fingerprint card image onmicrofilm
(MFILM), and subsequent development of that image (FLAB), the roll and
4-10
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microfiche location of the image, is fed to the system and stored in
the TR file. The data captured at the classification functions (CLASS
A, B, and CLCK) are also stored in the TR.
After the search parameters are entered and verified (DENT-A/B
and VDENT-A%B), they are passed through the Data Entry and Display
(DEDS) subsystem to the System Supervisor which initiates, through the
Subject Search and Response Generation (SSRG) subsystem, s subject
search. The result of that subject search is passed back to the
System Supervisory and then to the data entry verification (VDENT-A or
VDENT-B) operator to direct the operator in the proper routing of the
cASrd/document. The search data and the arrest information that have
been captured during the data input process are stored by the SSRG
subsystem in the TR file awaiting dispositive response from search
review (SEAR). Those fingerprint cards with no subject search
candidates are routed to the Automatic Fingerprint Reader System
(AFRS) where the fingerprints are read and the minutiae data are
captured. The minutiae data are processed against the Minutiae Master
File (MMF) in the Technical Search (TSS) subsystem. If a candidate is
located during the technical search, this information is then passed
back through the TSS and Systems Supervisor to the SSRG subsystem.
The list of candidates that has been generated, as a result of
either a subject search or a technical search is forwarded to the SSRG
subsystem. Using the FBI number, the SSRG looks up the associated
microfiche location and forwards these data to the Image Comparison
(ICS) subsystem. In the ICS, the appropriate microfiche for;^the
search inquiry card and candidate fingerprint image are selected from
the microfiche file. At the image comparison identification (ICI)
function, the image of the search inquiry card is placed on one screen
while the candidate card image, under computer control, is displayed
on a second screen. If there is more than one candidate, and the
first is a non-ident, the system automatically presents the next
candidate microfiche image to the ICI operator. The operator, upon
making positive identification, notifies the system. The identifi-
cation is then verified at the image comparison verification function
(ICV). Once an identification or non-identification has been made,
this information , is directed to the System Supervisor and placed in
the MTR .
Once the fingerprint cards themselves have reached the search
review (SEAR) function, the operator checks the MTR file and reviews
the search results. If a positive identification is made, the SEAR
operator instructs the system to generate an appropriate response and
update the related files. The process control number is cleared from
the system. If an identification has not been made t the SEAR operator
't' td	 h b	 d	 A. 	 d.	 h	 ('fan ini ^a e a secon sear% 	ass on U"	a Bear, criteria or
it is a criminal ' inquiry card) assign it an FBI number to establish it
as anew master card in the basic fingerprint file.
The Management Report Generation and System Simulation (MRGSS)
Task is part, of the System Supervisor. Different files (hardware
status, PCNe Manpower, etc.) are assessed and information contained	 u
IJ
4-12
P
tiR
.r
in these files is used to create Management Reports. This set of
files will provide -o mechanism for data collection, report generation
and system performance monitoring.
A software simul<, Cor which models the system operation will be
used for predicting word, load volumes at the various functions
including variations in input volumes, unavailable components, or
other dynamic portions of the system. This simulation is inclubive
down to the component level (i.e., the affect of removing a single
component can be evaluated). The simulator package will access many
of the same files utilized for the management report.
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SECTLON V
FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
A.	 DEFINITIONS
Four phrases used in this section may require definition.
(1) Functional requirement.
(2) Performance requirement.
(3) Top-down functional analysis.
(4) Measure of effectiveness. 	 r
Functional requirements are the collective capabilities that a
system and its subsystem must possess to tullfill the users' objec-
tives. Fftnetional requirements are not design characteristics. They
simply indicate to the designer the capabilities that must be
available in the system.
Performance requirements describe the level of quality with
which each function must be accomplished. Consequently, performance
requirements are generally quantifiable and can, as such, be measured.
The determination of the functional requirements of a system can
be accomplished in more than one way. An extremely effective method
is top-down functional analysis (see Reference 21 for a TDFA of the
FBI's Identification Division),. This method starts at the highest
level objective and systematically identifies all functions needed to
reach that goal. When the complete set of functions supporting the
objective has been identified, each of the functions is in turn sub-
divided into subfunctions until the lowest useful level is reached.
Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are the parameters used,to gauge
the state and performance of a system in achieving its goals.' They
are used as a source of performance requirements, since performance
requirements are essential to measures of effectiveness.
B.	 METHODOLOGY OF REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT
The development of functional requirements is illustrated in
Figure 5-1. First, a TDFA is performed. This analysis divides
objectives and functions of the Identification Division into
increasingly more detailed subfunctions until further breakdowns
become so design-dependent as to be unusable. Functions that,are
candidates for automation are identified. Those functions that, were
automated by AIDS I and II are marked in Reference 21, as well as
those which are to be automated by ALDS III.
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A functional design is then created that requires subsystem
identification. Next, interfaces between subsystems are defined, as
well as specific functions and major components such as data files.
In parallel with these steps, MOE are developed. The MOE are
then related to the functional system design by correlating them to
the functions of the TDFA by subsystem.
The next step requires the involvement of the FBI, since the
designer cannot know the importance of search accuracy or response
speed without consulting the operators and sponsors of the system.
After determining :system performance requirements, the engineers can
assign functions to appropriate subsystems, leading to a complete set"
of system and subsystem functional requirements. These requirements
can be communicated to the builders with assurance that the system
will accommodate the necessary functions, all interfaces will be
properly designed, and the system will respond and perform as intended.
C.	 EVALUATION OF ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS
The FBI has stated system requirements in two documents: the
Work Requirements Statement (Reference 31) and the Design Guide=lines
(Reference 23). Since each of the specific AIDS objectives in the
Work Requirements. Statement is repeated and often detailed further in
the Design Guidelines, the latter document was used as a source.
Footnotcs indicated below and in Tables 5-1 through 5-5 refer to
paragraphs in the Design Guidelines document (Reference 23).
The guidelines were arranged in categories and each category was
evaluated separately. The five categories selected were as follows.
v
1.	 System Objectives
System objectives were those statements indicating overall
benefits that should be obtained through the automated system. They
were too general -to apply to the measurement of operational feasibility
against functional requirements. They are paraphrased for brevity in
Table 5-1 and discussed in more detail in Volume 1.
3
A,
! ID 2.	 Design Guidelines
The guidelines determine the system designer's development
strategies (see Table 5-2). Reference paragraphs numbers 2 through 12
are specific to the AIDS III evaluation: and will. not apply to the
evaluation of alternative systems.
I't
These design guidelines strongly influence evaluation of the
system feasibility in terms of design approach. They are generally
,considered appropriate except for "3-byte minutiae storage and
matching," which may unnecessarily constrain the system designers.
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Table 5--1. System Objectives
Reference Paragraph System Objectives
1-a Achieve cost savings
i	 I
1-b Improve quAlity of service
	
j
7 Minimize and schedule overtime in advance 	 {
10 Hardware procurement3 not to be based upon 	 {
suggested configuration during evaluation
phase	 r
Table 5-2.	 Design Guidelines
Reference Paragraph Design Guidelines
1-f Nondisruptive implementation
1-h Parallel running of automated and manual
systems to allow for file conversion
I	 2 Semi-automatic classification system not
to preclude future automatic system
3 Manual fingerprint card retrieval 'system
acceptable	
1
12 3-byte minutiae storage and matching
^
14
1
System based upon available technology
1b Modular design for wcrk load variations
i
v
4
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3	 System Constraints
i
System constraints are externally imposed and thus dictate the
system environment. They define the boundaries of a working area
Within which a technically, operationally and economically feasible
solution must be found to establish system feasibility. Consequently,
constraints are used with both functional and performance requirements
(discussed below). Constraints are paraphrased for brevity in Table
5-3.
i
4.	 Functional and Performance Requirements
The remaining tables (5-4 and 5-5) briefly paraphrase the
functional and performance requirements identified in the Design
Guidelines document. The performance requirements refer to performance
levels that count be met either by the system, a subsystem, or a
specific component. Since these performance requirements provide the
quantitative basis for judging the operational feasibility of the AIDS
`	 ITI design concept, a discussion of each item follows:
(1) Reference Paragraph 1-c. This statement refers to the
degree of accuracy that must be achieved by the system.
The allowable miss rate for false or wrong identifications
is zero. This requirement will not change when
-
	
	 alternatives are evaluated. There is, however, an
allowable miss rate for "missed" identifications. For the
AIDS III evaluation, the requirement is that the new
system perform better than the existing manual system in
making identifications. This performance base is
established in JPL Document 5030-457 1 Volume V, Current
System Evaluation. This level of accuracy may need
quantifying on an absolute scale for the evaluation of
alternatives.
i
(2) Reference Paragraph 4. This statement defines the
permanent storage requirement for the Subject Search,
Technical Search, and Identification/Verification
Subsystems.
(3) Reference Paragraph 8. This statement defines the
projected work load that must be handled by the
Identification Division system. The volume is used to
determine the temporary storage capacity for the Subject
Search, Technical Search, and Identific,Ation/Verification
Subsystems as well as the interface capacity requirement
for the system and subsystems (see Appendix I for
discussion of work load value di.screpenci,es).
(4) Reference Paragraph 9. The performance requirements in
the Identification Division guidelines sometimes seemed
too stringent, particularly in the case of the 8-hour
response. time for 95% of the fingerprint cards. This
requirement did not appear to be based on a clearly
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Table 5-3, System Constraints
Reference Paragraph	 System Constraints
1-i Remain within current Identification
Division space allocation
1-j Fingerprint card to remain unchanged
5	 Workday to be 18 hr/day, 5 days/week for
routine processing; 24 hr/day, 7 days/
week to expedite processing
6	 Stuffing to be at a ratio of 2 to 1, day
shift to night shift
13	 No more than 5 AFRS
Table 5-4. Functional Requirements
Reference Paragraph 	 Functional Requirements
1-d	 Preserve or improve the integrity and
security of data
1-e Preserve existing legal and account-
ability features
1-g Subsystems to be tested separately before j
large-scale implementation
1-k Support the National Crime Information
Center Computerized Criminal History
{
program
1-1 Not`to preclude latent fingerprint search'
1-m Not to preclude alternative methods for i
data transmission between origin and
Identification Division
`i	
a
s
;a
f
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Table: 5-5. Performance Requirements Evaluation
Reference	 MOB
Paragraph	 Requirement	 Area	 Remarks
1-c	 improve fiojerprint identi-	 Accuracy Requirement
fication accuracy	 relative to
current system
4
8
9
Accuracy Qualitative; applies
only to AIDS III
evaluation
Response Based on capability
time	 of an obsolete class
of computer
1.5
	
AFRS cards read /hr (210)	 Response Rate of 250 used.
time	 Based on JPL Study and
projected 50% increase
based on AFRS modifi-
cation proposed by
Rockwell
15	 AFRS Availability (95x)	 Avail-	 98.82% based on JPL
ability	 study
11
15
Automated Subject Search to
handle 14.5 attlion records;
Automated Techlcal Search
(ATS) to handle 14-26
million records
Work Load to be 1973 actuals
plus 25%
Response time routine/
expedite to be:
0.95 probable for 8 hr/30 min
0.99 probable for 48 hr/8 hrs
0.999 probable for 96 hr
ATS; based on minutiae and
equal to or better than M-41
Matcher
ATlS CPU requirements (8 sec/
search)
Permanent Adequately defined
storage
capacity
Temporary Adequately defined
storage
capacity
r..
Response Adjust if neces-
time	 sary to satisfy
other requirements
1identifiable need. it hoe been agreed between JPL and the:
identification Division that the requirements stated in
the guidelines would remain until it was shown that no
operationally feasible solution existed. For exampler if
the 8-hour, $-reader (APR$) one and one-hsi le shift con-
straints excluded any feasible solution, then the
identification :Division would relax these boundaries, A 	 j
more substantial solution will be .sought during the
evaluation of alternative systems (second phase),
Consequently, these numbers are to be used as a sett of 	 !
initial parameters with which to test system performance,	 }
and not as strict performance requirements to be met in
determining operational feasibility of the design
concept,
(5) Reference Paragraph 11. This statement refers again to	 i
the level of accuracy necessary for AIDS III design
concept operational feasibility. This requirement is
sufficient for the AIDS III evaluation final repoart, but
may require quantifying on an absolute scale for the
evolustion of alternatives,
(6) Reference Paragraph 15. This item lists performance
levels that have been projected for AIDS III components,
(a) The CPU requirement for a technical search based
upon an IBM 3'05 0/65 employs an obsolete class of
computers.
(b) The AM throughput rate is discussed in Appendix F
of this volume.
W The AFRS availability is discussed in Section VII.
qi
1
f
a
i
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SECTION VI
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
The FBI Identification Division AIDS III Guidf^:,ines (Reference 28)
atatee that the ability of the overall system shall be sufficient to
provide:
(1) a 0.95 probability of processing each of the cards/
documents in the design workload within 8 work hours for
the routine work load and 30 minutes for expedite requests,
(2) a 0.99 probability of processing the design work load
r	
within 48 work hours for routine work, and within 8 hours
for expedite requests; and
(3) a 0.999 probability of processing the design work load
within 96 work hours for routine work.
The processing time is the time ,
,-
it takes a card or document to
travel between the mail room input 4' `-the beginning of the process and
the mail room output at. the end of the process.
To determine the feasibilit y of the AIDS III System Concept in
meeting these guidelines, a dynamic simulation model of the system's
card processing flow was developed on the UNIVAC 1108 computer using
the General-Purpose Simulation, System (GPSS). The results of the
initial simulation, using service rates and the number of servers
proposed in the AIDS III System Concept, indicated that the AIDS III
system would not process the Guidelines volume of 29,177 fingerprint
cards per day. However, with a total increase of five work stations
in four functions, the following results were achi%ved
(1) 95.0% of the cards were processed within 2.9 work hours.
(2) 99.0% of the cards were processed within 3.0 work hours.
(3) 99.9% of • ^'aie cards were processed within 3.8 
__ , i~k hours.
An analysis of the AIDS III system indicated that, by not
microfilming each fingerprint card and walking it th ;tough the system,
"rush"- requests could be processed within 30 minutes.
The simulation model was only developed for the card processing
portion of AIDS III. lb a application of a static analysis to the
document processing components indicated that the number of units
proposed would handle the work load. However, all functions relating
i
to the processing of documents were not addressed. In addition, the
'	 location of the work stations was not described in the Rockwell
i	 documents and the number of documents to be retrieved for the manual
system varied greatly from presetct operations without' planation (see
Append ix. I) `.
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Since the final hardware configuration has not been selected, it
was not practical to do a thorough static capacity analysis of the
computer subsystems. As an alternative, a summarization and analysis
of the operational component/computer subsystem data transfer require-
ments were made. Bs,fed on the data available, it is felt that if the
configuration proposed is properly sized (i.e., sufficient processing
rates, memory and storage capacity) and utilizes currently available
technology, it will support the AIDS III system. The development of
an effective networking structure and the utilization of a responsive
data base management system will be the keys to effectively using the
hardware/software selected.
A. OPERATIONAL COMPONENT AVAILABILITY
The development of operational component availability utilizing
Mean-Time-Between-Failure and Mean-Time-To-Restore data did not
materially affect the throughput capability of the various functions
(see Section VII). However, when the effect of a single unit failure
on the capability of an operational component was analyzed, a signif.
cant number of functions showed negative or marginal ability to handle
the projected work load on a stand alone basis. Those operational
components reflecting a near zero or negative spare capacity are of
particular concern and are summarized in Table 6-1. A detailed chart
on the availability of all operational compo'n.ents can be found ,in
Appendix B, Static Capability_ Evaluation of Operational Components.
B. STATIC ANALYSIS
The static analysis of operational components indicates that the
operational components have marginal spare capacity when operating at
100% of estimated throughput capacity. It is questionable whether the
components have sufficient resilience to deal with short-term surges
caused by increased card input volumes.
When all units of a component are functioning, there is a very
small capacity margin in the following card processing functions:
automated correspondence (AU1'000R), centerline sort (CSORT)p quality
control (QC) classification (CLASS A and B) and encoding related
functions ENC and ENCK (see Table 6-1). The fifteen work cells
proposed will just handle the projected work 'volumes.
The spare capacity of N-1 units indicates the impact of a single
unit failure within a component Under this condition, most functions
will be performed below the capacity required to support the estimated
volumes, while other units will perform,marginally (see Table 6-1).
This marginal production capacity is of//concern in functions with a
small, number of units, ,such as the Automatic Fingerprint Reader
Systems..:(A.?RS), image comparison and verification (ICS and ICV),
Semi-Automatic Readers ('SAR) and search review (SEAR). The SAR
function is of specific concern.
71
i
1Table 6-1.	 Component Capability - Static Analysis
Operational
j Components
% Spare % Spare
Proposed Capacity of Capacity of
k	 Acronym Description Units (N) N Units N-1 Units
AFRS Automated Fingerprint
Readef System
k @ 165 CPH OPL Measurement) 5 -20.1 -36.1
@ 250 CPH (Proposed Enhancement) 5 21.0 -3.2 j
AUTOCOR Automated Correspondence 25 3.7 -0.4
t
CLASS-A Classification-A 8* 6.7 -6.7
5
CLASS B Classification-B 3* 15.4 -23.1
P,	
CLCK Classification Check 3* 53.4 2.2
CSORT Centerline Sort 12 4.5 -4.2
DENT-A Data Entry A-Cards 6* 20.0 0.0
DENT-B Date Entry B- 42 3.3 0.8
Documents
ENC Encode-Cards 2* 6.7 -46.7
ENDOC Encode -Documents 17 4.5 -1.6
FLAB Film Processing 2 104.7 2.3
ICI Image Comparison 19 10.9 5.1
Identification
ICV Image Comparison 13 15.7 6.8
Verification
MAIL Open Mail and Sort 6 11.3 -7.3
q
MFILM Image Capture on 6 18 .5 -1.2
Microfilm
PCN Process Control Number 2 63 .3 -18.3 l
PCN`APPL Process Control Number- 1 0.0 -.00.0
Documents r	
^
-QC Quality Control 14 2.9 -4.5 x
r,
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Table 6-1.	 Component Capability - Static Analysis ('cont'd)
Operational
Components
% Spare % Spare {
f! Proposed Capacity of Capacity of 1
Acronym Description Units (N) N Units N-1 Units !
QUERY ON-Line Query 1 40.6 -100.0
d
1
READ Quality Control- 11 2.3 -7.0
i
Documents
SAR Semi-Automatic Reader 7 16.7 0.0
SEAR Search Review 15 14.1 6.5
f	 VDENT-A Data Entry Verification- 6* 20.0 0.0
A-Cards
VDENT-B Data Entry Verification- 42 3.3 0.8
B-Document I
WAND Wand Out of System 5 55.0 24.0
-- Work Cell 15 0.0 -6.5
cell ( i.e. 0 would reduce the capabi 'lit,y of a single work
a^
*Per work
cell by the percent noted)t
s,
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A very small .increase of poor duality print$ (e.g., S per hour)
can overload the capability of this function. The estimate is that 3%
of the cards entering the AFRS will require procesetng through the
SAR function. Tf this percentage increases to 5X, the SARs will not
handle the increased load and will have a backlog of 16 cards per hour
(the equivalent of 3.2 work stations). The number of rejected cards
will depend on two primary conditions; 1) the quality of the cards
received, and 2) the performance of the AFRSs.
In general, the analysis indicates that the system is sized with
a narrow margin. When one unLt fails and is not repaired or replaced,
the system will not be able to handle the work load. Because of the
marginal capability of many functions, work backlogs that develop
during a failure cannot be expected to be alleviated immediately when
the unit is replaced. This backlog may require overtime or additional
equipment.
The maintenance policy proposed by Rockwell assumes that suffi-
cient space, terminals and parts will be available for replacement in
the event of failure (See Section VII, Paragraph A.). This is
particularly significant for those functions identified above as being
marginal. In addition, the estimated one-hour response time for a
trouble or failure report must be reduced in these marginal areas. If
the system is to maintain its throughput goals and keep overtime to a
minimum, these marginal areas must be given close attention.
C,	 AIDS III SYSTEM DYNAMIC SIMULATION
1.	 Description of Simulation Model Results
When the AIDS III design was simulated using estimated 1993
input and the number of work stations designated, utilizations of 1.0
occurred at Quality Control (QC), Centerline Sort (CSORT), Semi-
automatic Reader (SAR) and Automated Correspondence (AUTOCOR). When
utilizations are 1.0, the system will never stabilize and queues will
grow without limit. However, the overloads at the station mentioned
above were small; and the addition of one work station to QC, CSORT,
and SAR and two work stations to AUTOCOR was sufficient to reduce
utilization to below .95.
With added stations, the system was simulated successfully with
the following throughput times
Fraction	 Upper Limit
	0.999	 3.8 hours
	
0.990	 3.0 hours
	
0.950	 2.9 hours
6-5
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Table 6-2 compares the number of stations in the Rockwell AIMS III
design with the minimum number of work stations required to
successfully stabilize a simulated run.
The analysis also indicated that the system is sensitive to
volume surges and has a low margin of spare capacity to handle
equipment failure,e As a result, either additional work stations or
overtime will be,"required to work off backlogs created by the
degradation of an up-line function or an increase in volume.
2.	 Simulation Model Queuing Concepts
An item in a queuing system generally spends its time either
receiving service or waiting in line to receive service. The total
time spent in the system is the sum of all of the wait times plus all
of the service times (ignoring, for the moment, such factors as
transportation times between stations or delays while sitting in an
output hopper). Service times for AIDS III are well defined and are,
in general, quite short. With the exception of the time required to
process microfilm and the service time for the SAR work station (which
only a small fraction of the prints enter), the sum of average service
times through the AIDS III stations does not exceed 20 minutes.
i	 Virtually all of the functions of the AIDS III system are served
by multi-server queues. One line: feeds each function, and the
transaction of the head of the line can be handled by any of a number
of servers. The average wait time to receive service from a
multi-server queue is given by the following formula*
I
average wait time _ M x ltP
i
where	 M	 the number of servers
B - the probability that all M servers are busy
is
	 the average service time
P = utilization = input volume x is
M
The average wait time (in units of service time) is shown in
Table 6-3 for 5, 10 9
 15, and 20 servers at various levels of
utilization.
„s
* Assumptions:	 1. Poisson arrival pattern
2. Exponential service times	 A
3. All servers equally loaded
5. First-in, first-out dispatching
	 's
6. No items leave the queue	 14
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Table 6-1.	 Comparison of AIDS III Design and Minimal Number
of Work Stations for Successful Simulation
AIDS III Minimum
Acronym Description Design Number_
AFRS Automatic Fingerprint 5 5
Reader System
AUTOCOR Automated Correspondence	 22 24
CSORT Centerline Sort 12 13
ICI Image Comparison '^^'
Identi fication 19 19
ICV Image Comparison
Verification 13 13
MFILM Image Capture Mic;.o-
fi lm 5 5
PCN Process Control Number
Application-CArds 2 2
QC Quality Control Check 14 15
SAR Semi-Automatic Finger-
print Reader 7 8
SEAR Search Review 15 15
WAND Wand Out of System 5 5
- Work Cell 15 15
Table 6-3. Average Wait Time ( in Units of Service Time)
P
NUMBER OF SERVERS
5 10 15 20
.4 .02 -- --
.5 ,05 .01 -- --
.6 .12 ,03 .01 --
.7:. .25 .07 .03 .02
.8 .55- .21 .11 .06
.9 .76 .67 .40 28
.95 3.5 1.7 1 .1 .76
.98 9.5 4.6 - 3.0 2.3
Table 6-3 is used as follows: gi :,en a work station with 15
servers, a utilization of 0.9, and an average service time of twenty
seconds, what is the average wait time to receive service? Table 6-3
shows that the `average wait time for 15 servers with utilizati.n of
0.9 is four-tenths of a service time or, in this case, 8 seconds
(0.4 x 20 - 8). It is important to note that, even with only five
servers (.f average utilization is kept at or below 0.95), wait times
will not exceed three-and-a-half times the average. As the number of
servers increase (and utilization is hold constant) the average wait
time decreases.
Most of the work stations in the AIDS III design have several
servers and, in general., wait times can be expected to be a maximum of
four times the average service time. Since the sum of average service
times is generally less than 20 minutes, it would be reasonable to
expect that total average wait plus service times would be somewhat
under two hours. However, note that if average input exceeds the
capacity of the servers, utilization will be 1.0 (the server, will
always be busy). In this situation, the system will never stabilize;
average queue length and average wait time for service will grow
without limit. The rate at which they grow will depend on the extent
to which input exceeds capacity.
With several servers and utilization less than or equal to 0.95,
wait times are reasonably short. With a utilization of 1.0, the
average wait time approaches infinity. With several servers, perform-
ance degrades from very good to unworkable within the narrow band of
utilization from approximately 0.95 to 1.0*. Thus, a system
designed to run at a high rate of utilization (given the assumptions
started earlier for the wait time equation) is sensitive to increases
in input. Even a small temporary increase in input could result in an
average utilization. of 1.0. If this occurred at any station, the
system would be unstable and average queue lengths would start to grow
indefinitely. If the system input were underestimated by a relatively
small amount in the design stage, an inherently unstable system would
be the result. The important concept is that the system tends to
either work very well or not at all. If a given AIDS III work station
is underdesigned.by three servers, then adding two servers will not
really improve the system, It will slow the rate at which the queues
build, but they will still grow indefinitely. Adding all three
servers, however, will generally improve performance to well within
AIDS guidelines. This fundamental understanding that AIDS III will
either work well within these guidelines or not at all was
`i^stxumental in designing the simulation model.
*In Table 6-3, with 5 servers, a change in utilization from 0.8 to 0.9
results in a change in average wait time of from 0.55 to 0.76 service
times - an increase of approximate? 38y , A change in utilization
from 0.9 to 0.98 results in an average change of from 0.76 to 9.5
service times - an increase of 1150%
A^C' IQ
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3.	 System Simulation Simplifying Assumptions
The General purpose Simulation System (GPSS) uses trafik'Ictions
which are moved through the system acco:rd.ng to the programmed
conditions. The fingerprint cards represent transactions in this
aimulation. A GPSS can only tolerate a limited number of active
transactions at one time. As the number of transactions increases,
the cost and time xequired for simulation increase dramatically.
Because of Ole large volume to be handled, it was quickly apparent
that one transaction could not represent a single fingerprint card,
but must represent a group of cards, This idea of batching introduced
its own problems. If,on-e transaction represents ten prints, service
times must be multiplied by ten. This causes average wait times and
average total times in the system to be multiplied by ten. Another
problem aggravated by the batch size is system stability. When the
simulation starts, the system is empty. The first several trans-
„
	
	 actions move easily through the system, without queuing causing a bias
in the statistics. To overcome this, the system is run until it is
reasonably stable. Then the statistics are reset (all transactions
are left in the system), and the simulation is run for an additional
	 s
period of time. The larger the batch size, the langor the system has
to be run to be confident that the system is stable. Thus, the
savings achieved by allowing one transaction to represent several
prints is at least partially offset by the need to simulate the system
for longer periods of time in order to achieve stability. Runs with
batch sizes of 1, 2 9 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100 were attempted. The runs
with batches of 1, 2, 5 t and 10 took inordinately long, and 25 was
selected as the smallest practical batch size.
In determining the number of days to run eachsimulatiun t the
determining factor was the number of queues at each station. Ideally,
the system should be run until average queue length stabilizes. For
most runs, it was found that the queues appeared to be stable after
approximately three days of s;imulatiorf. Statistics were then resets	 x
and the system was simulated an additional three days in order to
gather the desired statistics.
To keep the simulation within reason, several aspects of AIDS
had to be simplified. Rather than simulate microfilm processingp it
i
	
	 was decided to merely delay entry of a transaction into the ICI work
station until a standard processing time had elapsed. Rockwell AIDS
Technical Memo 80-0081 lists a total processing time for microfilm
(1000 frames/reel) of 159.7 minutes. No transaction was permitted to
enter the ICI station until it was held for at least 159.7 minutes.
Transportation was another aspect of AIDS III that was simpli-
fied. In most cases, output from the work station is placed on a belt
moving at a rate of 100 feet/minute. In many instances, the distance
to the next station is trivial (as in the work.cells). It was found i
f
	
	
to be more practical to simply omit transportation time for simulation
runs.
s
r;
i
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Each work shift waa simulated to have a productive period of 7.5
hours. Since the second shift is staffed at only half the level of
the first shift, this had to be reflected in the model. Thus, two-
thirds of the transactions are generated during the first shift.
Rather than reduce the number of servers during the second shift, it
was simpler to double the service time. This achieved the same effect
since it halved the output of the second shift. The work cells were
treated differently, since they were represented by individual blocks.
During the evening shifty transactions were routed only to half of the
work cell blocks (rounded higher when necessary). Transactions
remaining in the other blocks ar the end of the first shift were
allowed to complete processing through the cell.
A certain fraction of input is sent to the manual system from
the WAND station. A portion of these transactions returns to the AIDS
ITT system. The time spent in the manual system is not included in
the simulation f nor is it included in the throughput calculations for
AIDS Ill. It was not simulated because the time involved (days) was
not defined and was totally out of scale with the rest of the AIDS
ITT, functions (minutes),
Treatment of the work cells required simplification. initial
attempts at accurately simulating the entire AIDS III system with all
stations were not feasible, because the GPSS model was incapable of
simulating such a large number of transactions. One work cell was
modeled as a separate model. This was successfully done, and provided
useful statistics. The problem of how to insert a simplified version
of the work cell into the AIDS III model was addressed. This was
complicated by what has been described as the "pipeline" effect, which
can be illustrated with a few examples.
Suppose there is a system in which there are three serial work
stations. Each work station has one server and the service time
distribution is exponential, with a mean of 55 seconds. % The input to
the first work station follows a Poisson pattern with an average
arrival rate of 60 per hour. This situation is illustrated in Figure
6-1.
i
60/NR	 I SERVER	 1 SERVER	 l SERVER
MEAN SERVICE	 10 MEAN SERVICE	 NP MEAN SERVICE
TIME . 55 SECONDS	 TIME -65 SECONDS
	 TIME+* 55 SECONDS
Figure 6-1. Three Serial Work Stations
To simplify this model, an attempt was made to represent it with 	 1
a single block. To reflect the fact that a transaction goes through
three processing steps, the service time was tripled, as in Figure 6-2.
A simple simulation of this model, showed that the maximum input that
could be handled (without utilization reaching 1.0 and an infinite
queue buildup) was 21 per hour. ,Average throughput time was 2570
seconds. Clearly this simplification cannot handle the appropriate
volume of inputo,nor is the throughput accurately represented.
1 SERVER
MEAN SERVICE
TIME - 165 SECONDS
Figure 6-2. Triple Service Time
The next attempt involved tripling the service timep and also
tripling the number of servers, as shown in Figure 6-3.
60/HR
	
3 SERVERS
	
d
MEAN SERVICE'	 '-
TIME 165 SECONDS
Figure 6-3. Three Servers; Triple Service Time
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In this simplification, the benefits of a multi-server queuo are
obtained ands although the input of sixty per hour can be handled, the
average wait time and the average queue length are understated. A
simple simulation of this model yielded an average total throughput
time of 618 sacrhds.
It was finally decided to model the first block only as in
Figure 6-4.
60/HR	 I SERVER
go MEAN SERVICE
TIME 55 SECONDS
Figure 6-i4 First Block Only Modeled.
A simple si.mulu ion of this model indicated a total average throughput
time of 411 seconds. While this clearly unders mzes the average
throughput times the average queue length in front of the block will
be correct. In the case of the AIDS III model, since the work cell.
was modeled separately, throughput times are well known. By allowing
the work cells in the AIDS III model to be represented by single
blockep the mechanics of card distribution and queueing within the
work cell is accurately simulated. The understated throughput time
can later be added as a constant. Table 6-4 provides a comparison of
the original three-stage system and the three attempts to simplify it.
4.	 Work Cell Simulation
When the attempt to simulate the entire AIDS III concept failed
(due to inadequate capacity in GPSS) j it was decided to simulate the
work cell separately. Once the characteristics of the work cell were
understood, it was possible to replace each work cell, in the AIDS III
model with a single block. This simplification permitted the AIDS III
model to run successfully.
A schematic diagram of one work cell is shown in Figure 6-5.
The upper left-hand corner of each block gives the number of servers
for the function. The upper right-hand corner gives the service time
in seconds and the service time distribution (E-exponential). At the
extreme left *is the average hourly input. of 156 (one-fifteenth of the
total hourly input to all work cells). The small numbers on the lines
indicate the fractions of output from a given function when the output
can follow more than one path.
The work cell model was simulated successfully for a period of
twelve days.
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rThe average throughput times for prints going to civil files or
image comparisons (MFP hold) was 15.8 minutes. The average throughput
times for prints going to automated correspondence (AUTOCOR) or
centerline sorb (CSORT) was 21.5 minutes.
50	 Additions to Total Throughput Time
In order to simplify the AIDS III model, the time spent in the
PCN and CSORT output hoppers was omitted, In addition, the throughput
time for the work cell is understated as described in the previous
section. After a,justing for batch size, the distribution of
throughput times for the ,AIDS III simulations showed two distinct
groups: (1) those transaations which did not go through image
comparison functions (ICI and ICV) and (2) those which did. The
average time spent in the PCN output hopper is 10 minutes. The
average time spent in the CSORT output hopper is 5 minutes, and the
average throughput time for the work cell is 25 minutes. The sum of
these three times (40 minutes) was added to the throughput times for
all transactions which did not encounter a microfilm processing
delay. Nothing was added to those transactions which encountered a
processing delay, since that delay is greater than the others.
D.	 COMPUTER SUBSYSTEMS
As the final hardware configuration has not been identified and
specific equipment not selected, it was not possible to do a thorough
static capability analysis of the computer subsystems. As an alterna-
tive, a review and analysis of the proposed computer subsystem data
transfer requirements were made. It is recommended that a simplified
model of the system data flow be developed in order to assist in
determining the most effective hardware configuration for the
functiotal requirements of AIDS III as presented.
In order to scope the size and complexity of the AIDS ITT System
in terms of data flow, it waw necessary to gather and summarize the
message volumes and related record sizes that will be tranferred between
operational components and the computer subsystems.
The primary objective of this activity was not'to develop a
specific set of rates, but to analyze the size of the configuration
and scope the c:'nplexity of the data transfer invo?.ved. Changes in
volumes, card mix or inquiry ,identification rates could significantly
change these data.
j,Although the computer subsystems are not yet in the design
phase'; it is felt that sufficient data were available, to perform the
analysis necessary to scope the operational feasiblity of subsystems.
The data used for the analysis were primarily derived from Refer-
ences 1, 6 and 7,, and is detailed in Appendix D. Specific operational
component requirements are detailed in Appendix C. These requirements
are discussed below and s,mmarized in Table 6-5.
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Table 6--5. Estimated Computer Subsystem Data Transfer Requirements
Computer Subsystem	 Number of	 Number of
Messages/Hour	 Bytes/Hour
Data Entry and Display
	
23,324
	
1,529K
Image Comparison	 79277
	
185K
PCN and Image Capture	 6,144
	
37K
Subject Search and Response	 21,594
	
783K
Generation
System Supervisor
	
619221	 20055K
Technical Search	 89320	 2,614K
The computers subsystem configuration proposed will, from a
conceptual standpoint, support the AIDS III system. There are some
concerns regarding, the complexity of the configuration in network
structure, message switching, and data transfer requirements. There
also appears to be a proliferation of real-time computer system
concepts and mainframe hardware.
1.	 Data Entry and Display Subsystem
There is nothing inherent in the Data Entry and Display
Subsystem (DEDS) to preclude its operability, but the timing
requirements and input/output volumes are potential problems.
The Subsystem has'`L: a highest message transfer volume (23,324
messages per hour) of any subsystem except the System Supervisor.
While the proposed configuration of DEDS is such that the processing
is distributed over 14 Front End Processors (FEPs) it does complicate 	 {
System Supervisor activities in selectively--receiving and responding
to the same FEPs. This can be accomplished but, in order to be
effective, a proven and reliable network architecture and interface
	
1
software is required. To meet the 30-second response time proposed'
(from the VDENT operator release of search parameters to the subject
search response), the system will be demanding , but within current
technology.
The guideline to use Four Phase Equipment now in place could be
a constraint in taking advantage of current technology. Functional
requirements of DEDS should be carefully developed to ensure that the
current configuration meets the needs of the system.
4
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2. Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystem
The Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystem (SSRG)
hardware appears to be well within current technology. Although
correlating the information contained in the numerous data base files
associated with the subsystem is complex, it is readily feaeible with
current data base management technology.
3. Image Comparison Subsystem
The Image Comparison Subystem (ICS) handles microfiche location
data, This is not dissimilar to existing computer-driven systems now
commercially in use. From both a hardware and software viewpoint,
there should be no difficulty in identifying the file to be selected
and in directing the equipment to locate and retrieve it. Discussion
of the station terminal is found separately in Section V/XII.
4. Technical Search Subsystem
The Technical SP.arch Subsystem (TSS) contains a number of
specialized pieces of hardware (SARs t SPMs, AFRSs). A large volume of
minutiae data is also'nandled internally in the subsystem. The opera-
tion of the Automatic Technical. Search Pilot System (ATSPS) indicates
that the concept is feasible (see Section IX). However, the system is
expected to run at 100% CPU utilization (Reference 1, page 6-70),
which is well above the . 50y CPU utilization guidelines (Reference 1,
page 6-65). The absence of'sufficient capacity to clean up a backlog
is a potential problem. In addition, the TSS consists of more than a
purely technical (fingerprint) search. Extensive candidate filtering
is employed prior to minutiae matching. Although there appears to be
nothing inherent in the concept of this subsystem to preclude its
operability, the amount of CPU used, even with the pre-matcher candi-
date selection algorithms, could produce a throughput problem.
a
As in other computer subsystems, the j^pecific requirements of
the function must be stated and utilized whon selecting both hardware
and software. The AIDS III system should not be bound to either the
hardware or software used in the ATSPS. It must take advantage of the
advanced hardware and software techniques available at the time of
implementation and not held to the level of equipment used in testing
a concept.
5. System Supervisor
,.
The System Supervisor is the most critical aspect of the entire
AIDS III System. If it is not reliable or does not function properly,
the entire identification process will not meet its requirements or
will fail, completely. Yet, of all the subsystem concepts described in
AIDS III, the System Supervisor is the least defined. This gives the
impression that a bottom-up approach was taken in developing the AIDS
III computer subsystems. This approach usually-results in a system
that does not perform in an optimal manner.
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There are insufficient design data to state that the System
Supervisor is not conceptually viable. It may, however, end up with
more limited capabilities than stated, or be extremely costly in terms
of computer overhead as well as software development and maintenance.
a.	 Data Transfer. The main function of the System Supervisor
is that of data control. and routing. Over 61,000 messages containing
2.0 million bytes of data are to be processed by this subsystem each
hour. Many decisions based on the data source and system status will
have to be made in handling this volume level. Protocols, retrans-
mission of data, header information, equipment status, diagnostics,
etc. are additional items that will act to substantially increase the
System Supervisor work load. Various files under the control of the
System Supervisor (MTR, equipment status, queue size, management
report files) will be updated continuously and will require
significant CPU time.
The overall baud rates of the lines between the subsystems and
the System Supervisor appear to be sufficient but do not include the
equipment status, diagnostics, etc.
t,.
	
Feedback and Control. AIDS III proposes that each
subsystem, computer, and component will have a monitoring device
connected in some fashion. These devices range from very simple (an
empty hopper indicator) to very complex (switchover to a backup unit).
This segment of the AIDS III concept is not sufficiently
developed at this time to allow a realistic evaluation. Whether the
development and maintenance of the proposed feedback and control
concepts will be cost-effective has not been shown.
C.	 Monitor and Control. The system simulation package and
management report generation are also at an early stage of development
and are only discussed conceptually. Both of these subfunctions of
the System Supervisor appear to be large enough to occupy a signifi-
cant portion of the System Supervisor CPU resources. They may b e run
in the backup machines so as not to interfere with the primary CPU.
Based on JPL's experience in system simulation, sensor and system
diagnostic data gathering, and information system development, these
proposed functions are not small or uncomplicated efforts.
There is a need for monitoring to reflect card volume, card mix,
service rate, available units, and other parameter changes. The level
of complexity of the automated monitoring and control of work flow
will be an object of analysis in the second phase of the JPL study.
It appears that the devices used to distribute cards to the
cells (allocators) are a potential single point failure that would
seriously disrupt the functioning of the system. The documentation
does not adequately address the ;impact of failures in this equipment.
^x
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Id.	 Computer Architecture. Although the proposed computer
architecture is viewed.as being loosely coupled in terms of stored
data, there is a high degree of interdependency between the subsystems
and the System Supervisor. A high volume of data is transferred
between subsystems on an hourly basis (see Appendix C). Concern for
data and system independence appears to be paramount in the configur-
ation reflected in Reference 69 Figure 6-1.
Regardless of which subsystem is inoperative, the others can
only process work in the queue. If the flow rate of cards through the
system is close to the projected plan, all computer queues will be
fairly small except for the PCN and Image Capture Subsystem (PICS).
If the system works as conceived, the configuration in Reference
6, Figure 6-1, may not be cost-effective. This approach shows backup
front-end processors (PCP) and central processing units (CPUs) in a
number of areas to minimize lost processing time in event of unit
failure. This appears wasteful of CPU power, unless the second CPU
normally handles part of the work load. Half of the pr ceasing capa-
bility should not be allowed to remain idle for any othuirr purpose than
to substitute in the event of a malfunction. If the total system is
procured at the same time a commonality of CPU model and vendor can
result, and a minimum of "spare' s
 mainframes can be installed to back
up the entire AIDS equipment complex. Even if some CPUs are forced
into a larger model, the resulting flexibility could lead" to
substantial economies and improvements in performance.
A primary item missing in the system concept is a definitive set
of design requirements for the computer subsystems. The AIDS III
System, the hardware configuration development and the-ultimate vendor
selection would benefit if a set were developed. These requirements
would address what has to' be done in terms of function, data volumes
and reliability rather than how it is. to be done. The present level
of architectural detail is too limiting to encourage a free and open
response from industry. A good set of system design requirements
related to data capture, processing, and response must also be
developed. The development of functional requirements for the AIDS
III System would.permit uninhibited configurations and responses from
industry.
Much more work is required on the System Supervisor. Its
design, implementation and .relationship to the other subsystems will
be a critical point in determining the success or failure of AIDS
III. Given that a computer (of- some reasonable .size) can handle the
projected work loads, the major problem will not be hardware
performance, but rather its cost and the cost to develop the
associated software and networking. Until specific functional and
design requirements are developed, the-.efficiency, effectiveness and
costs of the subsystem cannot be realistically stated. The System
Supervisor will be a complicated system to develop and maintain,
requiring an extremely competent design approach.
T
i
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In developing a configuration to support AIDS III, it may be
very beneficial to build a model of the data flow. This would not only
assist in developing of data transfer requirements but could also
assist in the selection of a cost-effective hardware configuration.
e. Subsystem Interfaces and Protocol. The interdependency of
the subsystems and System Supervisor, and the transfer requirements
from the data source points, through one subsystem, to the System
Supervisor, to another subsystem does not fully support the loosely
coupled concept. The usefulness of the loosely coupled and distri-
buted architecture is reduced in direct proportion to the
interdependency of the subsystem for data gathered in other
subsystems. Although physically separated, all of the subsystems are
logically tied very tightly together. In the development of loosely
coupled or distributed information/data processing systems, software
and interface protocols sometimes are not given the attention
required. Just as each of the machines must have hardware to connect
to other machines, there also has to be software to support these
interfaces.
Data handling varies significantly depending on its source
format, use, etc. Software will be required to handle data routing
decisions once transfer by the hardware is complete. As the number of
machines and interfaces increases, so does the software necessary to
handle the data. The aoare machines (especially front-end processors)
involved in transferring data from one operational component to the
subsystem that needs the data, the more these hardware and software
handlers are involved. A large amount of system resources could be
expended in just passing and checking this information from one
computer to another. Since a large portion of the AIDS III system
deals with transferring data from one computer system to another, this
concept and its associated problems should be carefully evaluated.
Any simplification and/or reduction in the number of computers needed
in a particular path should be encouraged. So long as any portion of
the network depends on the output of another, multicomputer systems
become more vulnerable to malfunctioning as they become more complex.
All protocols, line interfaces, etc. that are used in AIDS III
should be purchased, not developed in-house. Standard sets are
readily available through suppliers. The ability to upgrade hardware
and take advantage of new technologies is always desirable. Nonstand-
ard` interfacing can preclude cost-effective hardware and software
upgrades. In -house development generally brings higher initial
costs, maintenance costs, and time delays. Unless there is a
demonstrated need to do otherwise, commercially available products
should be used. There will generally be a reduction in system
implementation lead time corresponding directly to the amount of
off-the-shelf hardware/software that is purchased.
f. Diagnostics. The use of vendor-supplied diagnostics to 	 4
facilitate hardware/software repair should not be overlooked. The
expense of implementing these is clearly dependent on the machines and
I,
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system software utilized. Some of these, particularly CPU to CPU
signaling, have proven quite difficult to implement in some of the
systems used to process telemetry data from JPL flight projects.
The executing of on-line diagnostics seems to imply that the
processing functions of the system need to shut down before running
diagnostics. Periodic system checks should be designed so that
potential faults can be identified without disturbing overall system
j	 function until. necessary (such as replacing a failed piece of gear or
j	 reloading a computer). For nonstandard or special terminals, fault
l	
isolation methods should be an important element in their design.
[	 Some system of self-initiated diagnostic routines, standard checks and
fault recovery is essential. Fully-automatic monitoring and corrective
action can become complex and unreliable. Activities such as running
diagnostics, isolating problems, and switching around failing units
should probably remain under control of human operators. As proposed,
the presence of on-site spare parts and experienced maintenancej	 personnel are essential.
a
SECTION VII
AVAILABILITY
The availability (i.e., the probability that the equipment will
be able to perform its function when required) of the operational
components and related subsystems of AIDS III directly reflects the
ability of the system to meet its requirements. In the Technical
Memo, "Major Component MTBF/MTTR Summary and Availability Design Coal"
(Reference 24), Rockwell only discusses hardware and equipment Mean-
Time-Between-Failures and Mean-Time-to-Repair of major deliverable
assemblies purchased from various equipment manufacturers. Opera-
tional and software aspects of availability and related problems are
not addressed.
The Mean-Time-Between-Failures (MTBF) and Mean-Time-to-Repair
values acquired by Rockwell are from many different sources. Some
data was obtained from documented references, while other sources were
identified as being informal correspondence between Rockwell and the
equipment manufacturers. Data collected by Rockwell over the past few
,years from other programs and predictions based on MIL-HDBK -217
 
were
also used (Reference 24). It is not clear, however, which data are
from which source. Data sources were provided only for the film
viewers. the Automatic Fingerprint Reader System, and the Four Phase
Data Entry equipment.
The maintenance data for each operational component as reflected
in Appendix A, Operational Component Summary, do not include related
computer subsystems (including the System Supervisor) or transportation
system availability. The rationale for this is discussed below.
The component unit availabilityp ranging from 0.9737 to 0.9997,
did not significantly affect the simulation model results for the
overall system. However, when the effect of 'a single unit failure on
the throughput capability of an operational component was computed,
there were some significant areas of concern (discussed in detail in
Section VI)
It has been JPL's experience that figures provided by equipment
vendors tend to be quite optimistic, and records of operation rarely
support their original optimism. Therefore, the numbers in the system
concept should be viewed skeptically and considered on a "best case"
basis until specific hardware has been identified and empirical data
can be presented,
A.	 MAINTENANCE POLICY
The original maintenance data presented in Reference 24 did not
	 !,
reflect response time (i.e., time between failure identification and
beginning of repair). Rockwell iiter estimated response time to be
1.0 hour in all cases. It was assumed that the hardware main-tenance
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personnnel will be properly trained and on site (Reference 25).
Rockwell's estimates were derived from failure data in Reference 24,
and on predicted failure rates of equipment used in the AIDS It
system. The number of failures expected for a 90% confidence level
were then calculated.
The hardware maintenance staffing considerations are based on
the establishment of a qualified maintenance force consisting of:
M 2 stockroom clerks.
(2) 2 electronic technicians - repair failed boards.
(3) 9 electronic technicians - system level repair.
I	 (4)	 3 electromechanical technicians - treijsport system repair.
This crew would maintain and repair highly sohisC,C r,ted computer
hardware systems f the conveyor belt transport t v n system and related
elements.
B	 OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS
To determine whether the system was able to handle the required
throughput ! single unit component availability based on Reference 24
data was computed for each operational component. This computed
availability (detailed in Appendix A, Operational Component Summary)
was introduced as a factor in determining the service rates in the
dynamic simulation model.
The results of JPL studies of the availability of the Automatic
Fingerprint Reader Systems (AFRS) and the process control, number
machines (PCN)', while different from Rockwell's estimates, did not
substantially affect the ability of the AIDS III System to perform the
fingerprint identification process in a given period of time. In the
case of the PCNs, Rockwell estimated 0.9906 availability while JPL's 	 j
Study showed 0.9813. For the AFRSs, Rockwell estimated 0.9943 (exclu-
ding processors) while JPL's study revealed 0.9882 availability.
Since the source was empirical, JPL data were used for the dynamic	 x
simulation model. The JPL studies are discussed in Appendix H, Study
of AFRS and PCN Availability.
Introduction of an availability factor in both the static
analysis and dynamic simulation model for operational components did 	 f
not materially affect their ability to meet system throughput require	 t
ments.
Ak.
C.	 COMPUTER SUBSYSTEMS
Computer subsystem availability could have a significant effect
on the ability of the AIDS III to meet its performance requirements.
While today's processors and data storage devices development have
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lgreatly improved computer reliability, subsystems reliability will vary
significantly between vendors. The hardware configuration will also
affect system availability. The snare networking, electromechanical
operations and single point failures, the greater the chance of system
failure. In selecting the final vendor and hardware configuration,
reliability should be a major consideration, Beyond the period of
equipment infant mortality, the reliability of the computer subsystem
proposed should have minimal effect on the availability of operational
components. Furthermore, Rockwell has proposed that each computer
subsystem include a spare processor, available for immediate replace-
ment in case of prime system failure.
A more thorough analysis of computer subsystem availability
should be made when specific hardware is proposed. With present
hardware reliability, there is no indication that availability rates
will adversely affect the operational feasibility of AIDS III.
D. OPERATIONAL AND SOFTWARE FAILURE
In reviewing hardware availability, a lack of concern as to the
impact of operational and software failures on the system must be
noted. Based on JPL's experience with state of the art systems,
avai lab lity of the overall system is more affected by operational and
software failures than by hardware failure. These items are not
sufficiently addressed in the ,AIDS III System Concept when discussing
availability.
Additional failure and maintenance data related to software and
technician failure are required for a realistic picture of system
availability. Experience at J PL has shown that random software and
operational failures do occur after the start-up phase of any data
system, and are an important factor in the availability and reliabil-
ity of a system of this size.
E. SENSITIVITY TO EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
The AIDS III design is sensitive to equipment availability in
three cases if the component availability falls below 93% (see Table
7-1), This is a potential problem that can be solved by adding a
processing margin where required.
Table 7-1, AIDS III Sensitivity to Equipment Availability
Availability Estimated
Wo, k Station Used for Minimum
Simulation Availability*
PCN 0.9906 0,6102
MFILM 0.9996 0.8152
WAND 0.9986 0.6608
WORK CELL 1.0000 0.9356
AFRS 0.9882 0,8607
SAR 1.0000 0.7874
SEAR 0.9997 0.9136
ICI 0.9972 0.9425
ICV 0.9972 0.9058
AUTOCOR 1.0000 0.9541
*At the indicated availability rates, utilization would
reach 1.0.
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SECTION VIII
COMPONENT OPERABILITY
The object of this portion of the evaluation was to determine at
the component level if the AIDS III. concept is operationally feasible
in three major areas: 1) fingerprint card processing, 2) document
processing; and 3) computer subsystems. In the course of the evalua-
tion, many questions arose concerning design details, specific opera-
tional functions and data handling. Because of the complexity of this
system and the scope of evaluation in both level of detail and re-
sources, only the conceptual questions that impact the overall system
operability have been included in this report. Many detail design
questions arose and are discussed in Volume II. An assumption was
made that these would be addressed and resolved at the appropriate
time in the design phase since feasible solutions are known to exist.
A.	 FINGERPRINT CARD PROCESSING
There is no evidence to suggest that the individual operational
c6mponents described in the AIDS III concept will not work as pro-
poned. The arcs- of concern are: 1) operational complexity, 2) the
status of work station development and hardware integration of func-
tions, and 3' ) the lack of conceptual data for some functions, These
concerns are discussed in this Section.
1. Automated Correspondence (AUTOCOR)
There is a lack of definition of the operations and functions
that take place in. this subsystem. The available information is
sketchy and appears to assume that the functions now taking place in
related activities in the current system will continue under AIDS
'III. How this transition is to be accompli.sheri is not clear. AIDS
III has work flow and computer system interfaces significantly differ-
ent from the current operation. Additional development of the system
concept for this function is needed.
2. Automated Response Generation (AUTORESP)
This function is insufficiently detailed by the concept documen-
tation. It is described at a more general level than most other
:Functions. The process of response generation appears to be taken for
granted. Discussion of the procedure and software to be used in
support of this function is insufficient, and must be developed
further. ;t
ii
3.	 Classification A, S and Classification Check (CLASS A, B and
CLCK)
The AIDS III document (Reference 1 page 6-19) recommend# a
special terminal as the best data entry device for the classification
(CLASS A and B) and classification check (CLCK) functions. The
rationale for this decision is stated in Reference 1. It is not dear'
that a special terminal is a cosh-effective design for the o func-
tions. AIDS III procedures still require that the classification be
written on the fingerprint card. Consequently, the operator is
required to perform two steps in the automated system, where only one
is required by the manual system. Also t the operator is riqu red to
have two unrelated skills: fingerprint classification and data
entry. As suggested by Rockwell in Reference I, in-depth studies are
strongly recommended prior to committing to this concept.
An alternate approach might be to mark the card at the classifi-
cation work station, then enter all classification data at the data
entry station. Eliminating a special terminal would save development
expense, as well as the cost of the 224-plus terminals themselves. It
would also reduce related computer subsystem hardware, storage and
processing requirements.
The fingerprint classification and classification check func-
tions proposed by AIDS III support three i.ndi.vidual. tasks: 1) finger-
print analysis and classification, 2) classification data entry, and
3) classification data entry verification. There are areas, however,
that impact the productivity and cost effectiveness of the function
and the ability of the classifier to perform the ,job well. These
areas include closure, compatibility, error detecting, learning, ,job
variety and economics.
As presently conceived: there are two alternatives proposed for
handling the classification and classification data entry functions.
The first is a one-position approach, where the classification techni-
cian classifies each fingerprint and keys a classification into a data
entry terminal. The second is a two-position approach separating the
classification task from the data entry/verification task (which
exists for other data entry requirements as well).
The structure .)f the card flow in separating the classification
functions into two separate modes in the system, and the location of 	 C
the classification check function in relationship to data entry and
verification,, do not make the selection of either of these two alter-
natives as clear-cut as might first appear. It is recommended that
additional design and testing be performed before commitment to a
special classification terminal is made.
On the surfaces the one-position approach seems to provide
increased error detection by the data entry task. However, it may not
be as cost-effective. it can,also presont an obstacle to learning the
job. No special advantage or disadvantage is seen for closure, job
variety or job skill, However t the mixing of two dissimilar skills
can be detrimental to productivity,
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The two-position approach may be more economical and easier in
the training area. There scam to be some advantages when discussing
skill levels and job variety. An apparent disadvantage of this
approach is in error detection. This can be mi tigated by the classi-
fication verification work stntionr which is expected to uncover data
errors as well as classification errors.
of specific concern in the class of job variety is whether or not
the classification technician would welcome relief from the classi-
fying activity when entering data or whether this would be seen as a
burden. The capabilities for this position most be determined at the
classification level and not at the data entry level. This also means
that the technician would be required to learn to manipulate the
terminal at a fairly rapid pace.
Fingerprint card ;flow through the system for clasci(ication data
entry (CLASS A and CLASS E) and classification check (CLCK) should be
reevaluated to determine the feasibility of the special classification
terminal. Some consideration might be .given to eliminating terminals
at the CLASS A function (having terminals only at the CLASS 8 and CLCK
functions).
If a decision to use a special classification terminal is mad_a^
several aspects of the proposed work station design are of concern.
The recommended keyboard has some obvious problems. The physical
layout is most appropriate for a hunt-and-peck operating style, and is
not conducive to easy finger movement in a quick -response, touch-
typing style. There is no backspace key for ch4 actett corrections.
The number sequencing is inverted, compared to the us + al calculator or
computer terminal, keyboard. The "Enter" key is in an'awkward posi-
tion, and the "Clear Card" key is next to the "Card Cowplete" key. A
small error in singer reach could cause an entire card entry to be
lost. The same concern applies to the "Clear Entry" key, which is
next to the "Add Reference" key.
A detailed discussion of these concerns can be found in Appendix
F "
 Special Classification Terminal.
A third solution, which is beyond the scope of this report but
which will be addressed in the final JPL report, is to automate
classification by designing a system that does not require Henry
classification at all.
4.	 Centerline Sort ( CSORT)
The proximity of this function to the Automatic Fingerprint'
Reader System (AFRS) function is a consideration, since it is proposed
that the cards be carried to the AFRS via a conveyor belt, where they
are stacked awaiting manual, withdrawal by the AFRS operator. If, for
safety or facility reasons "
 the AFRS® are located in a separate room
or location " the conveyor belt mode of transportation may be restric-
ted (see Section XII, Facilities).
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5.	 Data Entry and Data Entry Verification-Cards (DENT-A and VDENT-A)
The primary concern as to operability of the data entry (DENT-A)
and data entry verification (VDENT-A) functions is whether problems
similar to those encountered in the development and implementation of
AIDS II will apply to AIDS III.
Initial attempts to interact with the host computer, in AIDS II
were not successful due to insufficient file size and the throughput
limitations of the host computer. The inability of the AIDS II system
to hold unprocessed data beyond a preset length of time created a
problem in its implementation. it is recognized that the original
AIDS II host computer was ol.d, unreliable and employed only because of
budget cons'^!,raints_.
The AIDS III design,is based on the functional requirements for
AIDS II, and calls for a data entry/verify concept that is similar,
but on a smaller scale (storing of search data only). Because of work
backlogs resulting in file overflows, this methodology of saving the
search data was abandoned. Search parameters are entered to make the
subject search, but not verified. The same data is later reentered
and verified when an identification has been made and the file will be
updated. The inability of the data base- file management system to
respond to the overflow caused by the backlog in the existing AIDS II
system, along with the slow response caused by an overloaded host
computer, resulted in a decision to take additional data entry steps.
A main concern of the evaluation team in the feasibility of the DENT-A
and VDENT-A functions is not their specific operational capability,
but rather the ability of the proposed sysvQm to handle file overloads
and work backlogs ok this nature. Data baeo file structures and
hardware configurations must be flexible and expandable enough to meet
these types of occurrences. (See Section X, for additional comments
on data base management.)
I
r
In a system of the scale of the current AIDS II, the impact of
redundant data entry is not significant, compared to not being able to
process stored data. Under the expected AIDS III workload, duplicate
data being entered into the system would have a serious effect on
processing time and costs.
The ability of the Four Phase front end processors (FEP) to
perform to the level proposed in the AIDS III Data Entry and Display
Subsystem is also a concern, Currently, between 20--29 terminals are
connected to each Four Phase FEP. AIDS III proposes that 31 terminals
will interface with each CPU. Assuming that the search parameters and
arrest data volume per message remain consistent with those curron'tly
used, improvements inthe software or additional hardware will be
required to meet the proposed aystem specifications.
Another concern in the operability of DENT-A and VDENT-A is the
sequence of the data as it is entered from the card. Under some
circumstances (multiple offenses), it is necessary to turn,the card
over a number of times for the data. It is recommended that further
analysis of this - potential problem be made and a redesign of the screen
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format be considered. The screen format should reflect the needs of
the data entry operator rather than emphasize ease of data handling
for the computer.
6. Film Processing (FLAB)
The effect of a backlog at the Film Processing function (FLAB),
caused by simultaneous film delivery from the microfilm reader sta-
tions (MFLM), is of concern to Rockwell. This is addressed in Refer-
ence 1 1 pages 18 and 19. It is not clear how the figures on page 19
were derived or what steps will be taken to avoid this problem. While
it is stated that the possibility of a backlog is reduced by having
two processors in the lab, the effects of one being down or of an
uneven work flow should be addressed in more detail. This could
present a significant bottleneck in the system, as the microfiche	 }
processing is on the critical path in the identification process.
The handling of fingerprint cards requiring refilming due to
processing problems is not addressed. This problem could develop into
a complex control situation in locating and recycling the cards
involved. The Master Transaction Record (MTR) will be the focal point
for this control. Quality control requirements in the film processing
laboratory were not fully addre ssed. The film processing activity
must be constantly monitored with microscopes and densitometers.
7. Image Comparison Identification and Verification (ICI and ICV)
The Image Comparison Identification and Verification (ICI and
ICV) functions have the same possible operational problems. While
these stations have not yet been developed and are of a conceptual
nature, it is reasonable to assume that they can be developed. What
is of concern, however, is the criticality of the need for clarity in
reading fingerprints. The use of ultrafiche at 2000 images/fiche
requires tremendous magnification when reading "%e image. Focus and
ambient.. dust become significant operational problems. A visit to the
s_
	
	
Montrose, California, Directory Information Office of the Pacific
Telephone Company demonstrated this problem. They are using MDS
ultrafiche storage and retrieval systems (the same vendor and concept
proposed for the FBI). In their system of 200 images/fiche, dust
definitely presents a problem. AIDS III will have 2000 images/fiche.
The JPL Photography Laboratory has a similar problem with microfiche
and finds it necessary use electrostatic air cleaners. Before a full
commitment to this approach is made, a prototype should be„developed
and thoroughly tested to prove the concept.
c;
j
	
	 In addition, special lighting arrangements will be required to
reduce eye fatigue. Current operations of a similar nature, with less
and critical comparison and reading requirements, are equipped with
controlled lighting. This may require the construction of a separate
work area.
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i8. Semi-Automatic Reader (SAR)
The prototype seems fairly awkward to operate, and the cursor
positioning seems time-consuming.	 Over the workday, eye fatigue may
become a problem and a special room with controlled lighting will
probably be necessary to alleviate eyestrain.
Using a trackball to position the cursor seems to limit the
speed of the operation (and hence the a^-uracy). 	 Special handling
and use of the SARs could become a limit±2q;",factor in the success of
an automated technical search for some carU::w^ 	 A very small increase
in poor quality prints (e.$., 5 per hour) can easily overload the
capability of the SARs.,, The basic assumption '.hat only 3% of the
cards from the AFRS will be rejects may be optimistic or at best
highly variable (see Section VI).
Another approach would be to use a light pen and CRT capable of
recording the X-Y coordinates designated by the operator.	 Each
minutia is touched with the light pen and its X-Y coordinates are
automatically recorded by the computer. 	 The direction of the minutiae
can also be entered with this efficient, human-engineered technique.
9.	 Search Review (SEAR)
The functions and decision processes required of the SEAR
operator are rather complex.	 The function will require concentration,
reliability, accuracy, and detailed knowledge of the entire system by
the operator, in addition to a high eye/hand coordination in routing
the card to one of seven future operations. 	 In 15% of the cases, the
SEAR operator must assign and verify an FBI number for new cards being
added to the file.
i
It will require quick response for an operator to sustain a rate
of 150 cards/hour,	 The review of data on two CRT screens with differ-
ent formates, along with various hand operations (data entry, handling t
the PCN wand reader, and card sorting) gives the impression of a
highly sophisticated operation requiring a great degree of concentra-
tion, ability and dexterity.
,k
The handling of cards whose print images have not yet been
f
processed through the image comparison functions (ICI and ICV) is not
addressed.	 At SEAR, there is a real potential for card handling and r
storage problems.
The SEAR physical console is conceptual at this time, although
Rockwell states that its design will utilize standard components. 	 The
implementation of such a console could be.-complex.	 A prototype of the
dual screen SEAR console work station should be developed to thoroughly
test the operational concepts proposed. 	 In general, the SEAR function
still is only a concept and requires significant additional
development,
10.	 Wand Out of System (WAND)
The use of a hand wand reader in addition to keyboard data entry
appears to be an awkward combination. A significant loss of efficiency
and accuracy may be caused by combining card handling, keyboard entry
and wand manipulation. A stationary optical character reader and
associated keyboard may permit greater productivity and accuracy in
this function.
B.	 DOCUMENT PROCESSING
There are three major areas of concern regarding the AIDS III
concept design for processing documents other than fingerprint cards.
They are:
(1) Omission of key functions.
(2) Location of work stations not documented.
(3) High number of documents returned to manual systems.
With 14,500* documents a day to be processed, this portion of the AIDS
III system requires much more attention that it has received thus
far. These areas of concern are discussed below.
1.	 Omission of Key Functions
The documentation stops at the point at which miscellaneous
documents and dispositions are used to initiate a subject search
(Reference 7, page 6). No functional blocks are described for later
processing, particularly where an identification or a file update
would be performed. The handling of dispositions and some miscella-
neous documents requires both an identification and file update step.
Final disposition reports (FDRs) are sent to the FBI Identifica-
tion Division as a result of the action of _a court. In many cases,
the offense that an individual is convicted of and sentenced under by
the court is not the offense he was arrested for. This makes it
difficult for the FBI to match the offense on the FDR to the offense
in their records. ,Compounding this problem is the tendency for the
date on the FDR not to match the date reported on the arrest record
*Reference 42, page 12, projects a daily processing volume of 22,000`
in 1993. This is in conflict with ID Division Guidelines, Reference
23 page 3 and other Rockwell documents (i.e., Reference 7, pa'g
which specify 14,500 documents per day. See Appendix I for other'
discrepancies.
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Under the current AIDS II system, the FBI requests a "proof list" of
offenses within a 30-day window of the date cited on the disposition
to compensate for this situation.	 This proof list is printed out, 	 In
the case of an FDR with a contributor-quoted FBI number, one proof
listing is printed.	 In cases where no FBI number is supplied, proof
listings are printed for all candidates found as a result of a subject
search.	 Both types of requests could be initiated from the data entry
functions (DENT-B and VDENT °-B).	 Up to this point, the AIDS III
concept will accommodate this process.
Under the current AIDS II system, an identification process is
run once the proof listings arrive at the appropriate work stations. i
The FBI must be sure that the person described in the FDR is the same, a
person found in their file, with or without an FBI number.
	
This
identification process is analogous to the identification process used
with fingerprint cards. 	 However, in the case of FDRs, physical
characteristics (e.g., color of hair, eyes, etc.) and other FBI
acceptable data (e.g., date of birth, Social Security number, etc,),
are used.
	
Once the identification process has been completed, match-
ing must be performed.	 In this procedure, the acquittal, conviction,
and/or sentencing data on the FDR is matched with the-,arrest data on
the AIDS II-generated proof list.	 After the offense and disposition
data are matched, a file update transaction is coded, key entered and
key verified.	 A similar series of steps is followed in response to
correspondence requesting a correction to the FBI files,
None of the steps described above ( identification, matching,
file update -date entry or file update -verify) are covered in the AIDS
III concept.
2.	 Location of Work Stations Not Documented
In the Rockwell documentation, a great deal of discussion is
directed toward the work cell and alternative methods of optimally
a
allocating facilities for the processing of fingerprint cards (Refer-
ences 1 and 8).	 Very little is said about the facilities for proces-
sing documents.
	 For example, in Reference 1, a floor plan is shown
r	 which accommodates everything except the PCN machines and image
capture machines . . . the latter items are assumed to be located near
r	 the mail room, which is assumed to be on another floor" ( Reference 1,
page 119).	 In Reference 8, page 28, the PCN machines are shown to be
Located with the card processing work clusters.
	
It is not clear in
either document if these include PCN devices used to process docu-
ments.	 It is doubtful that they are, yet it is not specifically
documented one way or the other.
The same problems are found with the locations of other document
E,	 processing units.	 While the quality control check, read, annotate
(READ) and encoding (ENCDOC) functions are said to be grouped together
into cells, their locations cannot be found on any floor plan.
	 At the
same time, the location of encode checking function (ENDOCK)	 which
should be located with READ and ENCDOC, is not discussed.
r^
^.
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3.	 Abnormal Number of Documents Returned to Manual System
According to the designp over 93% of the documents processed by
AIDS III will be sent on to the manual system after the automated sub-
ject search. If we were to include the omitted functions discussed in
paragraph 1, we would have to expect that the design would still
direct the vast majority of documents into the manual system. This is
in direct variance with the current AIDS II/manual system.
I
Since dispositions make up 67% of the daily arrivals of docu-
ments projected for AIDS III in 1993 0
 they would make up the large
majority of those going back into the manual system. Currently, the
disposition notices are simply thrown away after being used as an
update to an automated or manual, record. We have no documentation to
suggest that this policy is expected to change. Therefore, it remains
unexplained as to why the bulk of these forms is to be sent into the
manual system under AIDS III.
!
j	 C.	 COMPUTER SUBSYSTEMS
i
All of the subsystems have some degree of interdependency. If
there is a failure or degradation of one subsystem, most of the other
subsystems will be affected. Naturally, the further down-line the
problem, the less the effects (other than the backing up of queues)
are felt
There are two conditions that have an immediate effect on a
subsystem throughput. The first occurs when the System Supervisor is
down or in a degraded mode. All functions in AIDS III will be degraded
or cease functioning altogether.
The second condition occurs when a subsystem itself is in a de-
graded mode or down. This has the effect of drastically slowing or
stopping all work in-a subsystem except the totally manual operations
(Blocking Out, QC Check, etc.). The queues will build in direct
proportion to the amount of degradation involved. The degradation of
a subsystem will also have an effect on the other subsystems directly
related to it. This means that subsystems feeding data to the
degraded subsystem would be affected, as well as those subsystems
receiving data from the degraded subsystem.
1.	 System Supervisor (SS)
The System Supervisor is the focal point of the entire informa-
tion processing system associated with AIDS III. Since the System
Supervisor is the message controller and router, none of the sub-
systema can communicate with any of the other subsystems if the System
Supervisor fails. Under this condition, the entire AIDS III systcm , ` P':
inoperative. These can be a limited amount of processing accom 	 'j
plished, i.e., the Four Phase equipment can continue to be used for
data entry, with verification data written out to tape. However,
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ias no card routing can be accomplished, queues will build up at the
data entry/verification functions. 	 The System Supervisor has most of
the aspects of a real-time system controller.
	
It does not route the
cards automatically, but through instructions to people ' and does not
optically read the PCN at most stations.	 Effects of a System Super--
visor failure on management reports and the simulation model are
recoverable, provided the data required is retained at the initiating
subsystem until the System Supervisor is operational.
2.	 Process Control. Number and Image Capture Subsystem (PICS)
i
The PIC subsystem is the initial controlling subsystem for AIDS
III.	 The maximum rate at which cards can be processed through AIDS,,I11
corresponds directly to the rate at which the cards go through PIGS.
No processing can be started (other than opening and sorting the mail)
until a process control number is assigned and both the Master Trans- dI'	 action Record (MTR) and Transaction Record (TR) are created.	 If the
j-	 PIC subsystem is run in a degraded mode, the cards will not be avail-
able for down-line processing at the expected rate.	 If the subsystems
down-line are degraded, the PIC subsystem can still be run at full
capacity with an accompanying increase in down-line queues.
3.	 Data Entry and Display Subsystem (DEDS)`
fingerprint classification, wand-out, and data entry func- FThe
tions are all part of the DEDS subsystem. 	 Any up-line degradation has
the immediate effect of a reduction in card flow to these functions.
Without the classifications and data entry (DENT or WENT) functions,
'	 the cards cannot be processed by any of the down-line subsystems. 	 A `	 e
degradation in DEDS has a minor impact on the wand-out (WAND) func-
tion.	 All of the cards going through WAND are either being removed
from the system to be routed for manual processing or returned to the
contributor.	 The impact is felt in the delay in printing responses
and in getting some of the wanded-out cards to the manual system
(approximately 70% return to the AIDS III system at a later date).
The impact at search review (SEAR) results in a delay in pro-
ceasing the response generation, rerouting of cards for a technical
searches, re-searching, and final disposition routing.
	 There will be
an accumulation of data in the search statistics file, update files, , l
and response files because there will be no authorizations for updates
processed.
	
This filesize overload must be considered. 	 DEDS is `
critical for the timely processing of cards through the classification
and data entry functions, while at WAND it is only marginally criti-
cal.	 At SEAR, the impact is primarily in the release of cards from
the system.
8	
'`0
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1G.	 Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystem (SSRG)
The SSRG subsystem is a critical entity of AIDS Ill. The subject
search must be completed prior to routing the cards from the VDENT
operation. Without knowing if a candidate was located, the card
cannot be processed. The degradation of the SSRG has a serious effect
on card flow and all interfaces with the TR fife. Technical search
and image comparison data cannot be processed when the SSRG is down.
5. Technical Search Subsystem (TSS)
The TSS has less of an impact on the overall AIDS III system be-
cause it handles no data transfers except those directly relating to
the technical search function, and processes fewer cards than the
REDS, PICS or SSRG subsystems. The degradation of this subsystem
does, however, cauta a backlog in the Automatic and Semi-Automatic
Fingerprint Reader functions (AFRS and SAR). As the AFRS function has
some ability to separately store its results until, the TSS subsystem
is operational, the backlog here can be minimized. Since this sub-
system and some components are running at a CPU-utilization of 100%
(Ref. 1, p. 6-70), there is no excess capacity to work off the queue
build-up without scheduling overtime. The other subsystem affected
directly by a degradation in the TSS is the Image Comparison Subsystem
(ICS). Feuer than normal image comparison requests will be generated
until the TSS is fully operational. As the image comparison and
verification functions (ICI and ICV) are running at near capacity, a
surge from the TSS will require overtime in ICI and ICV (and probably
SEAR) if the backlog is to be reduced.
6. Image Comparison Subsystem (ICS)
A degradation of the Image Comparison Subsystem (ICS) will have
the 'least effect on other subsystems and down-line functions. This
subsystem does the final verification of a candidate match. The input
is a result of either a subject or technical search resulting ; in the
identification of one or more candidates. A degradation of the ICS
will cause the queues at search review (SEAR) to build. There can be
no rerouting of cards or response generation, etc. from SEAR until the
ICS results are complete. All of the other subsystems can function
more or less independently from the ICS, providing those interfacing
with ICS can store the d.ate-try be processed until ICS is operational.
ORIGINAL PAGE
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rSECTION IX
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C;
SEARCH. PERFORMANCE
A.	 AUTOMATED SUBJECT SEARCH
Automated subject search is a generic designation for the
process of identifying and retrieving, in an on-line mode, a subject's
record based on personal identification alone.
1.	 Evaluation
The performance of a subject search is evalutated in terms of
its accuracy and reliability in making identifications or finding a
candidate who will be positively identified. The FBI has required
that the AIDS III Subject Search perform with a lower miss rate than
the current manual name search (Reference 23). Ll order to make this
evaluation, the current AIDS II Automated Name Search (ANS) was
studied.
The AN$ was designed for two reasons:
(1) To evaluate the performance of an automated search based
on name and descriptive information.
(2) To use this evaluation as a basis for estimating the
performance of the automated subject search for AIDS III.
The performance evaluation of subject search is based on AIDS II
Volume Test results (Reference 44) which are summarized in Table 9-1
The results indicate that the subject search does perform better than
the manual name search.
The second purpose of the ANS (providing a basis for estimating
the performance of the AIDS III Subject Search) is impractical, since
the current ANS system is too unstable to permit any final conclu-
sions. Prior to June 16, 1980, the AN$ unit was accepting only those
searches that could be handled in a day. No queue was allowed to
build up. After that date, all inquiries qualifying for a subject
search sere routed to the ANS unit. Full implementation of the auto-
mated subject search was hampered by the Identification Division's
inability to hire qualified people, software reliability problems and
the limited capacity of the hardware used. The capacity problem was
partially resolved by an upgrade of the computer hardware. The
software is still being modified. The problem of hiring qualified
people is not easily solved, and it appears that it will be a contin-
uing factor.
Given the similarities between the ANS and the AIDS III design,
it appears that the accuracy and reliability of the subject search
will be superior to the.manual name search. Although there are decided
differences between the two systems, there is nothing to prevent the
subject search from being operationally feasible.
zit
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2.	 Basis of Evaluation
In addition to the volume test resultrx, the evaluation was based
on a number of observations of the manual name search and the AIDS 11
Automated Name Search,
It has been observed that the manual system conducts searches
for potential candidates in the following environment:
(a) The master file is composed of 3 by 5 inch file cards
containing the name. and full fingerprint classification of
each person represented in the criminal. file, plus any
aliases which have been used.
(b) The searches are conducted entirely by hand, and Are based
upon the names appearing on the fingerprint card. The	 I
accuracy of each search is dependent upon the individual
capabilities of the clerk making the search.
(c) The update of the master file is manual as well, making
the integrity of the master file dependent upon the
timeliness and accuracy of the update.
{d) The only index to the file is the name and sex appearing
on the fingerprint ward, If more than one file curd has
the same name, primary and secondary fingerprint classifi-
cations are used for greater discrimination.
(e) A separate search must be conducted for each alias indica-
ted on the fingerprint card.
The design of the AIDS III Automated Subject Search is similar
to the original, design of the AIDS 11 Automated Name Search and
Automated Correspondence functions in several ways:
(a) Data entry screen formats and identification record re-
sponses are substantially identical- to those implemented
in AIDS 11.
(b) All significant data elements being captured from the
fingerprint cards and documents will continue to be
captured in AIDS III.
(c) The four existing query types (i.e., disposition, contri-
buting agency, process control numbers and miscellaneous)
that are in use in AIDS II are sufficient for AIDS III.
I	
(d)	 Specifications for the AIDS III Subject Search are based
on the functional requirements for ANS in AIDS II. It
therefore appears that the search algorithms will be
carried over to the AIDS III Subject Search.
f	
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There are several significant ways in which the AIDS III Subject
Search will differ from the AIDS II Automated Name Search:
(a) Even though the algorithms to be used in the search will
be the save, the application programs will most likely be
rewritten due to hardware and software differences,
(b) File updating will be on-line in AIDS III, where it In
batched in AIDS II.
(c) The AIDS III design concept is assuming that the existing
C'U loading problem can be resolved to efficiently service
32 terminals per Four Phase Controller. Currently, 31 CRTs
and one printer are being serviced by one controller in
the ANS unit. The other controllers serve 20 to 29 CRTs.
(d) In 1993 9 the Subject Search master file will be 3.37 times
as large as the current file (14.5 million compared to 4.3
million). A reorganization of the name index is planned
to keep degradation of response time due to this growth to
a minimum. Rockwell has estimated that the CPU time
required for a search will increase by a ratio of 2.80
when the file has grown 3.37 times (Reference 21, page 11).
(e) The file structures that will be utilized in AIDS III have
not been determined. All indications are that a file
reorganization will be necessary. The file structure will
be dependent upon the hardware selected, the data base
management system utilized and other operational consider-
ations that are not yet clearly defined.
3.	 Description
The Subject Search and Response Generation (SSRG) Subsystem
includes a search of the Computerized Criminal. Name and Record File
(CCNR), the updating of those files, the generation of user responses
and related interfaces with the System Supervisor.
The CCNR is comprised of two separate but interrelated files.
The Computerized Criminal. Name File (CCN) contains one record for each
FBI number, which includes personal descriptive data. The Compu-
terized Criminal Record File (CCR) contains the arrest records, which
is organized so that one record contains a separate date of arrest for
a specific FBI number.
There are four indexes to the CCN file. The Name Index is a
hierarchical structure permitting access to CCN records on a basis of
combinations of sex, name, and either high (blocked-out) fingerprint
classification or date of birth. For a 15-50 million subject CCN file,
the index will require 275 9000 fixed length records and 20 -40 million	 4
variable index entries for certain common combinations of retrieval:,
parameters (Reference 1, pages 5-2, 5-3).
The other three are unique identifier indexes. 1) FBI Number, 2)
Social, Security Number (SSN), and 3) Originating Agency Identification
(ORI) Number and Originating Agency Case ('OCA) Number. The number of
records in each of these indexes depends upon the number of occur-
rences of the identifiers. For example, a 1.5-million subject file
will have 15 million FBI number indexes, but less than 15 million SSN
indexes. The ORICOCA index records are purged from the index after
one year,
The proposed system is based on each search being allowed a
maximum response time of 30 seconds, Seven seconds is allocated to
the System Supervisor to process the request and initiate the search,
The search itself is allocated fifteen seconds and the remaining eight
seconds are allocated to the System Supervisor For processing the
response.
Figure 9-1 shows the logical flow of the Subject Search process.
The subject search is initiated by the data entry verification
operator (VDENT A or B) through the Data Entry and Display Subsystem
(REDS) and the System Supervisor. The VDENT operator enters the first
screen of data (60-80 characters) which is the data required for the
search (i.e., FBI Number, SSN ORI/OCA, high-level fingerprint classi-
fication, date of birth, sex, race, place of birth and name). While
the IMENT o-o rator is entering the. arrest data the CCN file will be^.,.	 _
searched.
Searches can be initiated in one of the following ways: 1) FBI
Numbed 2) SSN, a) OR VOCA Numbers or 4) name. The name search is the
only one that is not based upon a unique identifier. A search by FBI
Number has the highest priority, followed by the SSN, ORI/OCA Number
and name search.
A name search will automatically be initiated if no candidate is
found for a SSN or ORVOCA Number. A routine name search must contain
first name, last name, sex and state of birth. If the high level or
blocked-out fingerprint classification is available, it will be used
with the name and sex for the search.
Potential candidates are retrieved from the CCN file based on
the exact matches of the search criteria. These candidates are then
scored, based on the other available information such as name, high-
level fingerprint classification, date and place of birth, seat and
race. The scoring process results in a relative score for each FBI
number retrieved. The SSRG subsystem selects candidates based on a
minimum threshold score of 1.0. The individuals whose score exceeds
1.0 qualify as candidates.
Figure 9-2 shows the internal and external functional data
interfaces of the Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystems.
A control function within the SSRG allocates the requests to the
appropriate subject search modules. The SSRG then notifies the System
Supervisor of the search results, and a response is returned to the
VDENT operator to route the fingerprint card for further processing.
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All the verified data that was entered by the VDENT operator is
stored in a Transaction Record (TR) file until a case disposition is
made. When the System Supervisor receives an authorization from
search review (SEAR) the TR file data is retrieved, and the CCNR files
are updated. The appropriate response is generated and sent to the
contributor. If the case results in an identification of an indivi.-
dual already in the data base, search data is used to subsequently
update the data stored in the file for that individual, If an identi-
fication was not made and a new FBI number is established for the
individual, the associated data is stored permanently in the data base,
BO	 AUTOMATED TECHNICAL. SEARCH
1.	 Description
i	 a
Technical search refers to identification searches based on
fingerprints as opposed to searches based on name or physical descrip-
tion.
	
The Automated Technical Search Pilot System (ATSPS) is a
Rockwell -designed and developed system intended to:
r	 (1)	 Test the automatic technical search concepts.
(2)	 Produce performance statistics on fingerprint searching -^
and matching operations in order to measure search
accuracy (sometimes referred to as reliability) and
selectivity in an operating environment. p
(3)	 Provide a basis for estimating the costs associated with
an automated technical search system,
The ATSPS has been evaluated relative to the manual system and
as a stand alo.te system.
	
The only requirement placed upon AIDS III
fingerprint search accuracy is that an automated search .should perform
better than a manual one (Reference 23).	 The test results indicated
that the ATSPS does provide a lower miss rate than the manual finger_.
print search.
M	 Because of the limited size of the initial ATSPS data base,
k	 additional tests on other segments of the file have been useful in
f	 (	 fully evaluating the technical search algorithms. 	 Since the AIDS III
fingerprint search is intended for use it
 on-line retrieval and file
updating and the ATSP"1 is operating in a batch mode, the interactive
search algorithms, on-line updating of files, and computer interfaces
have yet to bid specified.	 The procedures used by the AIDS III System
may be differlynt than those in the ATSPS, but it is expected that they
`	 will;, be equal to or better than those in the ATSPS.
Figure 9-3 shows the lugi,cal flow of the Automated Technical.
Search Pilot System and is described below.
The Minutiae Master File is logically divided into 22 categorie s
or units of fingerprint classification. .	 As of August 1, 1980, the
1	 rint units ofATSPS Master File was limited to one of the 22 fingerprint8	 P rt
^f
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tt,e master file. The unit chosen (Unit 14) contains 560,415 male
fingerprint cards, which are broken into 1972 segments or bins. The
bin divisions were selected based on empirical analysis of the classi-
fication frequency distribution of 1.3 million cards. For comparisons
the entire 22 units contain approximately 22 million master finger-
print card records.
A request for a fingerprint search enters the system, is classi-
fied by the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) fingerprint
classification (process 1), and is entered into the system (process 2).
The classification algorithms and search rules are applied to determine,
as a function of NCIC-FPC and sex, the bins to be searched. Based on
this classification, candidates are selected from the Minutiae Master
File (process 3).
The purpose of the next scoring procedure, tkie Filter (process 4),
p
	
	
is to eliminate obvious non-candidate records in the selected bins and to
choose the best subset based upon similarities of fingerprint
classification, sex, date of birth, race and height. In the finger-
print classification scoring portion, a score of minus l to plus 2 is
assigned to each finger in the Master File subset. Each complete record
(10 fingers) will then have a score between minus 10 and plus 20.
Records with a score of 17 or higher are selected (process S) to be
evaluated further by the personal history and physical description data
in the records. As result of this evaluation, a subset of records is
1	 sent to the Matcher scoring procedure (process 6).
In the Matcher scoring, the minutiae data of eight fingers
!	 (omitting the two little fingers) on the request record is compared With
'
	
	 each record in the Minutiae Master File subset. A raw score is assigned
for each finger comparison, and a raw score total is computed for all
records in the subset. The Matcher Evaluation Rules (process 7) increase
the accuracy and selectivity of the Matcher selection. These rules
weight the raw scores based on finger position and pattern type. One
rule selects passing fingers (those that have more than a minimum score),
a second rule weights, the scores and a third rule ranks the candidates
based on this weighted score. The third rule also adjusts the
candidates' final scores by increasing the score of the top-rated
candidates and reducing the scores of all others.
In the ATSPS, the Interim Selection (process 8) evaluates each
record in the subset data set based on the Filter and ,Matcher scores. If
a candidate has high enough Filter and Matcher scores, the FBI number is
listed and the candidate's fingerprint card is manually retrieved for
positive identification (processes 9-10)
2.	 Test Implementation
ATSPS software testing began in May, 1979. To date, it consists of
three phases:
(1) Phase I (completed): Technical searches against known
identification to 'determine reliability.
A
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(2) Phase II (in progress)t Fingerprint card searches pro-
cessed in parallel through Unit 14 of the manual system.
and the ATSPS.
(3) Phase III (test/evaluation mode): New software is
currently being tested and evaluated. Enhancements
include limiting the size of the data set passing the
Filter scorings some Descriptor scoring (i.e., date of
birth, race and height) } NCIC-FPC scoring, an interim
final selection process and update of the data base.
Fingerprint records for first-time offenders assigned FBI
numbers since,July I t 1974, provide more information to the filtering
algorithms (as shown below) because these records have been converted
for name/subject search by AIDS II.
Post July I t 19, 14	 Pre July 1, 1974
	
Information	 Information
Sex	 Sex
NCIC fingerprint	 NCIC fingerprint
classification
	 classification
Date of birth (year t	 Date of bi, th (year)
month, and day)
Race	 Not available
in the ATSPS
Height	 data base
Minutiae	 Minutiae
3.	 Test Results
a. Phase I technical search (against known identifications)
test results are shown below:
Number of
Searches	 Percentage
	
Identifications	 283	 93.4
Misses	 20	 6.6
	
303	 100.0
The identification rate by data group:
	
Post July 1, 1974:	 97.7%
r
	
Pre July 1, 1974:	 90.1%
4
b. Phase II technical searches (in parallel with manual Unit 14) and
comparative statistics to May 24 0 1980, are shown in Table 9-2.
9-11
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Table 9-2 ATSPS vs Manual System Test Results
Misses in Manual	 Misses in ATSPS
System Found in
	 Found In
ATSPS	 Manual Systems
Possible	 No. of
	
r	 Misses
	 No. of	 %	 Misses
Date Number of
	 Misses	 Miss	 Per	 Misses
	 Miss	 Per
of Report Searches	 Identifi-	 Rate	 Search	 Rate	 Search
cations
05-24-80 27,681	 11440	 354
	 24.58	 0.013	 75	 5.21	 0.003
In addition to the tests run in Unit 14, three representa-
tive vertical slices of other areas of the data base were
selected to make some additional tests.
	 The purposes of
these tests were to;
(1)	 Make a preliminary determination of search reliabil-
ity in portions of the file which provide extremes
of classifications, or which provide special prob-
lems for the minutiae capture/usage process.
(2)	 Determine and quantify the types of misses which
occur in each area.
(3)	 Make a preliminary determination of Automated
Technical Search selectivity in each area.
	 A radial
loop-intensive segment (in Unit 3), an ulnar
loop-intensive segment (in Unit 5), and a balanced
area of female prints (in Unit 22) were chosen for
,y
these tests.	 The results of the tests are
!1
summarized in Table 9-3.
The results indicate that the search algorithm does maintain its
reliability and selectivity when performing searches in areas outside
Unit 14.
C. Phase III was brought up on July 21, 1980 for testing
(Phase II will continue until the new Phase III software
is validated.)	 Because no'final test results were avail-
able, the evaluation of the technical search algorithms is
based upon the results of Phase II tests.
	 However,
" preliminary results from Phase III testing indicate that
the software is improving the performance of the ATSPS.
9-12
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4.	 Enhancements
The AIDS III Technical. Search will incorporate enhancements that
have been designed for Phase III of the ATSPS. Figure 9-4 shows the
revised logic flow of the Phase ITT ATSPS. This is also the concep-
tual logic flow for the AIDS III Technical Search.
As in Phase 11, the NCIC fingerprint classification is assigned
to the request card (process 1) and entered to the system (process 2).
The bins are selected (process 3), and filter scoring (process 4) and
selection (process 5) take place. The number of records which may
pass the Filter in a search is now limited to 250 (Reference 1 9
 pages
5-46).
In Phase III, the NCIC--FPC (process 7) and some Descriptor scor -
ing (process 9) are taking place in parallel with the Matcher scoring
(processes 6, 8). The NCIC-FPC Scoring (process 7) will develop a
score based upon the similarity of the search FPC (and references) to 	 l
the FPC of each file candidate, "NCIC-FPC Scoring involves the develop -
ment of a distance measure based upon the degrees of disparity (or
similarity) between the NCIC-FPC (and references) of the search print
versus the file print. Individual finger classification distances are
combined to produce a card level distance for each candidate. NCIC-FPC 	 i
scores are then derived as a function of the card level distances, the 	 1
rank ordering of the candidates, the distance differential between the
file candidate being scored and the file candidate which has the
smallest distance of all those in the search (Reference 35, page 12,
Reference 36, page lb).
Fourteen descriptors will be incorporated into the Descriptor
Scoring algorithm (process 9). These descriptors are included in the
information normally recorded on a subject's, fingerprint card and sub-
sequent captures by the data system (Ref^,.rence 1, pages 5-51). It
appears that this data will be stored' with the minutiae data for each
subject. File update procedures for this data have not been addressed 	 t
by Rockwell.
1
Rockwell has categorized the descriptors into three categories.
Physical descriptors include sex, race, eye color, hair color, height,
weight-i scars, marks, tattoos and skin tone. Personal history descrip
tors include date of birth, place of birth, Social Security number and
name. Criminal history descriptors include place of arrest and type
of offense (Reference 1, pages 5-51 thru 5-53),
A Final Selection procedure (process 10) performs the final,
automated determination as to which candidates (if any) will be
selected for comparison with the inquiry search card (processes 11,
12). Identifications and non-identifications are handled as appro -
priate (Reference 1, page 5-84).
r
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SECTION X
DATA BASE MANAGEMENT
The data base structure and management of that data are integral
parts of any information system, especially one of the sire and
criticality of the one proposed in the AIDS III System Concept. The
development and maintenance costs of supporting the information
processes in AIDS III are significant. They are a major factor in
developing and utilizing the data being accumulated for identifying
individuals.
A make/buy evaluation of commercially available general-purpose
Data Base Management Systems (DBMS) for use in the AIDS III System
should be made. In the documentation received, there was no evidence
of such an evalution, nor that any data base management system tech-
nology assessment had been made. If evaluations have taken place: the 	 t
results should be reexamined to determine the exact justification for
rejecting the use of a commercially available DBMS. If such an
assessment has not taken place, it should be completed prior to addi-
tional expenditures in the development of specialized software to
support the FBI Identification Division function. This recommendation
is based upon the following considerations:
(1) AIDS III file structures are compatible with a
general-purpose DBMS.
(2) There are cost savings in implementation and maintenance.
a. automatic file access control and data security.
b. automatic audit trial and backup,
(3) Upgrades have a minimum impact.
a. operating systems.
b. CPU.
C.	 disks.
d.	 data element revisions and additions.
(k) DBMS parameters can be adjusted to meet specific needs.
(5) query languages are available.
The use of a commercially available DBMS does not imply that a
single physical file or data base must be established. The rationale
behind the recommendation is to establish the required number of
physical data bases or files with common software support, and to
increase the ease of handling logical interfaces.
	
a
Prior to the evaluation, a set of functional and data usage
requirements must be developed for each logical file aaticipated in	
7C
the system. How the various commercially available DBMSs meet these
requirement4I on a cost-effective basis will be a major consideration.
,e
10-1
A.	 GENERAL COMMENTS ON GENERAL-PURPOSE DATA BASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
While the cost per bit of storage and execution coat per
instruction have both been decreasing, the same trend has not been
true of software development. Since software development has con-
tinued to be a people-oriented activity; a higher percentage of the
total system cost in acquiring and developing a computing system is
accruing to software development (Reference 28).
General-Purpose Data Base Management Systems are characterized
as software packages which provide a flexible facility for accommoda-
ting different types of data files and operations while requiring less
programming effort than conventional programming languages. A DBMS
provides a software env.i'onment which is not tied to a particular se"
of application programs or files. This provides tremendous flexi-
bility in utilizing program maintenance personnel:.
In selecting or developing a software capability for data pro-
cessing functions, there are two extreme alternatives: 1) Design and
implement the system by tailoring it to a specific application,
without using any prepackaged software or 2) utilize a commercially
Available DBMS, and build any necessary additional functions with
application programs (Reference 22).
The first way necessitates a large initial: investment in data
bane system design and implementation. Although a great deal of this
effort has already been invested in AIDS II, over $5.9 million remains
to be invested in computer subsystem software development. In the
development of a homegrown data base managment. system there is gener-
ally a substantial, time lag between system conception and implemen-
tation, especially if the hardware and operating systems are not known.
The reliablity and dependability of commercially available DBMSs
is continually increasing. Experience at JPL in the development of
homegrown database management systems vs commercially available sys-
tems has shown that: 1) implementation times for commercial systems
are shorter, 2) reliability of commercial systems has been equal or
higher. and 3) costs have been leas than if the systems had been
developed in-house.
B.	 PILE STRUCTURES
It does not appear that the structures of the files proposed for
AIDS 'III (Reference lµ) are of a nature to preclude the use of a DBMS.
File maintenance and data updating is always complex. Reutilization
of freed storage space in the data base is automatically managed by
nii ,st DBMSS and is transparent to the user. Special utility programs
to do this will not be required. Establishing functional requirements
for the AIDS III data bases will greatly assist in the development of
hardware requirements.
ORIGINAL PAGE I
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C.	 COSTS
An important fact to reGsember when designing a computer-based
system is that hardware is cheaper than software development, mainte-
nance or operation costs. If the present trend continues, this
differential will be greater and greater (Reference 28).
The proposed AIDS III system appears to treat the problem of
data base management as a software coding exercise. Large amounts of
specialized assembly language and COBOL software are proposed which
would be sensitive to environment and data changes, and would tend to
maximize both new Aevelopment and long-term maintenance costs.
The basic problem to be solved by the AIDS III system is that of
managing an inquiry into a large collection of highly sensitive data.
The system proposed is a highly complex simulation of the manual
system containing electromechanical devices, electronic hardware and
human interfaces. If it is to support the FBI Tdentification Divison
in a cost-effective manner into the mid-1990's, it must be able to
respond to change, both technical and societal. As time passes,
equipment will be changed due to age and advances in technology.
Future social pressures may cause changes in the data and in its use.
Hence, the data base must remain adaptable and the system flexible.
Programming costs are an important factor in implementing AIDS
Mi One means of determining program development time and cost&
involves the average number of lines-of-code (LOC) produced per hour.
There are various standard rates that can bo applied, but three
sources: Johnson (Reference 29), Brooks (Reference 30) and Walston
(Reference 28) are fairly consistent in stating LOC productivity
rates. Batch systems are in the 6000-7000 LOC/man-year range, com
pilers, 2000-3000 LOC/man-year, and operating systems 600-500
LOC/matt-year. Recognizing that a data base managment system is more
complex than a batch pystem, but not as involved as a compiler or an
operating system, an extrapolated LOC productivity rate could be in
the 4000-5000 LOC/man-year range. Rockwell. has stated that the coding
will probably be in assembly language which, being a lower level
la;q-,tage than COBOL, could have a different productivity rate. Using
5,000 LOC/man-year as an assumed rate and 500,000 lines of code
estimated for the task (Reference 15), this equates toabout a 100
man-year effort. If only one-quarter of the estimated 500,000 LOC are
to be devoted to the data base managment system and related inquiry,
backup and operational procedures, 25 man-years will be applied to
development of the data base management system. Given the estimated
cost of $76,000 per man-year of programming effort (Reference 34)', the
development cost becomes $1.9 million.
Nigh-level software, maintenance people will bu required to
maintain the various data base files. The more varied the file
structures in a system, the wider the range of software maintenance
skills: and knowledge required.
The security of the information being utilized in AIDS III is
critical. protection not only from unauthorized inquiries or data
manipulation, but also in the form of audit trails, backup, restoral
facilities and system integrity. Security is a major concern with
computer systems and is not sufficiently addressed in AIDS III.
Today's commercially available general-purpose Data Base Management
Systems provide this as a standard feature.
Data protection and security involve insulating a data base from
system failures, vandalism, natural catastrophes and the like, This
includes backing up multiple files containing tans of gigabytes (109
bytes) of data and restoring them in a timely manner. DBMSs provide a
natural facility in this area.
D.	 CONFIGURATION UPGRADES AND DATA ELEMENT REVISIONS
When n system is developed for a specific application utilizing
a specific hardware configuration, it may not be flexible and respon-
sive to internal and external environmental changes. Upgrading
central processing units (CPU) or storage hardware, or using an
improved version of an operating system to take advantage of the
continuing improvements in the state of the art can have significantly
less effect on a commercially available DBMS than on a homegrown
system in terms of both effort and costs expended.
Modifications or changes of data elements in the system will
require reprogramming and possible file restructuring. All data now
in the system may not be needed or required in 1990. If a commercial
DBMS is structured to permit elimination or separate handling of that
data, additional storage space can be freed and used for new file
records.
DBMS technology uses separate logical and physical data tease
descriptions to completely,
 insulate user applications from changes to
the data organization and hardware environment. In the AIDS III
System Concept (Reference 14), it states that assembly language DSBCT
macron and C0B0L record descriptions will be used to provide data
independence. This means that, whenever a record element is changed
these descriptions must be changed, and all programs referencing these
data must be recompiled, retested, and recertified. If, for example,
a change from a 3 to a 2 byte minutiae file format is desirable, this
could require significant effort in making modifications to existing
programs. DBMS technology requires modifications only to affected
schemas/subschemas (data descriptions) and furthermore insulates users
from hardware upgrades, data reorganization, and all but major record
restructuring.
1S.	 ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET SPECIFIC USER NEEDS
Some DBMSs are structured to facilitate wtintever specific
modifications may be necessary for unique search processing. In
information systems utilizing computers it is important to identify
any areas in the system where data flow is inefficient or ineffective,
and those areas where a slight improvement or modification in either
the software or hardware structure will produce a significant through-
put improvement. Generally speaking, commercially available DBMSs
provide statist%cal information and control information that can be
used to improve processing of throughput time. In addition, the
acquisition of a data dictionary, query language, report writer, etc.,
could greatly extend and enhance the capabilities of the AIDS III
system while providing useful management Information upon request
without extensive programming.
The structure of the data bases for various logical and physical
files must be such that they can handle greater than expected caps-
cities through the addition of hardware, rather than needing repro-
gramming. Reference 14 (page 5) states "the tremendous volumes of
records to be processed by this system dictate that the files be
designed in a manner which will optimize processing efficiency."
While this statement has validity when addressing processing through-
put, it does not address the software management complexity introduced
by the development of a homegrown system. It precludes or presumes
that commercially available DBMSs will be inherently slower and
adversely impact the ability of the overall AIDS III system to process
the inquiry in an acceptable period of time. In reality, DBMSs can be
tuned to meet the specific requirements of the user.
It is possible that a commercial DBMS package may require
slightly greater computer resources than a homegrown, tailored
system. The acquisition cost of more powerful hardware should be
considered as part of the evaluation. This additional coat can be
offset by savings in software and by improved implementation sche--
dules. In addition, the configuration of the system may be such that
any additional resources required are already available.
F.	 QUERY LANGUAGE
In the AIDS III concept, a number of inquiry requirements are
identified and data files established to provide management infor-
mation. ;these queries will require computer programs to interface
with the files involved. There are also a number of files that
interact with each other and demonstrate a high complexity for those
inquiries known today. Inquiries handled in the future may be best
served by the use of the query language available as part of a
selected DBMS. In nod ition to management and statistical informa-
tion, a flexible query capability could enhance the performance of the
on-Line query (QUERY) function.
10-5
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Reference 14, page	 rjvates that there are ".	 . no plans to
incorporate a generalized query capability to the AIDS III system.
AIDS III. :s a highly specialized system which is necessarily dedicated
to the processing of f rsgerprin^, cards and related documents. Other
uses of the system are onti.rely /, secondary to this primary purpose."
While a general -purposf, query	 pability is not , >Janned, "additional
specialized query caprbilitiee; 'will be incorporated ... should the need
arise" (Reference 14). To promote standardization and facilitate
r
	
	
expansion, it appears that a query language with syntax tailored to
AIDS III is already planned. Based on .JPL's,experience in information
e tystems, the probability of query capabi]itee being needed is high.
.As,sophistication and a better understanding of the capabilities of
- AIDS III axe developed, there will be an increased inquiry demand.
G.	 CONCLUSION
MFor the above reasons, it is recommended that a make/buy evalu-
ation of the use of a commercially available general-purpose Data Base
i	 Management System be made and incorporated in the implementation of
I
	
	 AIDS III. The implementat ion of A, data base manageraeat system proto-
type could greatly assist in this evaluation, and'would,be useful in
determining the full benefits of commercially available''general-
p
r	 purpose Data Base Management System.
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SECTION XI
FILE CONVERSIONS
Implementing AIDS III will require restructuring and reformat-
ting the Minutiae Master File (MMF) and Computerized Criminal Name and
Record (CCNR) files. The same basic procedures (including testing)
used in establishing the Automated Technical Search Pilot System
i
	
	 (ATSPS) will be employed for the , AIDS III conversion. Data file
structures and format requirement's will vary depending on the hardware
and data base technology used.^ , A brief general discussion of Rock-
well's file conversion concepts can be found in Reference 16.
	 Conver-
sion of source. data and data files is addressed in Reference 12.
Conversion of the fingerprint card master file to microfiche is
mentioned in Reference 2. It was estimated that the conversion will
take 15.5 months to convert. The fingerprint card/microfiche conver-
sion plan briefly discusses costa, time and resources but does not
discuss how the conversion is to be done.
r
i
	
	 The cormplexity, scope and coordination required for a project of
this size cannot be overemphasized. A comprehensive validation test
and transition plan is planned for AIDS III, although it has not yet
been developed. Details (both technical and management) for the
creation of AIDS III data and microfiche files require further consi-
deration and development.
A.	 MINUTIAE MASTER FILE AND COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL NAME AND RECORD
C.? FILES
As of July 16, 1980 ?
 the Technical File Conversion Unit of the
Automation and Research Section had converted 12,701,591 fingerprint
master cards into machine-readable format for minutiae data. This is
out of a planned conversion of 14 9 500 9 000 cards. There is no expected
additional card conversion necessary when implementing AIDS III. Depend-
ing upon the hardware selected and the software utilized in establish-
ing and maintaining the minutiae files, a conversion from the current
format, file structure and equipment will be necessary. Data from the
technical master file conversion is being archived and maintained on
magnetic tape.
;;;
The information contained in the Computerized Criminal Name and"
Record (CCNR) file is being accumulated and maintained by the AIDSI II
system on an ongoing basis. Rockwell anticipates that the CCNR a
organization and file structure will be different in AIDS III than in
AIDS II, making a CCNR file conversion necessary (Reference 14, page
7)	 The CCNR data will be,.extracted from data and files in existence
at the time of AIDS III implementation._ The CCNR data
-,
 will be extrac-
ted directly from the Technical Master Fi; y Y1,'s archived' tapes and
existing CCNR files. At the time of the AIDS III operational a:tart
up, the data bases will b,,-; current and wi.'1' contain records that have
f	 11-1
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been subjected to extensive editing. Programs to extract data from the
AIDS IT CCNR files and the Minutiae Master File (MMF) created during
the Technical. File conversion do exist and have been utilized
extensively by the Automatic Technical Search Pilot System (ATSPS).
The value of these programa however t depends upon the har dware and
data b4se management technology ulti&^tely selected. A detailed plan
for the management, development, teat and integration is required
before a transfer from the AIDS II operational and AIDS III test modes
to the proposed AIDS III System can be expected.
Data entry screen and identification record response formats are
expected to be substantially identical to those implemented in AID S IT
(Reference 14). Data screen file formats do not appear to require a
conversion but t depending on the final hard4are and data retrieval
system selected, response data in the CCNR files may require a reorga-
nization.
A data base upd.:te method has not been formulated for the AIDS
III design. In Refei^Vace 14, it is stated that it "should be assumed
that updating will be"Verformed on-Line." Transactions will be
accumulated on a serial file device. In the event of a system mal-
function, the file can then be rebuilt by a combination of restoration
and reapplication of the interrupted transaction. Extensive develop-
ment work is still %^aquired in this area. The implementation of a
reliable and effective on-Linedata base update methodology is cr iti-
cal to the success of.'AID,S III (See Section X. Data Base ManagPm-ant).
The standards for software development will be based on the FBI
Technical Services Division Systems Development Standards manual that
Rockwell understands is now in preparation- , A review of these stand-
ards was not included in the evaluation.
MMF and CCNR file conversions should not be'considered as simply
extensions of the ATSPS conversion with some fine tuning added. The
size and complexity of AIDS III is far greeter than ATSPS. It is
implied that the programs used in the ATSPS (where applicable). will be
used in the AIDS III conversion. It may be more effective to utilize
the system concepts but rewrite the programs, in view of today's
technologies. Whatever route is taken, the MMF and CCNR file convey-
sions will require a level of design testing and implementation
management which is not detailed in the implementation plan at this
time
It is implied that the FBI Technical Service Division will be
responsible for the development of the design requirements (Reference
14, page 17). The line of responsibility between the concept or
functional requirements of the system and the system design require
ments is not clear. Additional conceptual and design effort is needed
before reliable time and cost estimates for data 'file conversions can
be established,
^^^	 ^	 r^^h. ,.+Y	 -mss..	 ^	 a6+=..	 -	 K _.	
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A.	 MICROFICHE FILE
The only reference to fingerprint card conversion to microfiche
images was found in Reference 2, page 164. Co p ts, resources and
schedules were generally addressed. It is stated that, working 15
hours a day, it will take 15.5 months to convert the estimated lk
million fingerprint cards (from mid-1980 to late-1981). No discussion
of how this will impact the ongoing system or the computer subsystem
interface requirements is noted. More detail is required in this
area. Converting fingerprint cards to readable microfiche images is a
critical activity and will require an extensive effort.
SECTION XII
FACILITIES
Development of the facility requirements for the AIDS III System
will req.'j re additional work before a realistic evaluation of require-
mente ca" be made III concept changes are not yet fully reflec-
ted. It`is recommended that a further review of safety and Lire
protection requirements be made.
A. EQUIPMENT LOCATION
In the AIDS III System Concept (Reference 1), it is not clear
whether Figure 6.6-6 is an update of Figure 6.6-1 or is complementary
to it Much of the computer hardware shown in Figure 6.6 -1 is not
reflected in Figure 6.6-6, while the process control number machines
and the microfilm image capture equipment are shown in Figure 6.6-6.
The revised plan (Reference 8, Figure 8-4) indicates a larger
floor area and does not specifically address the proposed computer
central processing units (CPU) or front end processors (FEPs). The
floor space requirements presented in Reference 1, Table 6.6 ,-1 must be
updated to reflect the space requirements for the work cell, the
transportation mechanisms, and the number of work stations required.
In addition, safety requirements may require additional considerations.
Consideration of interfloor modes of transportation as well as between-
station conveyor systems need further examinati:s,i-
B. CARPETED FLOOR
Placement of carpeting`on a computer room floor is not recom-
mended. Based on the experience JPL has had in its numerous computer
areas, there is a tendency for dust and dirt to gather underneath the
equipment and, in general, carpeting does not promote the cleanliness;
required for a computer room environment as well as tile flooring
does. Carpeting in normal office work areas, including those having
terminals, is recommended.
C. SAFETY' CONSIDERATIONS
The floor layout presented in Reference 1, Figure 6.6-1, with
all computers grouped in the center of the building, may generate a
safety hazard. Discussions of permanent walls and partitions, air-
conditioning ducts, various subfloor cables and glass walls around the
computer room do not reflect the application or consideration of RP-1,
Standard Practice for the Fire Protection of Essential Electronic
Equipment Operations, issued August 1978, by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (Refer- IV
ence 43).`
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Using the same ducts to run air conditioning from the computer
area to the employee area raises the possibility of smoke being
transmitted through the building or work areas via these ducts in the
event of a fire. Provisions could be provided to expel smoke directly
to the outside of the building in the event of a ,fire. R1"-1 should be
reviewed for further consideration in this area. In addition # if
water is used as part of the air-conditioning system, appropriate
water detection devices should be placed in the raised floor area to
detr_-ct possible water Leakage.
installation of any power transformers or Uninterrupted Power
,apply (UPS) batteries on the same floor or within close pvomi,mity to
the work area could also present a hazard from fire and resulting
smoke.
	 t	
t ransformer s	 socia ted
dofpower generatingequipment 	 belocatedneat either thethis nature  {
computer room or the general working area.
r
A.	 FIRE CONTROL 4
The discussion of fire prevention in Reference 1, Paragraph
6.6.7 should also be reviewed in light of RP-1
	 Using a Halon fire
.extinguishing system within the control roam should be reconsidered.
Halon is not a recommended method for controlling fires within a NASA
computer room.	 This is due to the toxic nature of Halon, and the time
delay required for the evacuation of persona in the fire area (Refe:r=
ence 40).
	
in addition to CO 2 extinguishers mounted on the walls for
electrical firesp H 2O extinguishers should be available in the event
of paper fires (especially those in wastepaper baskets).
The use of a "wet" sprinkler system may be an alternative.
Problems in such a system are caused by contaminants in the water,
vather then the water itself, which can be controlled by regular
flushing of the water system.
In order to ensure the best available fire protection, fire-
stops should be in the walls between the computer CPU area and the
employee working area. 	 This includes the ducts through which all
interconnecting cables pass, including cables between computers and
their assigned peripherals.
	 Cabling for terminals outside the;com-
pater. room should also ps,ss through fire-stop control walls. 	 'here
should not be glass walls betwec-n the computer area and the employee
working area.
E.	 POWER SUPPLY
Using the UPS as a meodology to shut down the computer system
until facility power is res2red appears to be reasonable. 	 Some
questions arise, however, regarding the exact power configuration that i
would ultimately be required, which will depend upon the exact equip-
ment being used.	 UPS should not be utilized beyond graceful system
! shut-down. 'Since lights, air-conditioning and power for individual
a 12-2
iF
v	 l^
terminals would not be available, it does not seem practical to keep
the computer running if it can be gracefully shut down. it is recom-
mended that procedures to hu,idle the controlled ,shutdown and start-ap
of the system and be developed-and thoroughly tested to ensure that no 	 !
data is lost in the input or inquiry front-end pro- cessors. Since
pover cables and the like are located under the floor, smoke detectors
should be installed at the came level.
i
F.	 OTHER
As previously mentioned in the report, consideration must be 	 j
given at
	 I an	 em
n to the need for controlled lighting at the image comparison and
vei^'fiion function (ICd ICV) and the Si-Automatic Readers
(SAO . Activities associated w..i.th :sage capture on microfilm (MFILM)
and microfilm processing (FLAB) should be in a separately enclosed
roomy properly ventilated# with appropriate fire protection.
r{
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APPENDIX A
OPERATIONAL COMPONENT SUMMARY
Table A-1 contains a summary or the basic data gathered for each
operational component in the AIRS III System Concept . . The data
contained for each component includes:
Act
..... °.^..n%ml
An abbreviation used in the system to identify the opera-
tional component. Table A-1 is in acronym order.
Description;
Complete description of each component can be found in
Appendix G.
Service Rate:
The processing rate of a single unit in the component.
Service Distribution:
Constant or exponential service distribution rate within
the component.
I '	 Number of Units:
The number of units proposed in the AIDS III System
concept. If a component has units in the work cell, the
number of units in each work cell is also shown.
Interfaces:
Input:	 The source of the data entering the component
on an hourly basis. This is broken down by
percentage and volume based on workload
guidelines. Interfaces with computer sub-
systems reflect hourly messages and bytes/
message transfer rates.
Output:
	 The destination of the data leaving the
component on an hourly basis. This is broken
down by percentage and volume based on work
load guidelines. Interfaces with computer
subsystems reflect hourly message and bytes/
message transfer rates.
MTBF:
(Mean Time Between Failures) The average value of time
intervals between successive Failures of equipment over
the total operating time.
A-1
MTTR
(Mean Time To Restore) The time from determination; of
equipment failure to locating the failure acrd repairing it.
Avai.labilit t
The probability that the equipment will be able to perform
its intended function.
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APPENDIX B
OPERATIONAL COMPONENT STATIC CAPACITY SUMMARY
Table B-1 reflects a summary of the operational component static
capacity analysis. The data contained for each component includes:
Acronym:
An abbreviation used in the system to identify an opera-
tional component. Table B-1 is in. acronym order.
Description:
Complete description of each component can be found in
Appendix G.
Total Required Capability:
The number of unite to be processed per hour by the
component, based on work load guidelines.
Service Rate:
The processing rate of a single unit in the component.
Number of Units Proposed:
Number of work stations proposed by Rockwell for the
component. If the component is in a work cell, the x
figure represents the total number of unitap and the y
figure represents the number in each of the 15 work cells.
Productivity of N Units:
Number of unite proposed tsY4tiplied by the service rate.
X Space capacity of N Units at 100; Availability equals:
Service Rate x N Units (Availability) - Required Capability x 100
Required Capability
X Space Capacity of W-1 Units at 100% availability equals
Service Rate x N-1 Units (Availability) - Required Capability x 100,
Require Capabilitypab 	 -
Calculated X Availability.
The probability that the equipment will perform its intended
function when required.
!	 B-1
a	 ,;
r.«
% Space capacity of U Units at calculated availability$
Service Rate x N Units (Availabili ty) — Required Capability x lOp
Requ redCapability
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APPENDIX C
ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL COMPONENT/COMPUTER SUBSYSTEM
DATA TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS
Data contained in Table C-1 reflects an estimate by JPE of the
relative scope of the hourly message volumes and related record sizes
that are proposed to be transferred between operational components and
the computer subsystems,
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APPENDIX D
DATA SOURCES
The rates used in the evaluation process were from various
sources with varying degrees of consistency and rationale. Where a
derivation of the rate was provided by Rochwell, this is so noted.
Estimates by JPL based on Rockwell. data or arrived at from other than
Rockwell sources'oe also noted,	 If no remark is made, the rationale
or derivation for the data stated in the reference was not speci-
fically identified.
Data sources are listed in this appendix for:
(1) Number of Work Stations
i!	 (2) Service Rates
(:3) Servi, , Rate Distribution Function 1
.`	 (4) Card/66cument V61t=es and Routing Distribution
(5) Maintenance
(6) Data Transfer Message Volumes and Size
A.	 Number of Mork Stations
Acronym Description Source
AFRS Automated Fingerprint Reader System Reference 23, Pabe
AUTOCOR Automated Correspondence Reference 7, Page 6
AUTORESP Automated Response Generation Reference 6, Page 16
BLO Blocking Out Reference 8, Page 26
CLASS-A Classification-A Reference 8 t Page 26
CLASS-B Classification-B Reference 8, Page 26
CLASS-C Classification-C Reference. 1, Page 4-7
CLCK Classification Check Reference 8 t Page 26
CSORT Centerline Sort Reference 7 9 Page 6
DATE STP Date Stamp, Count and Log Reference 7, Page 6
DENT-A Data Entry-Cards Reference 8 1 Page 26
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents Reference 7 9 Page 6
ENC Encode Input Data-Cards Reference 8, Page 26
ENCDOC Encode Input Data-Documents Reference 7t Page 6
ENCK Encode Check-Cards Reference 8 9 Page 26
ENDOCK Encode Check-Documents Reference 7 9 Page 6
FLAB Film Processing/Composer Reference 2 t Page 57
FLOAD Film Load Into Consoles Reference 1, Page 6 41
ICI Image Comparison Identification Reference 7 9 Page 6
ICV Image Comparison Verification Reference 7 9 Page 6
MAIL Open Mail and Sort Reference 7 t, Page 6
MFLIM Image Captute Microfilm Reference 7, Page _6
PCN Process Control Number Appl-Cards Reference 7 9 Page 6
PCN APPL Process Control Number Appl-Documents Reference 7 t Page 6
QC Quality Control Check Reference 7, ,Page 6
QUERY On-Line Query Reference 7, age 6
M	 READ	 r Quality Control Checks Read, and Reference 7, Page 6
Annotate
D-1
r	 IsWtie-.iwxxnrixC(	 ... .s sue.	 ^	 _ u u+.
Automated Response Generation
"Shocking Out
c^
Classification-A
Classification-B
Classification-C
Classification Check
Centerline Sort
Date Stamp, Count and" 
_
tog
D-2
Acronym. Description
SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader
SEAR Search Review
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents
WAND Wand Out of System
- Work cell
u.
B.	 Service Rate
Acronym Description
I,
AFRS Automated Fingerprint Reader Syste
AUTOCOR Automated Correspondence
Source
m	 JPL Studies and Refer-
99
ence 6,page 12 - See
Appendix F
Reference 8 9 Page 13 -
engineering estimate
" t
Reference 7, Page 6
Reference 8, Page 13
Test results of 7
cards /hour derated
to 50 C/H to allow j
designation of
possible illegibles.
Based on measurements
from similar
j
functions.
Reference $, Page 13 -
FBI Standard for full,
Henry Classification f
t
Reference 8, Page 13 -
FBI Standard for full
Henry Classification
Reference 1, Page 4-7
Reference 8, Page 13 -
FBI-supplied estimate IN
of current performance
r
Reference 5, Page 9
Time and motion
estimate and file
conversion
Reference 7, Page 6 ;
Source
AUTORESP
BLO
CLASS-A
CLASS-B
CLAS s7F
CLCK
CSORT
DATE 'STP
Reference 1,
Rockwell, exp
Reference 7,
Reference 8,
Reference 7,
Reference 7,
Reference 8,
Page 6-12
erience
Page 6
Page 26
Page 6
Page 6
Page 27
rx
u
1
Acrony►4 Description Source
DENT-A'' Data Entry-Cards Reference 8 9 Page 13 -
Based on 4800 key-
strokes/hour and
160 character/card
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents Reference 8 9 Page 13 -
Based on 4800 key-
strokes/hour and
160 character/card
f
ENC Encode Input Data-Cards Reference 8, Page 13 -
FBI-supplied estimate
based on AIDS I
performance
' ENCDOC Encode. Input Data-Documents.p g	 -Reference 5	 Page 10
Estimated
ENCK Encode Check-Cards " Reference 8, Page 13
FBI-supplied estimate
based on AIDS I
performance
al
ENDOCK Encode Check-Documents Reference 8, Page 13 -
Estimated
FLAB Film Processing /Composer Reference 6, Page 8
i FLOAD Film Load Into Consoles Reference 7, Page 6
ICI Image Comparison. Identification Conflicting data was
presented in Refer-
^ ence 2, Page 86
ICV Image Comparison Verification (Studies), Refer-
- ence 5, Page 10
(which references Ref-
er ence 2, Page 86) ,
and Reference 7, f
Page 6.	 The service E
rate stated in R fer-
ence 7, Page 6 was ?	 t
i selected as being a
reasonable compromise
between the conflict- }
ing data.l
MAIL Open Mail and Sort Reference 8, Page 13
?s" Engineering estimate  Ff
t
MFLIM Image Capture Microfilm Reference 5, Page 10 '- u
Model M600W M4 Mods. f#
 i
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Acronym Description Source
t
PCN Process Control, Number Appl-Cards Reference 7, Page 13 -
Derated from design
rating
PCN APPL I	 Process Control Number Appl-Documents Reference 8, Page 13 -
FBI-supplied estimate
i I
QC Quality Control Check Reference 8, Page 13
FBI-supplied estimate
i
QUERY On-Line Query Reference 5, Page 10
AIDS II experience
READ Quality, Control Check, Read, and Reference 5 9 Page 10 -
Annotate Estimated
/ r	 SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader Reference 8, Page 13 - €
Rockwell experience
on Rockwell's terminal
used in latent print
processing
SEAR Search Review Reference 8, Page 13
Engineering estimate
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards Reference 8,`'Page 13 -
Based on 4800 key-
strokes/hour and
1.60 characters/docu-
ment
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents Reference 8, Page 13 -
Based on 4800 key-
strokes/hour and x
160 characters/docu-
ment
WAND Wand Out of System Reference 8 9 Page 13
Engineering estimate
- Work Cell JPL estimate based on
detailed analysis of"
d card routing distri-
buczon shown in
Figure E -1
a
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IC.	 Service Rate Distribution Function
In all cases where the service rate distribution function is
used, it was obtained from Reference 8, Page 13.
D.	 Card/Document Volumes and Routing Distribution
Acronym Description Source
i
AFRS Automated Fingerprint Reader System Reference 7 1 Page 6
AUTOCOR Automated Correspondence Reference 7, Page 6 j
AUTORESP Automated Response Generation Reference 7 9 Page 6
BLO Blocking Out Reference 7, Page 6
CLASS-A Classification-A Reference 7, Page 6 s
CLASS-B;, Classification-B Reference 7 9 Page 6
CLASS-C Classification-C Reference 1, Page 4-7
CLCK Classification Check Reference 7,.Page 6 x,
CSORT Centerline Sort Reference 7, Page 6
DATE STP Date Stamp, Count and Log Reference 7 1 Page 6
DENT-4 Data Entry-Cards Reference 7, Page 6
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents Reference 7, Page 6
ENC Encode Input Data-Cards Reference 7, Page 6 E
' ENCDOC Encode Input Data -Documents Reference 7 9 Page 6
ENCK Encode Check-Cards Reference 7, Page 6
ENDOCK Encode Check-Documents Reference 7, Page 6>
` FLAB Film Processing/Composer tReference 7 9 Page 6 i
and
Reference 8 1 Page 16
FLOAD Film Load Into Consoles Reference 7, Page 6
ICI Image Comparison Identification Reference 7, Page 6
ICV Image Comparison Verification Reference 7, Page 6
MAIL Open Mail and Sort Reference 7, Page 6
MFLIM Image Capture Microfilm Reference 7, Page 6
PCN Process Control Number Appl-Cards Reference 8 1 Page 6
See Note A i.
PCN APPL =	 Process Control Number Appl-Documents Reference 7, Page 6
„ t QC Quality Control Check Reference 7, Page 6
N^ QUERY On-Line Query Reference 7, Page 6
n.
READ Quality Control Check, Read, and Reference 7, Page 6
t Annotate
f SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader Reference 7 ^ P ageg 6
F; SEAR Search Review Reference 7, Page 6
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards Reference 7, Page 6
` VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents Reference 7, Page 6
WAND Wand Out of System Reference 7, Page 6
NOTE A: - There is a conflict between Reference 7, Page 6, Reference 8, Page 9 {
and Reference 10, Page 9, concerning, the mix of input cards. Data
s
^J
from References 7 stud 8 was used as it was the most consistent.. r4 a
D-6 r
1E.	 Maintenance
Mean-Time-Between-Failures and Mean-Time-to-Repair data was not
identified by specific source or related to a specific operational
component.
The evaluation team used its best judgment based on the generic
data presented to relate the data to the operational component.
Mean-Time-to-Respond was stated in Reference 5, Page 47,,o be
1.0 hour. In determining Mean-Time-to-Restore, this hour was added to
all Mean-Time-to-Repair data.
Acronym
	
Description
AFRS Automated Fingerprint Reader System
AUTORESP Automated Response Generation
CLASS-A °Classification-A
CLASS-B Classification-B
CLCK Classification Check
DENT-A Data Entry-Cards
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents
FLAB Film Processing/Composer
ICI Image Comparison Identification
ICV Image Comparison Verification
MFLIM Image Capture Microfilm
PCN Process Control Number Appl-Cards
QUERY On-Line Query
SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader
SEAR Search Review
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents
WAND Wand Out of System
Source
JPL Study - Appendix R
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference 24. Page 8
Reference 1 1 Page 6-85
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference 1 1 Page 6-87
- Configured for on-
line backup
Reference 24 9 Page 6-8
Reference 24, Page 6-8
Reference 24, Page 8
JPL Study - Appendix H
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference, 24, Page 8
Reference 1, Page 6-82
Reference 24, Page 8
Reference 24, Page 8
F.	 Data Transfer Message Volumes and Size
The subsystem interfaces between the operational components and
the various subsystems were derived from Reference 6, page 16, and the
various subsystem descriptions found in References 1, 6 and 7.
The message volumes between the operational components and the
computer subsystems were derived from the source indicated in Para-
graph E above, Card/Document Volumes and Routing Distribution.
When the operational component transmitted only PCN status
accounting information, to the System Supervisor, a value of
10 bytes/message was assumed.
Other message sizes were obtained from the following sources:
Acronym Description Source
AFRS Automated Fingerprint Reader System Reference 6 t Page 2617
AUTORRSP Automated Response Generation Reference 7p Page 6 and
JPL estimates
`CLAS,S-A Classification-A Reference 6, Page 21
CLASS-B C149sification-B Reference 6 t Page 21
CLCK Classification Check Reference 6 1 Page 21
DENT-A Data Entry-Cards Reference 8, Page 13
DENT-B Data Entry-Documents Reference 5, Page 10 and
Reference 8 t Page 13
FLAB Film Processl;ng/Composer Reference 6, Page, 19
FLOAD ' Film Load Init.`.o Consoles Reference 1 0 Page 6-41
anc,, JPL extrapolation
ICI Image Comparison Identification Ref^:rence 2 1 Page 106
TOV Image Comparison Verification Reference 2, Page 106
MFLIM Image Capture Microfilm Reference 6, Page 19 and
Reference 2 9 Page 106
PCN Process Control Dumber Appl-Cards Reference 6, Page 19
QUERY On-Line Query JPL estimate based on
DENT DENT and VDENT data F
SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader JPL estimates based on
the number of fingers to
'be encoded (2) and
' 250/bytes finger
SEAR Search Review JPL estimates based on
the data requirements of
the various status
_ conditions of the cards
and extrapolations from
previously documented
processing information`
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Cards Reference 8 9 Page 13
£t
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents Reference 5, Page 10 and £
Reference 8, Page 13 0	 i
WAND Wand Out of System Reference 6 t Page 20
}
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APPENDIX E
SPECIAL FINGERPRINT CLASSIFICATION TERMINAL
The fingerprint classification terminal requires more stk ►dy and,
testing before a commitment to its use is made. There are two basic
design alternatives for this station. The first combines the classi-
fication process with the data entry process, while the second breaks
out the data entry as a separate position. Appendix E addresses the
human factors for these alternatives, as well as the design of the
proposed terminal itself. This decision will be based on the classi-
fication work station processes described in Reference 1. The human
factors will be identified and analyzed f and both advantages and
disadvantages of the alternatives will be addressed.
If it is decided that the Special Classification Terminal is to
be implementedp wholly or partially, there are concerns with the
keyboard design regarding data entry errors that it might promote.
A.	 CLASSIFICATION/DATA ENTRY FUNCTIONS
I' 1.	 Task Analysis
-r	 The fingerprint classification process consists of the following
individual tasks:
(1) Finger rint analysis and classification - Specific charac-
teristics of each print on thef gerprint card are
translated into an alphanumeric code. The throughput
summary (Reference 1) indicates an expected 10 documents
per hour. After removing the time required for data
entry, this translates into an average of one fingerprint
card every 5 minutes and 30 seconds.
(2) Classification data end - The classification codes are
entered into a data entry terminal for storage in the
system. Assuming that each classification code is 2
characters (for a total of 20 characters), and using the
card keystroke model (Reference 37), the time required to
enter the PCN and classification codes is estimated at 30
seconds.
(3) Classification data entry verification The codes entered
into the dat4 entry terminal are verified on the CRT
screen befog transmitting it to the System Supervisor.
r	
2.	 Work Station Configur%tion Alternatives
U
	
The workstation alternatives are the one-position work station
and two-postion work station. In the one-position work stationp the
,
c^ i
n
E-1
technician classifies each fingerprint and keys the classifications
into a data entry terminal.
	
The two-position work station separates
the classification and data entry tasks.
l
Following are comments on pertinent issues:
(1)	 Closure - Closure is the technical term for the degree of
sa	 afaction felt by an individual after completing a
task.
	
A task with high closure is one in which the i
completion is clear and well identified. 	 A task with low
closure is one in which the completion of the task is not
clear,	 The classification task probably has a medium
level of closure.	 The closure for the classification task
is the completion of the classification codes.	 The
closure for the data entry is the completion of the input
keystrokes.	 Closure for the data entry verification is
when the visual data check is complete and the card
¢
complete key is hit.
	 We can expect the closure for the
data entry tasks to be lower than for the classification
task.	 It is not clear that the combined tasks of classi-
fication and data entry have any highest level of closure
than the individual Casks.
(2)	 Compatib ilL
t
y
	
c ompat ibility
thedata entry task.
The two tasks are essentially independent.
	
Although they x
are not totally incompatible, there is very little sim -
larity between the tasks, and no reason to combine the two
for compatibility.
(3)	 Error Detecting - Combining the classification and data {
entry tasks	 creases the error detectng , capability of
the work station.	 For data verification tasks, the j
operator/technician can relate the entered data back to
the original sources the fingerprint, making it easier to
recognize an erroneous data entry.	 For the two-position
work station, the data entry and verification tasks are
separated from the original data in the classification
task.	 Therefore p
 the data entry operator can only relate
back to the intermediate (handwritten) data.	 The data
entry operator did not participate in the original classi-
fication code generation, and therefore does not have a
feeling for the validity of the entered data.
The advantages of increased error detection capability is
reduced in the one-position work station, since the f'
classification verification work station is expected to
detect data entry errors as well as classification
errors.	 It is conceivable that the increased error
detection of the one -position work station would allow a
reduction in the number of classification verification
stations-^ but it is riot likely to be significant.
E-2
(4)	 Skills - The classification technician is trained in the
sk	 of classifying fingerprints using a particular
method. The skills required to enter the data into a
terminal are quite different. There is no advantage to
combining these tasks in terms of skill compatibility.
There is merit in separating the task assignments, in
order to capitalize on skill apecializati.on in maximizing
throughput.
(S)	 Learning.- Because the classification and data entry tasks
are differenty the learning (or training) process is
complicated, With separated positions (two-position work
stations), the technician is not burdened with having to
learn the data entry tasks at the same time as he is
learning the classification task. This may not be signi-
ficant, as the data entry task would probably be fairly
eas7 for A technician. In any event, separating the tasks
would reduce the learning load on the technician.
(6) Job Variety - The two-pos ition work station does provide a,
modicum o £ job variety for the classification technician.
Data "entry and verification tasks require different	 t
activities. It is not clear whether this would be
regarded as a welcome relief or as an added burden.
Direct measurement would be required to determine how
classification technicians would react to this issue.
Most likely, the lower skill level of the data entry task
would provide little in the way of satisfactory job
variety. The separated (two-position) work station would
provide another type of data entry task, which might
provide more job variety for the operator.
(7) Economics —There may be a ' cost savings in a two-position
work station configuration. In the two-position configt;r
ation, the classification task becomes completely manual
in nature, and all mechanical and electronic equipment can
be eliminated. The data entry task can be accomplished
with fewer terminals }
 although additional personnel may be
required. ,The economic aspects require additional study,
as the concerns for data entry following the CLASS-A
function are different than those following CLASS-B and
CLCK.
3.	 Advantages/Disadvantages of Configuration Alternatives
The one-position work itstion has an advantage in increased
error detection for the data entry task. It may have a disadvantage,
however, in the economics and training areas. No advantage or disad-
vantage is seen with closure, job variety, or job skills issues.
4
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The two-position work station may have advantages from an
ncononic and training standpoint. Thera are some advantages in the
areas of skill level and job variety. Theonly disadvantage to this
configuration is in error detection, which is mitigated by the classi-
fication verification function (expected to uncover data entry errors
as well as clnes.fication errors).
k.	 Recommendations
The two-position classification work station, in which classi-
fication and data entry tasks are separated, is strongly recommended
for further analysis and study from both the human and economic
standpoints.
B.	 SPECIAL CLASSIFICATION KEYBOARD
The decision to use a special keyboard design (i.e., differing
radically from a conventional typewriter or QWERTY keyboard), should
b4 based on an analysis of the specific tasks to be accomplished and
the characteristics of the special keyboard. The special keyboard
must offer s-ignificant advantages over a conventional keyboard format
to warrant its use. General task requirements include the manual
identification of specific fingerprint characteristics, converting
them to a code, entering the code on the fingerprint card and entering
the code into the computer system. Functionally, it is assumed that
the major amount of time: will be spent in encoding the fingerprints.`
Some time is required to enter the codes through the keyboard, and
more time is required to verify the codes on the display. The princi-
pal areas of operator attention are the fingerprint cards with indivi-
dual, prints, the keyboard, and the data display on the terminal.
The encoding process is beyond the scope of this critique; it is
primarily a customer skill.. The verification process should be
atraigt,tforward, since the display format is well suited to that
applidation. It provides compatibility between the encoded display
and the original fingerprint card, reducing any adjustment required by 	 j
the operator when going . :from the display to the fingerprints.	 ?
1.	 Data Entry Methodology
gIt would be advanta eous if the data entry procedure were an
overlearned process- (e.g., touch -typing). if data entry is an over-
learned process, the operator has only two centers of attention; the ^j
fingerprint and the coded 'display. If i"t is not an overlearned process,
the operator has three centers of attention. In addition to the finger-
print and coded display, he must also think about -the keyboard.
Overlearning is a process that requires training and practice.
Ease of learning depends on the compatibility between the operator and
the process (Referenco 32). The amount of training and practice
required depend upon the following compatibility factors: mechanical,
conceptual, and spatial,. Mechanical compatibility concerns the ability
of an operator to physically accompl+sh the task. Conceptual, compati-
bility is When the process feats natural to the operator (this may be
due to some inherent quality, cultural background, or a previously
learned experience). Sp.,tial compatibility concerns the similarity of
physical arrangement bel;uten different elements of a process.
2	 Special Terminal Keyboard Layout
it is interesting to compare the proposed special keyboard with
the conventional QWZRTY keyboard in the context of the previously
outlined task scenario. Since 1975, society has had a great deal of
experience with QWERTY keyboards. Investigations have indicated that,
although it may not be the optimum, it is sufficiently close. The
conventional keyboard fits the line of the fingers ) and the keys are
comfortably spaced. With the touch system, each finger has to move
only two rows up, one row down, and one key to each side (each finger
is responsible for a limited number of keys). With s„ shift key• the
entire ASCII character set is available. This large character set
allows flexibility in the man/computer interface dialogue, which can
accommodate future expansions or changes in the basic process. Wit'
operators trained in the touch-typing system ) the QWERTY keyboard bas
conceptual compatibility; they are familiar with )'t4 Even operators
who have not had typing training and who use the hunt-and-peck system
find the QWERTY keyboard familiar. Although the QWERTY keyboard does
not have spatial compatibility with the fingerprint classification
process, this is not important since ),; in an overlearned system, the
physical configuration of the keyboard does not require attention.
What is important is that the man/computer dialogue design should be
conceptually compatible with the fingerprint classification process.
The QWERTY keyboard requires two hands, which could be a disadvantage
in some situations.
We have had no experience in using the special keyboard, so we
do not know whether is is better suited to this specific function or
not. However, we can analyze it as we did the QWERTY keyboard. The,
physical arrangement of the special, keyboard is not mechanically
compatible with the human hand, and the keys appear to be very close
together. The keyboard does not provide a reference key for hand
placement to support touch typing. It appears that the special
keyboard also requires two hands. Hand placement for touch-typing on
the special keyboard is closer than is required on the QWERTY keyboard.
Reference 1 statea that the special keyboard complements the
classification function by providing a finger-block display layout,
similar to that of the fingerprint card ) and special-purpose keys to
input preferred finger classifications and references. The display is
tow
E-5
t
both conceptual iv and spatially compatible with the fingerprint card,
but this doer not apply to the keyboard. The keyboard layout is not
related to the card layout. The key labels are conceptually compoti-
ble with the fingerprint classification process (good for a hunt-and-
peck typing system, but this is immaterial for an overlearned or
touch-typing system. For"a touch-typing system )
 the key position is
the important issue. The special-function keys are appropriate when a
limited number of functions are to be selected. Nominally, the limit
,s on the order of seven functions. This seems to be the largest
number of functions that the general population can easily distinguish
(Reference 33). The proposed special keyboard contains more than
seven special function keys, and these. are mixed with transaction keys
such as "Card Complete," "Clear Card," etc., which increases the
difficulty of using the keyboard.
The numerical keyboard is a telephone-style format. This may
create none serious compatibility problems. The telephone format
places the number 1 in the upper left of the numeric keyboard with
2 and 3 to the right, and 4 through 9 below. The moot-used alternate
	 I
numeric keyboard con,fig+tration is th e
 calculator format, where 1 is
placed on (;he 'lower left, 2 and 3 on the aright, and the remaining
numbers above. The specific difficulty withthe telephone-style
numeric keyboard is that is is not compatible with the calculator-
style keyboard. Even though touch-tone telephones employing the
telephone-style keyboard are becoming more common, calculators are
also widely used (especially in business). Also, the data entry
function is conceptually- compatible with the calculator function
(rather than the telephone -number-sel +action function). Standard
F
	
	 keyboards on available computer terminals usually use the calculator
style for the numeric keyboard. Having two different styles .increases
the di , ffi.culty of rotating operator s within work stations for training
and upgrading of personnel.
The location of the "Enter" key creates another conceptual
compatibility problem. This key signifies the completion of a data
element. On a typewriter,, the same basic function is a carriage
return. On calculators, it is "-", "&", and ".". All of these keys
are to the right of the data keys. The more normal keyboard charac-
teristic is to use the little finger: of the right hand for this
function. The special keyboard places the "Enter" key below and to
i
	
	 the left of the numeric keyboard. This implies that the first or
	
l
second index finger would be used, which is clearly incompatible with
other data-entry activities. Againr this might create transaction
problems in rotating operators within work stations, and training
problems for new or upgraded operators.
^t
Frequency of errors is another issue that needs addressing.
When a data-entry system incorporates a significant possibility of an
operator error, the system performance is reduced. If the operator
feels that he must be very careful to avoid making an error, he must
then work at a slower, more deliberate pace. if the operator inadver-
tently hits the"Clear Card" key while expecting to hit one of the
others in the normal data-entry process, his previous work will be
cleared. This is quite frustrating, and recovery is time-consuming.
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The same comment Applies to the "Sign off" key, which is located next
to the 9 key. A slight mistakep and the work station is
disconnected from the computer.
?
	
	 If a special keyboard is used, it is suggested that the keys
providing different functions be physically separated. The data entry
keys should be located together for a smooth, key-stroke flow. The
error-recovery keys ("Clear Card," "Clear Entry," etc.) should be
physically separated from the data-entry keys and the system-function
keys ("Log On" and "Sign Off") should be together but separated from
the other keys. The "Card Complete" key should be separated from the
other 'keys. Its function is to terminate the individual card trans-
actionp and it is initiated after the data has been entered and
verified. This expanded configuration would localize functions for
better comprehension and use reduce errors due to misplaced key
strokes f. and reduce the distraction of keys, demanding the operator's
attention around the data-entry keys, making the keyboard easier to
use.
A back space key should be included for error recovery. Clear-
ing the entire entry to a clear a character err%r_is a drastic action
which becirnes especially frustrating when ai, error is near the end of
the data item.
In conclusi:ont it is not clear that a data-entry terminal is
	 j
appropriate, for this application. If one is used, the keyboard design
should be improved to ;increase performance and reduce error rates.
fi
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APPENDIX F
AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT READER SYSTEM (AFRS) SERVICE RATE
A.	 SERVICE RATE USED FOR EVALUATION
Various service or throughput rate capabilities for the Auto-
matic Fingerprint Reader System (AFRS) function have been stated.
Reference 7 9 Page 6 indicates a value of 210 cards/hour. The FBI
Guidelines to Rockwell (Reference 8, Page 13) indicate a range of 210
+ 15 cards/hour (i.e., between 195 and 225 cards/hour). JPL studies
indicate a throughput capacity range of from 107 to 176 cards/hour
with a weighted average of 165 cards/hour (Reference 19). This rate
equates rather well to the overall fingerprint file conversion effort
average rate of 18 9 000 cards/day (Reference 35). Using 165 cards/hour
as a basic service rate, and assuming the successful implemention of a
50% AFRS productivity increase as a result of the modification pro-
posed by Rockwell,(Reference 6) 9 a service rate of 250 cards/hour was
used in evaluation of the AFRS component. Appendix B reflects the
details of the static analysis on the AFRS function for the varying
service rates.
The results of the JPL study (discussed in Paragraph B) were
based on data gathered from actual FBI worklogs processed by all five
AFRSs for the file conversion effort (i.e., reading all fingerprint
cards on file with subject date of birth 1929 and later, and storing
the minutiae data for use in Technical Search when AIDS III is imple-
mented). This conversion required reading several different versions
of the fingerprint card used over the years. Many of the cards pro-
cessed'were dog-eared, frayed and required mending to process them
through the AFRSs.
Rockwell has stated (Reference 6 1 Page 12)'that, for a modest
additional investment, the minutiae detection processor can be inclu-
ded in the hardware, increasing the throughput by 50%. According to
Rockwell, this modification has already been made on some of their
equipment, and a 50% improvement was seen. This has not yet been
demonstrated in a production environment to the JPL evaluation team.
Estimated costs for such a modification are included in the AIDS III
capital cost estimates.
The use of a service rate of 250 cards/hour provides a 21.0%
spare capacity with nll five AFRSs in operation. With only four AFRSs
operating, a -3.2% capacity is experienced. Results of the simulation
model show that the 250 cards/hour rate does not adversely impact the
ability of the system to process cards in a given period of time at
the 1993 workload, with a 50/50 (criminal vs civil) mix.-
The ongoing operability of the AFRSs as they Age could become a
problem. From an operability viewpoint, the primary- concern in this
function is cards jamming due to their poor physical condition. The
F-1
card dejamming procedure described on page 1-218 of the Calspan manual
(Reference 20) is complex and time-consuming. The procedure has been
substantially modified in the Rockwell-designed production AFRSs
(Reference 22, Page 4-2). Malfunctioning of the card hopper is
usually caused by an accumulation of paper dust, which can be avoided
by routine cleaning. The quality and newness of the inquiry finger-
print cards should greatly reduce this problem.
R.	 MEASUREMENT OF AFRS SERVICE RATS
To measure the AFRS. production rate, statistics were taken from
the Automation and Research (ASR) Finder Room production data log
(Reference 19). The sample size used was 53 work periods distributed
among day, night and midnight shifts. The duration of each shift was
7.5 hours. Samples were picked at random from the months of Septem-
ber, October, November and December 1979.
The criteria used to reject a sample were:
(1) When an AFRS was not operational because of lack of work=.
(2) When no report was generated for a specific AFRS.
(3) When an AFRS was used for pilot test activity.
The statistics generated were weighted by sample size to reduce
the degree of bias.
The computation of the mean production rate yielded 165 finger-
print cards/AFRS/hr.
The calculations using the September 1979 production data log
follow:
I
Sample Size Fingerprints/hr Z Rejects
System 1	 29 176 6.1
System 2	 25 156 5.3
System 3	 25 169 3.3
System 4	 26 173 5.2
Net weighted average:
29 x 176 + 25 + 156156 + 25 x x 169 + .6 x 173 + 20 x 107
= 5104 + 3900 + 4225 + 4498 + 2140
125
19867 = 159 fingerprints/AFS/hr
125
Weighted rejects:
	
N
Im 29 x 6.1 + 25 x 5.3 + 25 x 3.3 + 26 x 5.2 + 20 x 9.5
125
176.9 + 132.5 + 82.5 + 135.2 + 109
_	
.	 = 5^^7/125
The October, November and December logs give the total number of
fingerprint cards attempted per shift for the five AFRSs.
A 5% reject level, was used to obtain the net fingerprint cards
.processed.
Calculations from the Octoberr November and December production
data logs give the following:
Total fingerprint cards attempted 5025
Sample size n	 28
5025Mean - 28
	
= 179
Rejects	
_	 5%
Net fingerprint cards read:
179 ( 1 - 0.05)	 170 fingerprints/AFRS/hr
f	 n	 ',1
Combining the September samples with the October, November and
December samples yields the following:
i
i
25 x 159 + 28 x 170f	 _	 53	 165 fingerprints /AFRS/hr
t
E	 F^3
l	 _	 Jr	
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{APPENDIX G
SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTIONS
A.	 OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS (FUNCTIONS)
1. AUTOCOR (Automated Correspondence)
At this ,function, all information about a subject (no identi-
fication notification, rap sheet, wgnts f
 etc.) to be sent to the
contributor is accumulated (with fingerprint card, documents, etc, if
they are to be returned) and placed into an envelope, addressed, and
submitted to the mail room. Responses prepared in AUTORESP on fan-
folded computer paper are burst prior to placing in the envelope. No
identifications that are to be returned are hand stamped. Incomplete
or illegible fingerprint cards are also returned to the contributor
from this function.
2. AUTORESP (Automated Response Generation)
This function generates computer-printed responses that will be
returned to the contributor. It will, where possible, group responses
to the samecontributor. The results of the searches in AIDS III and
one address label for each envelope (containing multiple responses to
a contributor) will be printed on high-speed line printers. These
responses are thEpn sent to Automated Correspondence (AUTOCOR). The
high-speed printers will also print the name index cards to update the
Card Index name files (the manual system).
3. AFRS (Automatic Fingerprint Reader System)
The Automatic Fingerprint Reader System (AFRS), consisting of a
card handler,.a scanner, a control computer and a data output pro-
cessor, performs the function of taking the fingerprint image on the
fingerprint card and converting it to machine-readable format (Figure
G-1)
The fingerprint card is transported from the input hopper via a
motor-driven belt and positioned under the scanner. The cards are
registered to read the fingerprint image and process control number.
The positioning and card movement are computer-controlled. At each
position, a pair of fingerprints is scanned. After all pair's are
scanned, the card is moved to the output., hopper or, if a complete scan
was not made, to a reject. hopper.
The main components of the scanner of the AFRS provide the light
source and the image sensing functions. The light source is a CRT
that is computer controlled in its X and Y axes to illuminate the scan
pattern. Within the control computer, the following functions are
performed; preprocessing scanner movement and illumination control,
postediting and encoding of the minutiae detected in the fingerprint
images.
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The AFRS Data Output Processor (DOP) processes the input minu-
tiae information through the registration algorithm. This includes
finding the core of the print image, determining the X-Y axes of and
referenced to that image, transplanting the X, Y and 0 minutiae
information to the image orientation and reducing the image area to
0.75 in x 0.75 in from the original area of 1.5 in x 1.5 in. This
information then constitutes the output of the DOP, and is the regis-
tered set of min+itiae sent to the,.matcher. The matcher does the
actual comparison of the subject fingerprint data with data in the
technical file.
4.	 BLO (Blocking-Out)
All cards received by BLO are criminal. carde without an FBI
number. A high level fingerprint classification ^s performed at this
function. Any prints that are illegible are flPgged so that the
arrest data is not entered at the data entry function (DENT-A and
VDENT-A) for the initial subject search.
S.	 CLASS-A (Classification-A)
The classification process includes determining the NCIC finger-
print classification, writing the classification on the card and enter-
ing it into the system via a special purpose terminal. This activity 	 ?i
does a full NCIC fingerprint classification on all civil, military,
and Coast Guard cards. Reference to the ?referred classification is
also entered on the card.
6. CLASS-B (Classification-B)
This activity receives all of the criminal cards for which no
candidates were found by the automated subject search or, if found,
were not identifications. The full NCIC fingerprint classification is
determined and written on the card. It is then keyed into the AIDS
III system with the use of a special purpose terminal. Reference to
the preferred classification is also entered on thel card.
7. CLASS-C (Classification-0
This function classifies all alien registration and personnel
identification cards. The classification is made and entered on the
card. The classification performed here is not as detailed as re-
quired for criminal. searching. The cards are then forwarded to the
civil file for filing.
8. CLCK (Classification Check)
At this station, the NCIC fingerprint classification verification
is made and the cards are sorted into legible and illegible categories.
The classification check for civil cards is less extensive than for
c-3
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criminal cards., A special purpose terminal is used in this function
in the verification of the data previously entered into the system.
9. CSORT (Centerline Sort)
The fingerprint cards are inspected to determine the approximate
centerline of the inked fingerprints. A template is used to manually
de,termi.ne the centerline of the fingerprints. The cards are placed
(	 into one of the ten channels going to the Automatic Fingerprint Reader
System (AFRS) t depending upon the centerline group to which they
belong. Cards for which no centerline can be determined or which are
of low punt quality are routed directly to the Semi-Automatic Reader
System (SAR).
10. DATE STP(Date Stamp)
S
This manual process handles only alien registration and. persona,
:dentificati,on cards. The cards are date-stamped and counted. Once a
day statistics are logged, to the computer. The cards are then classi-
fied and forwarded to the civil files. There is no process control
number applications subject search, or technical search required for
these cards.
F
11. DENT-A (Bata ]entry-Cards)	 T
All data. from fingerprint cards that is required for the auto-
mated subject search and to update the Computerized Criminal Name and
Record (CCNR) files is entered by a data entry operator.
Data is entered from the cards to formatted screens selected by
the operators. Data is stored in the front-end computer and will be
verified.by the data-entry verification (VDENT-A) operation. In the
DENT-A function, there is no interaction with the host computer. For
a detailed description of this function and its relationship to
VDENT-A, see Section IX t Paragraph A, Automated Subject Search Perfor-
mance,
12. DENT-B (Data Entry-Documents)
Within the operation, document, information from wanta t
 flashes -s
expungements, d,ispositions t
 etc. is entered into the system. The data
entered includes information required to generate a subject search for
identiikcation purposes, and the appropriate data to be added/deleted/
revised on the individual record (i.e., arrest information, sentencing,
etc.). The data is key-entered and stored in a front-end'processor
(PEP) to await verification (VDENT-B). The process in this componentis similar to DENT.-A.
I-
13. ENC (Encode Input Data-Cards)
In this function, the data input formats are checked and the
criminal arrest data are encoded. The operator checks the charges on
the subiect fingerprint card against a list of standard charges, sel-
ects the most appropriate representation and enters that code number
on the card.
14. ENCDOC (Encode InOtit Data-Documents)
All dispositions and miscellaneous documents which generate
inquiries or updates against the master file are coded at this func-
tion. Many documents require that the coding be on forms which
accompany the source document, Examples of items coded include
offenses, date of births race, sex t etc.
15. ENCK (Encode Check-Cards)
This function is an independent validation of the charge codes
selected by the ENC operation. The operator compares the charge ..code
on the fingerprint card against a set of standard charges to ensure
that the proper code has been selected. The cards are then sorted and
routed to the appropriate function downstream.
16. ENDOCK (Encode Check-Documents)
The encoding performed in function ENCDOC is reviewed and
verified at this operation.
17. FLAB (Film Processing and Fiche Duplication)
The Film Processing Lab receives 16mm cartridge film containing
1000 card images/cartridges From the Image Capture (MFLIM) stations.
It develops the films then produces and duplicates ultramicrofiche at
a IOX reduction (containing 2000 card images/fiche).
18. FLOAD (Film Load)
This function is not a work station per se, but an activity. The
duplio ated microfiche are distributed to each of the Image Compar-
ison (ICI) and Verification (ICV) work stations for insertion in the
appropriate location in the microfiche carousels.
19. ICI (Image Comparison Identification)
The function of the Image Comparison Identification component is
to display fingerprint images for the examiners to compare subject
{	 prints against candidates selected as a result of either a subject
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search or a technical (fingerprint) search. The examiner must deter-,
mine whether a positive fingerprint match has been made.
The search inquiries are assigned to stations based on the
inquiry NCIC fingerprint classification of the particular candidates.
Each station contains microfiche fingerprint images of both the
inquiry subject and the candidate(s) selected from the fingerprint
microfiche master file. 	 The inquiry and the candidate fingerprint
images are automatically displayed side.-by-side.
	
A keyboard accepts {
comparison decisions and control commands from the examiner.	 A j
ceparate text display prompts the operator and displays system statue.
The microfiche fingerprint card images at each work, station are
i
stored in carouser-. type storage and retrieval mechanism.	 Each station
contains 500 fiche, and each fiche contains 2000 images, giving a
total capacity of 2,000,000 images per station.
20.	 ICV (Image Comparison Verification) {
The Image Comparison Verification function verifies the identi-
fication (if any) made in the Image Comparison Identification(ICI)
function.	 The process And work station facility is similar to the ICI
function.	 ICV has a smaller workload than ICI because it only veri-
fies the ICI identifications.
21.	 MAIL (Mail Room)
Mail is receved daily from the post office.	 The input iolume is
highly variable (from 17 cubic feet to 68 cubic feet per day).	 The
mail is opened and sorted into three basis: categories:
1.	 Fingerprint cards (both civil and criminal).
4
2.	 Alien registration and personal identification fingerprint
cards.
!	 3.	 Dispositions, flashes ) wants, expungements, etc.
'	 It then is routed to the next appropriate function,
22.	 MFILM (Image Capture Microfilm)
f ' o
At the Image Capture function, fingerprint cards are microfilmed
at a 6.3X reduction.	 The associated PCN are read with an optical
E	 character reader (OCR) and associated with the image in the Trans-
action Record.	 1000 card images are produced on each lbmm microfilm
cartridge.
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23.	 PCN (Process Control Number Application-Cords)
A process control number (PCN), which is a unique, machine-
readable number, is printed on each inquiry fingerprint card as it
enters,the system. The PCN is a 12-digit number structured as
YYDDDSSSSSCC where:
YY - digits of year
DDD w Julian date
SSSSS a Five digit sequence nwjAer
CC - check digits
As each PCN is generated, a Master Transaction Record (MTR) is
established. The MTR is the means by which the AIDS III System can
track the detailed status of each inquiry card from the time it enters
the system until it is disposed of at the end of the processing cycle.
The MTk consists of a series of fields which provide the means of de-
fining the detailed statue of each card.
24	 PCN APPI., (Process Control Number Application-Documents)
All documents processed by the AIDS III system require a unique
process control. number (PCN) which is stamped on the document (or an
Attached routing form) via a "'Bates" type stamp machine.
25. QC (Quality Check)
At this manual function, the fingerprint cards are checked for
completeness of information. Any incomplete or inappropriate cards
are returned to the contributor. Several hand stamping operations are
used to highlight special, conditions.
26. QUERY (On-Line Query)
To accommodate special requests from coatr Outors and FBI
offices received over the telephone " via wires or from special corre-
spondence, one CRT work station is designated for on-line interro-
gation of the AIDS III files. Most requests will be satisfied,-,by
reading information from the CRT screen at the work station. Some
requests will require data to be printed out from individual file
records on the Computerized Criminal Name and Record (CCNR) files and
sent to the requestor. Interfacing with the manual system for finger-
print cards, ,jackets, or photographs may be required.
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27, MAD (Quality Control, Check, Tread and Annotata-t r)cumants)
At this point, all documents and final dispositions are mixed
together. The dispositions are separated and sent on to the next
operation for coding. All remaining documents are given a quality
control check to ensure that information required for data entry is
correct. Documents found to be incomplete are sent back to the
contributor or to the manual system.
28, S,AR (Sgmi-Automatic Reader)
Cards that have one or more fingerprints rejected by the Auto-
matic Fingerprint Reader System (AFRS) require manual minutiae en-
coding using the SAR. Fingerprints that cannot be manually encoded
are designated as rejects and returned to the contributor.
To encode the minutiae data manually, the FCN is keyed into the
system, and the finger number to be encoded is displayed on the screen!
That particular fingerprint is then placed under a high resolution
closed circuit television (one finger at a time). The print is
registered (squared-pup and centered), and a trackball used to position
a cursor on the CRT screen. The point is registered with' a button and
the cursor is them moved 1/4 to 1/2 in. (usuall y along a line of A
fingerprint and showing up as a darker line), then registered a second
time. This creates a short line. Using the center, x and y coordi-
nates, an angle is calculated. Once a sufficient number of minutiae
are encoded (usually 40 to 100 individual points) the data is regis-
tered and then sorted on Y descending order. This data is then
transferred to the candidate minutiae file to complete the information
necessary for an automated technical (fingerprint) search.
29.	 SEAR (Search Review)
In those cases where an identification has been made and veri-
faed (ICI and ICV), this function authorizes the update of the arrest
data to the files. Where no positive identification has been made,
this function reviews the parameters used in the search. The search
parameters and statistics are displayed for the inquiry and if, in the
judgement of the SEAR operator, changes to one or more of these
parameters could bias the search process such that a new candidate or
candidates may be located, the operator may cause a new search to
begin at any one of several steps. For new criminal file additions,
the SEAR operator assigns a unique 'FBI number to the card, updates the
Transaction Record and routes the card back to be microfilmed (MFLIM)
for permanent addition to the file.
The search review operator also controls the secondary card
routing (i.e., non-identifications are routed to the proper functions
to continue their flow through the system). Inquiry into the Master
Transaction Record provides the operator with the necessary informa-
tion to route the card,
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30. VDENT-A (Verify Entry-Cards)
The VDENT-A function verifies the fingerprint card! data that has
been entered by the data entry operator (DENT-A). The data parameters
required for the automated subject search are entered first. When
this data (60-80 characters) has been verified, the automated subject
search is initiated. Whale the search proceeds, the VDRNT-A operator
enters the remaining arrest data.. (average of 80-100 characters). The
search process is discussed in Section U t Paragraph A, Automated
Subject Search Performance.
Based on the results of the subject search, a massage is dis-
played instructing the VDENT-A operator where to route the fingerprint
card. If there are one or more candidiates, the card is sent to
Search Review (SEAR); of there are no candidates, but tt is a military
card, it ,goes to the Civil file. Non-candidate criminal cards arc
routed to be classified in more detail: (CLASS-B), and non-candidate
civil cards are routed to have a classification check (CLCK) prior to
being aubmitted for an automated technical. (fingerprint) search. The
search and arrest data, along with the search results, are stored in
the Transaction Record (TR) file to await final disposition.
31. VDENT-B (Verify Data Entry-Documents)
At thia vomp.o ee'nt, Mocutmtent information entered in data entry
(DENT-B) is verified. After the descriptive data required for the
subject is entered, the automated subject search is initiated. As the
search is being conducted, the operator enters the remaining descrip-
tivC data for verification. The VDENT-B operator is notified by the
system if an identification has been made, and routes the document
accordingly.
32. WAND (Wand Out of System)
This function receives from quality check (QC) any rejects or
incomplete fingerprint cards that are to be removed from the AIDS 1Tx
system. A card may be rejected by QC for the following reasons:
(1) Only four fingers were fingerprinted.
(2) Znformrition is missing.
(3) Search not required by law for the applicant card.
(4) A non-AIDS FBI number.
(5) Civil file name search required,
The PCN number is read by an optical character recognition (OCR)
wand, and the appropriate reason for removal of the card from the
.r
system is entered into the system via a keyboard terminal. The cards
are then routed, to either the manual system or automated correspon-
dence (AUTOCOR).
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B.	 COMPUTER SUBSXSTEHS
1.	 REDS (Data Entry and Display Subsystem)
(1) Descr iption: The Data Entry and Display Subsystem con-
s,str, of a series of free-standing computers used to
enter, validate, and buffer data prior to burst trans-
mission to the System Supervisor, Information can also be
returned and displayed on soma of the REDS equipment
(i.e,, the results of a subject search are returned to a
VDENT operator with rotting instructions). The Data Entry
and Display Subsystems support the basic data entry,
verification and inquiry functions.
(2) Confi uration: The SEAN, WAND, and Classification func-
tions (CLASS and B and CLCK) are all configured with
their own front-and processors (FE ps). One PEP is planned
to handle the SEAR and WAND functions, with a second used
as backup ► Three sets of FEPs are planned to handle the
classification and classification check functions (CLASS A
and B, and CLCK). Each set consists of a primary and a
backup PEP. The entry and verificati.or ► (DENT-A and B, and
VDENT-A and B) portirat of the HERS consists of 9 separate
PEI's (Four Phase Equipment). each hooked directly to the
System Supervisor. There is no backup for this equipment
(that is, there xs ta) auxiliary PEP to switch to in the
event of a failure)
(3) Interfaces: The main components of REDS and its associ
aced actions and interactions with the System Supervisor
are as follows:
a,	 Data Entry and Verification
Enter data for subject search from card and verify.
Send verified data to System Supervisor for subject
search.
Enter, verify, and transmit arrest data for criminal
cards.
Enter, verify and transmit file update information
for documents.
Receive card routing information.
ResponRp by_System Supervisor
Update nester Transaction Record (MTR).
Update Transaction Record (TR) with subject search
information.
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Finitiate subject search.
Update MTR with search results.
Send card routing information to VDENT-A or B.
Format Image Comparison Request (ICRQ) and send to
Image Comparison Subsystem (ICS).
Receive and send additional criminal card data to
Subject Search and Report Generation Subsystem
(SSRG) for TR update.
Forward file update requests and information to SSRG
document.
b.	 Classification
Enter and verify full NCIC fingerprint classification.
Response by System Supe rvisor
Update MTR.
Send classification to Technical Search Subsystems
(TSS) for TR update.
Remove illegibles from the system.
C.	 Wand Out of System
Transmit process control number and reason data on
those cards being removed from the AIDS III system.
Response by System Supervisor
Update MTR.
Close M'7;R for rejected cards.
d.	 Search Review
E
	
	 Request status information by Process Control Number.
Change search parameters and initiate a new search.
Remove cards from system.
Route cards according to search status.
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Assign new FBI number for criminal non-
identific^itions (non-idents).
e.	 Response by System Supervisor
Send search status information from SSRG.
Close MTR for cards being removed from system.
Update MTR; t TR, and search paramters for a new search.
Authorize updates or additions to the Computerized
Criminal Name and Record (CCNR) files and the Minutiae
Master File (MMF) as appropriate.
Authorize a response generation. 	 i
2.	 ICS (Image Comparison Subsystem)
(1) Description: The function of this subsystem is to compare current
subject prints against candidate prints (both sets of prints are
on microfiche and are displayed automatically).
As a result of a subject or technical (fingerprint) search, a list
of one or more candidates may be generated. The image comparison
functions (ICI and ICV) compare the fingerprints on the current
subject against the fingerprints of the candidates on the list. A
simple ident or non-ident response for each candidate is given.
For rush requests, the FBI number can be entered at an image
comparison terminal and the fingerprint location will be found.
The microfiched print is then displayed and compared with the
inquiry hard copy fingerprint card. No response to the System
Supervisor is entered.
(2) Configuration: For the ICS, all of the image comparison consoles
are hooked into a single front-end processor (FEP). One YEP is
expected to handle the processing requirements of the subsystem,
although a second FEP for backup is provided. These two FEPs are
joined by switchable controllers.
(3) Interfaces: The main components of the ICS and its associated
interactions with the System Supervisor are as follows:
a.	 Image Comparison Consoles
Request fiche location by FBI number (for rushes).
G-12
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Receive image comparison request and send microfiche
retrieval information to the microfiche file hard-
ware,
Transmit image comparison results.
b.	 Resuonse b y System Supervisor
Form and send image comparison requests using PCN
and FBI number with fiche locations.
Receive image comparison results.
Update MTR with search results
3.	 PICS (Process Control Number and Image Capture Subsystem)
(1) Description: The PICS subsystem is primarily a message handling
function. Tike information co l lected, Process Control Number
(PCN) and microfilm locction are buffered and then sent to the
System Supervisor. For each fingerprint card that enters the
AIDS III, a PCN is assigned. This number is used to track the
card and access any pertinent information: The fingerprint
cards are microfilmed and then microf,iched with the appropriate
location information appended to the Transaction Record (TR).
(2) Configuration In the PICS subsystem, the PCN machines, micro-
film cameras and the microfiche composers are all hooked into a
single front-end processor (FEP). One FEP is planned to handle
the processing requirements of the subsystem, but a second FEP
is provided for backup. These two are jointed by switchable
controllers. The facility sensors are tied directly to the
System Supervisor and do not interface with thlF PIC subsystem
FEPs .
(3) Interfaces: The main components of the PICS subsystem and its
associated actions and interactions with the System Supervisor
are as follows:
a.	 PCN Machines
`,Transmit last valid PCNs .
Transmit invalid PCNs.
Actions by System Supervisor
Create MTR and TR for each PCN.
a
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b.	 Image Capture Cameras
Transmit PCN, frame no., type (permanent,
current ) temporary), and roll no.
Response by System Supervisor,
Update MTR.
Update TR to show location on microfilm.
C.	 Microfiche Composer
Transmit PCN, fiche no., type, frame no.
Response by System Supervisor
Update 'MTR .
Update TR to show location on microfiche.
Based on fingerprint classification, calculate
which ICI and ICV consoles the permanent
microfiche should be routed to.
4.	 SS (System Supervisor)
(1) Description: The System Supervisor is comprised of three main
functions: system monitoring and control., system simulation and
management report generation. The latter two are discussed
separately in paragraph 4. The main function discussed here is
that of system control and monitoring. The handling and routing
of information is the major effort involved in this portion of
the System Supervisor.
Each of the subsystems, and their associated components, trans-
mit information to the System Supervisor. y.~rt of the infor-
mation is kept by the System Supervisor while other parts of the
F
	
	
information are routed to other subsystems. Some of the infor-
mation requires manipulation and a response to one or more
subsystems. Myriad combinations of data routing can occur,
making the overall interaction very complex.
The main functions handled by the System Supervisor are:
Monitors, controls, and interacts with all of the related
F	 subsystems and with the card allocator system.
Maintains responsibility for card routing, and process
a	 control.
Acts as link between all subsystems.
Controls the Management Reports and System Simulator.	
3
Creates updates and closes Master Transaction Record
(MTR).
Purges all references to a PCN for a closed MTR.
Creates, updates, purges a Transaction Record (TR).
Controls and authorizes response generation.
Controls file updates and authorizes updates of specific
files (CCNR, MMF, etc.).
Polls various systems for information.
Maintains Equipment Status files.
In addition, each subsystem, computer and component will have
monitoring devices connected in some undefined fashion. These
devices can range from very simple (an empty hopper indicator)
to very complex (switchover to a backup unit due to impending
failure). A brief list of capabilities and/or functions is as
follows:
Equipment Status - i.e., sensors linking a component and
its subsystem computer may relate operational status,
queue sizes, etc.
Operating Limits - i.e., overload or underload condition..
Measurement Data - inputs to count workloads, queue sizes,
response times, etc. for both a subsystem and/or indivi-
dual station (especially as relates to deflectors and
a1locators).
Diagnostics for failures, including:
Automatic switchover to backup functions.
On-line fault isolation diagnostics.
Fault isolation for non-standard devices.
(2)	 Configuration: For the System Supervisor, one CPU is planned to
handle the processing requirements, with a second planned for
backup. The two CPUs are joined by switchable controllers. The
system management terminals, management reporting facilities,
and program development facilities are also tied into the System
Supervisor CPUs,
G-15
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(3) Interfaces: Interfaces with each of the subsystems as detailed
in the description of the respective subsystem,
(4) Management Report Generation and System Simultion (MRGSS) Task
a,	 Description: The MOSS task is part of the System Super-
visor. Different files (hardware status, PCNs, manpower,
etc.) are accessed and the information contained within
these files is used to create Management Reports. There
is no definition as to the content or frequency of these
reports, therefore, no specific rates or information
transferrals can be implied. The real--time interactive
nature of monitoring suggeots a very detailed set of
informational files. This set of files is proposed to
provide a mechanism for data collections, report genera-
tion and system performance monitoring.
A software simulator which models the system operation is
proposed for predicting volumes, queues, etc., given
variations in card mixtures, missing components, or other
dynamic portions of the system. This simulation is
inclusive down to the component level (i.e., the effect of
removing a single component or station from operation can
be evaluated). The simulator package will have access to
many of the same files utilized by the management report
task. This feature of the System Supervisor is only
generally addressed at the highest conceptual level.
b. Configuration: This task is a part of the System Super-
visor and the combined configuration is addressed in the
configuration discussion, above.
C.	 Interface:
Management Report System Simulator Task
Real,-time interactive monitoring of stations
t
	
Real-time monitoring of hardwire availability
I	 Receive inputs from System Supervisor reflecting:
Hardware status
Manpower configuration
Queue lengths
Productivity of individual stations	 {
Card mix and routing
G-16
Accumulate data and generating reports
Interactive System Simulator
Responses b,X System Supervisor
Send status of any part of the system
Send rates for an individual station or a set of
stations on demand
Send diagnostic data and keep the information files
updated
5	 (SSRG) (Subject Search and Response Generation Subsystem)
(1) Description: The System Supervisor formulates a search
request and sends it to the SSRG subsystem. After a
search of the Computerized Criminal Name (WIN) file, a
list of candidates (if any) is returned to System Super-
visor, which routes the name of a candidate(s) to the data
entry verify operator (VDENT-A and B) with a response from
search review (SEAR).
A positive ident from the Image Comparison verification
function (ICV) results in an authorization to update the
CCNR files. Responses are generated, and those that
require return of the original cards are matched with
their responses and sent to the mail room.
The SSRG subsystem also maintains the information about
the inquiry subject in the Transaction Record (TR). This
information is compiled and then used in the updating or
creating of renords in the Computerized Criminal Name and
Record (CCNR) files.
i	 (2) Conjuration: The SSRG subsystem, consists of response
generation line printers, and an estimated 3 or 4 Subject
Search Modules (SSMs). The SSMs are envisioned to be
computers with any 3 of the 4 able to handle the load.
The extra is a backup in case of failure or some other
isrm of system degradation.
The SSRG architecture calls for two CPUs. Under normal
operations, the two are to operate in a load sharing mode
(i.e., the prime CPU controls the search and file update
j	 processes while the secondary CPU handles the response
I
	
	 generation process). The CCNR files are shared between
the two CPUs.
If one of the CPUs is down, the prime function subject
search will presumably be executed in the up machine, with
i
	
response generation occurring as time allows.	
;z
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(3) Interf cew:
a. SSRG Computer
Receive Subject Search Request
Return list of candidates (if any)
Receive arrest record for criminal cards
Store data for probable file update in
the TR
Store data with new FBI number if
non-ident in the TR
Update CCNR files from data in the TR when
authorized by SEAR
Generate responses
b. Responses by the System Supervisor
Format Subject Search request and send to SSRG
Update MTR with search results
Obtain microfiche location for Subject Search
Candidate list
Send card routing information to the WENT
function
Send Response Generation Authorizations
Send CCNR Update Authorizations
6.
t
L .,.: ,	 ...
TSS (Technical Search Subsystem)
(1)
	
Description:	 This subsystem attempts to match the inquiry
subject fingerprints with a set of Minutiae Master File E
(MMF) fingerprints.
	
Additional data similar to the
subject search data plus the NCIC fingerprint classifi-
cation is used in the technical search process.
	
This
subsystem automatically reads the fingerprints, extracts a
minutiae data, and seeks a possible match.	 The Automatic F
Fingerprint Reader System (AFRS) and Semi-Automatic f
Readers (SAR) are used to "read" the fingerprint and w-
calculate minitiae data. 	 The minutiae data are compared
against the MMF data (by NCIG classification bins) in the
Search Processor Modules (SPM) to obtain the most likely
candidate.
3
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(2) Configuration: For the TSS, all of the Search Processor Modules
(SPM - estimated at 5 to 15), all 5 of the AFRS, and the FEPs
for the SARs are hooked directly to the subsystem computers.
One CPU is planned to handle the loads but a second CPU is
proposed as a backup. These two are joined by switchable
controllers.
(3) Interfaces: The main components of the TSS and the
associated interactions with the System Supervisor are as
follows:
a, TSS Computers
Receive full NCIC fingerprint classification (plus
references) and search data
Transmit results of search including list; of Q,,ndi-
dates (if any)
A
Transmit search statistics (parameters) to 5Ls*t
Receive authorization for updates or additions to
Minutuae Master File (MMF)
b, SPMs
Receive data required to perform technical (finger-
print) search
Send search results to TSS
C *	 Response by System Supervisor
Send full NCIC fingerprint classifications (plus
references) and subject data
Receive search results
Send search results
Update MTR
Form Image Comparison Request
Send search statistics to SEAR
Send authorization for updates or ;additions to MMF
x
C.	 TRANSACTION PILES
(1) MTR (Master Transaction Record)
The data record contains tracking data. on each fingerprint card
and its related microfilm image as it flaws through the AIDS III
System. The record is maintained by process control, number (PCN) in a
file assoc?sated with the System Supervisor. The basic activity
against the record is that, whenever a fingerprint card (identified by
a PCN) ire processed by a function with a computer interface, notifi-
cation o,E that fact is transmitted to the MTR. This audit trail is
effective in identifying cards in the system over a specified length
of time Find by the last automated function in which the card had been
processed. Sixty-four bits of storage are proposed. Other data
contained in the MTR includes card type and priority, identification
statuso card disposition, and file maintenance status.
(2) TR (Transaction Record)
Although not fully defined, the TR is used to contain subject
and arrest information that is stored temporarily (i.e., the informa-
tion that will ultimately be used for updating an existing record or
creating a new record on the Criminal t amne and Criminal Record
files). Various steps through the process add data to the Transaction
Record. Both the technical and subject searches use the information
contained in the TR. Information contained in the TR includes PCN,
microfilm location, microfiche location, subject search information,
arrest and any additional information, NCIt, fingerprint classification
and references, and the FBI number.
t'
F
i
F
1
APPENDIX H
STUDY RESULTS OF AFRS AND'PCN AVAILABILITY
A.	 AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT PrEADER SYSTEM (AFRS)
An analysis of FBI maintenance logs for the Automatic Finger-
print Reader System (AFRS) currently being used in the fingerprint
card file conversion and the Automated Technical Search Pilot Study
was made. The basis for this analysis was the Technical Maintenance
Unit Processing Section System (maintenance) Logs for all five AFRSs
for the period ,tune 1979 through December 1979. These logs covered
unplanned maintenance (operation code 72), a few planned maintenance
records (operation code 71), repairs, operation/service codes,
assembly involved, and a description of the problem and correction.
Table H-1 reflects the results of the analysis of the unplanned
maintenance of the five AFRSs. (Preventive maintenance data is not
included in the table).
Table H-1. AFRS Availability Including Processors
Response
Maintenance Service MTTR Time MTBF Unit
System Period Number In Hours In Hours In Hours Availability
Number In Weeks Repairs (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) (Note 4)
1 27 26 0.61 1.0 140.2 0.9886
2 21 31 0,64 1.0 91.5 0.9803
3 25 45 1.74 1.0 75.0 0.9648
4 25 31 0.72 1.0 108.9 0.9845
5 22 25 1.07 1.0 118.8 0.9829
Average 1.00 1.0 106.9 0.9816
Notes:
1. Mean Time to Repair - actual service time in hours,
excluding travel.
2. Period of time from machine failure to start of repair work (based
on Rockwell response time estimates as stated in Reference 5).
3. Mean Time Between Failures s 135 hr/week x Maintenance Period
Number of Service Repairs
H-1
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4.	 Unit availability .
	
MTBF
MTTR + Response Time '+ MTBF
The availability for the ARFRs ( including processors) derived in
Table }t-1 is 0.9886, which is somewhat better than toe nvailability of
0.9500 indicated by Rockwell in Reference 24, page 6.
The following is a tabulation of the maintenance info rmation for
the AFRSs excluding the processors.
Table H-2 AFRS Availability Not Including Processor
r
Response
Maintenance Service MTTR Time MTBF Unit
System Period Number In Hours In Hours In Hours Availability
Number In Weeks Repairs (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) (Note 0
1 27 19 0.76 1.0 191.84 0.9909
2 21 22 0.74 1.0 128.86 0.9867
3 25 37 1.21 110 91.22 0.9763
4 25 28 0.76 1.0 120.54 0.9856
5 22 17 0.78 1.0 174.71 0.9899
	
Average	 0.85
	 110	 141.43	 0.9883
Notes;
1. Mean-Time-to-Repair - total service time in hours
excluding travel,
2. Period of time from machine failure to start of repair
work.
	
3,'	 Mean-Time-Between-Failures 135 hr/week x Maintenance Period
Number of Service Repairs
	
4 '	 Unit availability	 MTBF
MTTR + Response Time * MTBF
1
^F
I	
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Table 11-2 gives an overall MTBF of 141.43 houral which is
considerably 'Lose than Rockwell's 700 hours (Reference 24, page 6).
The FBI Log MTrR (0.85hours), plus the Rockwell estimatedl response
time (1.0 hr ) equals 1.85 hours which is shorter than Rockwell's
estimated 4.0 hours (3.0 hours ) given in Reference 24, page 6, plus
the estimated 1-hour response time from Reference 5, page 47).
The empirical JPL data was used in the development of the
simulation model. It was felt that this data reflected a more realis-
tic view of actual conditions. A concern of AFRS availablility is the
potential decreasing MTBFs and increasing MTTRs as the equipment
ages. No experience was presented which would assist in this projec-
tion.
B.	 PROCESS CONTROL NUMBER (PCN) MACHINES
An analysis of FBI maintenance loge was made for the period
September 1978 through April 1979. Table H-3 reflects the results of
this analysis. The average MTBF for the PCN machines during this
period was 126.14 hours. This compares to 168 hours stated by Rock--
well (Reference 24, page 6). The average Dean-Time-To-Restore from
the FBI log is 3.39 hours as compared to the Rockwell Mean--Time
To-Restore of 1.6 hours plus (a repair time of 0.6 hours, and an
estimated 1 hour response time).
Using the Rockwell numbers, the average availability for the PCN
machines was 0.9906 whereas based on JPL study information, the
average was 0.9738. This difference did not seem to have a signifi-
cant effect on the system availability unless a prolonged failure
occurred. This component had the lowest availability factor and, if
the two machines proved to be unreliable, a significant queue could
build up at this point.
The empirical JPL data was used in the development of the
simulation model. It was felt that this data reflected a more realis-
tic view of actual conditions. A concern of PCN availability was the
potential decreasing MTBFs and increasing MTTRs as the equipment
ages. No experience was presented which would assist in this projec-
tion.
s
I
Table. H-• 3 PCN Printer Availability
Mean-Time
To-Rep,% r Response Time
In Hours In Hours MTBF In Hours Availability
PON Systems (Nate 1) (Note 2) (No te 3) (Note 4)
1 3.70 1. 0 158.82 0.9713
2 1.08 1.0 93.46 0.9 782
Average 2.39 1 .0 126,14 0.9738
R
No tea 2
1 Total-service-Time in Hours, excluding travel;.
2-. Period of time from machine failure to start of repair work,
3. Mean-Time-Between-Failures . 135 hr/week x MR ntenancceP^ eri dNumber of Service Repairs
4. Unit availability MTBF
Repair Time + Response Time * MTBF
4
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APPENDIX X
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WORK LOAD VALUES
Figure I-1 shows the Design Work Loads for th q .AIDS III
processing functions in which the work ,flow is measured in cards/day.
In Figure 2, all figures have been converted to cards/hour during the
day shift, using the formula:
cards/hour .(day shift)	 3 x 7I5 cards/day
to provide for the 2:1 ratio of the day shift over the night shift.
The Rockwell AIDS III Operating Concept Chart displays a view of
the system in terms of cards/hour, based upon the Design work loads in
Figures 1-1 and 1-2. Using the work load information provided in the
Operating Concept Chart, Figure I-3 was drawn. It was found that
there are certain discrepancies between the two sets of numbers.
In order to analyze the meaning of these discrepancies, Table
I-1 was created. It lists the percentage values at which the workflows
splits at selected nodes in the system. These nodes correspond to
nodes used for the computer simulation studies that were conducted for
the AIDS III Evaluation Report. The model is shown in Figures 4 and
S, where the selected nodes are identified as NODE 1, NOI NE 2 and BODE
3. The Table also includes information on other percentage values of
special significance,
The two percentage numbers given for each item in the Table
correspond to values calculated according to the information provided
in the Design Guidelines of the Identification Division of the FBI and
the Operating Concept Chart of Rockwell, respectively.
t.	 The disagreements between the two sets of numbers can be seen by
observing Figures I-2 and I-3. Most of the differences are small and
probably of little significance, except for the fact that they do
exist. After examining Figures I-:2 and I-3 and Table I-1, a few
observations can be made:
(1)	 In the Design Guidelines, 52% of the total number of cards
thct go to Subject Search (SS) are criminal cards, 	 .
compared to 49.56% in the Operating Concept Chart
(Table I-0.
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h(2) The percentage of cards with FBI numbers (both as a
fraction of the total number of cards, and as a fraction
of the total number of criminal cards) is significantly
higher in the Operating Concept Chart (11.44% against 18%
and 22% against 35.54%, respectively). This differential
should result in a higher success rate by the Subject
Search function, with off--loading of the Technical Search
Function as a consequence. This is confirmed by the
percentages of cards with unverified SS candidates of
35.08% (FBI) against 42% (Rockwell). However, the total
number of cards idented by the system is equal in both
cases (37%), and the percentage of Criminal Cards with
verified SS candidates is 59.49% (FBI) against 47.87%
(Rockwell), which seems contradictory. The most likely
reason for the apparent contradiction is that the Design
Guidelines contain information only on verified idents.
On the other hand, the Operating Concept Chart shows
information on unverified idenn , and gives an overall
false drop rate after the Image Comparison (Verification)
function has been completed. This makes comparison
between figures in both charts difficult. The figure of
47.87% was calculated using the 31.63% false drop rate as
the Table indicates which, in this case, was probably not
a very accurate approximation. The false drop rate will
vary depending on the card type even though ) overall, it
will stay approximately at the 31.63% level.
(3) From Table I-1, the percentage of cards with verified
Technical Search idents and no SS candidates is 5.74%
(FBI) against 19.49% (Rockwell). However, the figure of
19.49% was calculated using the alreadymentioned false
drop rate of 31.63%, which might not be accurate for this
card type.
In the Rockwell chart, an alternative to calculating the
number of TS idents is to apply the TS success rates for
civil and criminal cards as deduced from the Design
Guidelines. Using Figure I-1:
The probability of finding TS candidates for civil
cards, given that no candidates were found in SS:
58	
x 100	 0.7%
9538-1568
The probability of finding TS candidates for
criminal cards, given that no candidates were found
in SS:
625	
x 100	 15.9%5609-1679
I-5
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TABLS I-1
Identification Rockwell
Division Design Operating Concept
Guidelines Chart
NODE 1 3
i
Full Classification (Civil & Military) 47.99% 50%
{
Blocking-out (Criminal w/o FBI #) 40.57 7. 32%
With FBI # 11.44% 18%
NODE 2
Criminal w/o Candidates 21.08% 15% i
Civil w/o Candidates 35.85% 38%
t	 Cards with SS Candidates ( unverified) 35.05% 42%
Military w/o Candidates 7.99% 6%
NODE 3
To CSORT 44.72% 43.4%
ToCivi;. File 7.99% 5.4%
To MFPHOLD 35.10 39.47
To AUTOCO1 12.20% 11.8'/. 4
M ISI'ELLANEOU,S
% of Crimina\. Cards with FBI 22% 35.54%
of total no. of Cards idented 37.66% 37.4%
7. of Cards with TS idents (verified)
given they had no SS Candidates 5.74% 19.46%
of Cards with TS idents (unverified)
given they,
 ha^^ no SS Candidates N.A. 28.467%
of Civil Cards ,with SS Candidates
(verified) 8.66% 10.64%
% of Civil Cards with SS Candidates -	 1
(unverified) N.A. 15.56%
of Criminal Cards with SS Candidates
(verified) 59.49% 47.87% * '4
of Criminal Cards with SS Candidates
(unverified) N.A. 70%
of Criminal Cards in the mix of civil
and Criminal Cards that go to Subject
f
Search 52% 49.561
a
*Assuming a false drop rate of 31.63%
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Figure 5. GPSS Simulation Model
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Applying these results to the Operating Concept Chart:
(1) Civil cards:
Of the 852 cards/hour without SS candidates, 15% (see
Rockwell Technical Memo 080-010, page 5, item #5) are
illegible.
852 - 852 x Loo = 716 cards /hour
.7% of 716	 5 civil cards/hour idented in TS (verified).
(2) Criminal Cards:
Of the 335 cards without SS candidates, 30% (see Rockwell
Technical Memo 080-010, page 5, item #5) are illegible.
335 - 335 x ip - 234 cards/hour
15% of 234 - 35 criminal cards /hour idented in TS
(verified)
The total number of cards idented and verified in TS (with no SS
candidates) according to the success rates deduced from the Design
Guideline is 35 + 5 - 40 cards/hour.
In Figure I-6 we see that, according to the Operating Concept
Chart, 'there are 294 cards/hour for which TS has found (but not
verified) candidates.
Combining both results:
294-40 x 100 86% false drop rate in TS1294
This surprising result shows, again, an inconsistency between
the work load values under consideration as they appear in both charts.
We find in Table I-1 that the percentage of cards with
(unverified)
TS idents and rio SS candidates is 28.46%. This is much too high,
confirming the inconsistency of some figures in both charts.
Work Loads Used in the Simulation Model:
The work load information provided in the Identification Division
Guidelines is not enough to create an Aids III model that can be used
in the simulation. The Rockwell Operating Concept Chart contains a
study of AIDS III work loads that is more comprehensive. It contains
additional information that was obtained from outside sources and
(
direct measurements, and is a consistent set of numbers in itself.
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For these reasons, the work loads in the computer model utilized
for the simulation studies were either taken directly from the
Rockwell Operating Concept Chart or were derived from it.
By way of reference, a listing of the calculations made to
create Table I-1 is given below.
A.	 PRE-SEARCH (NODE 1):
1.	 Design Guidelines:
Input to node: 13840 + 12769 n 26609 Cards
(a) Full Classification (Civil & Military Cards):
12769 x 100 - 47.99%26609
(b) Blocking Out (Criminal Cards w/o FBI number):
10796 x 100. 40.57%26^. 09
(c) Criminal Cards with FBI number:
3045 x 100 - 11.44%26609
2.	 Operating Concept Chart:
(a) All values are taken directly from the Chart.
B.	 SUBJECT SEARCH (NODE 2):
i
1.	 Design Guidelines:
(a) Criminal Cards w/o SS Candidates:
r
5609 x 100 - 21.08%N-609
(b) Civil Cards w/o SS Candidates:
4538 x 100 = 35.85% 09
k
f
I^11
l
W Military Cards w/o S$ candidateas
2125 x 100 -R 7.99%26609
(d)	 Cards with SS candidates (unverified);
This information is not available in the Design
Guidelines chart. Inasmuch as the sum of all four
branches of this node must be 100 9 the percentage
for this branch is;
100 - (21.08 + 35.85 + 7.99) - 35.08%
2.	 Operating Concept Chart;
(a) All values are taken directly from the chart,
C.	 POST-SEARCH (NODE 3):
1.	 Design Guidelines;
(a) To CSORT (Subject Search Non-Indents)
(9538 + 5609 - 1568 - 1679) - 11900
11900 x '100 = 44.72%26609
(b) To Civil File (Military ton-Ident)
2125 x 100 - 7.99%26609
(c) To MFPHOLD (Subject Search Idents):
3045 + 5118 + 1106 _ 9339
933926609 x 100 - 35.10%
(d) To AUTOCOR (Illegibles);
1568+1679 x 100 12,20%26609
t
I
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2.	 Operating Concept Chart:
Input to Nodes A feedback Hoop sends a total of
60 + 68 * 128 cards back to Technical Search from SEAR. In the Cell
Model, this feedback loop (point 8 in Segment 1 of figure 5) reenters
at the cell input. The system that is being modeled includes the cell
concept; thus, the input to NODE 3 that is used for the calculations
is
2254 + 128 2382 cards/hr.
(a) To CSORT (Subject Search Non-Idents)
1033 x 100 „ 43.4%23'82
(b) To Civil File (Military Non-ldent):
2182 x 100 . 5.42
{c)	 To MFPHOLD (Idents)s
2382 x 100 * 39.4%
(d) To AUTOCOR (Ill.egibles):
2282 x 100 - 11.8x
D.	 MISCELLANEOUS:
1.	 Design Guidelines:
(a) % of Criminal Cards with FBI. number:
3045 x 100 . 22%13840
(b) % of total number of Cards idented:
3045+5188+1106+625+58 x 100 - 37.66%13840+12769
(c) % of Cards with TS idents (verified) given they had
no SS Candidates:
625+58	 x 100 _ 5.74%9538+5609-1568-1679
I
(d) % of Cards with TS idents ( unverified) given they
had no SS Candidates:
The Design Guidel ines do not include the Image
Comparison (verification) Function with the False
drop rates.
(e) % of Civil Cards with Sub ject Search Candidates
(verified) s
1106
2^ 7
x 100 . 8.66%
(f) X of Civil Cards with SS Candidates (unverified)*
All figures in the Design 0.1 idelines are for
verified idents only. Unverified idents do not
appear in the work load chart.
(g) % of Criminal Cards with SS candidates (verified);
3045+5188 x 100 $9.49%13840
{h) % of Criminal Carda with SS Candidates (unverified):
Not available from the chart.
(1) % of Criminal Cards in the mix of Civil and Criminal
Cards that go to Subject Search.
1 x 100 * 52%1230+1135
2	 Operating Concept Chart:
The Operating Concept Chart conta ;ius information about the
false drop rates in the form of a uniform ratio in the mix of Civil
and Criminal Cards for which Subject Search or Technical Search has
found potential candidates. Flom the information in the Chart, the
percentage of the card mix verified as idents in Image Comparison is:
L43
t
!	
1235 x 100 - 68.37%
This result has been used in the Table to calculate the
percentages of verified idents for the Operating Concept Chart column
for both Civil and Criminal Cards with Candidates from the searches.
(a) % of Criminal Cards with FBI number:
397 
x 100 35.54%
397+720
X-14
11
,00
(b) % of total number of Cards idented:
2843 x 100 = 37.4%
(c) % of Cards with TS id ents (verified) given they had
no SS Candidates.
	 In Figure 6
1233 - 939 = 294 Cards with Candidates (unverified)
68.37% of 294 m 201
zol: 
x 100 - 19.46%	 11033	 ^
(d) % of Cards with TS i.dents (unverified) given they
had no SS candidates;
From Figure S:"
1233 - 939 = 294
294 . 28.46%
1033
(e) % of Civil Cards with Subject Search Candi d ates
lverifi.ed):
Civil cards with SS Cand:d.ates:
1137 - 128 - 852 = 157
_
157	
x 100	 15.56% (unverified)1137-128,
68.37% of 15.56	 10./64%
(f) X of Civil Cards with SS Candidates (unverified):
From above:
	
15.56%
(g) X of Criminal Cards with SS Candidates (verified) :
Criminal Cards wtih SS Candidates:
397 + 720 - 335	 782
F
782	
x 100	 70% (unverified)
397+720
68.37% of 70	 47.87%
(h) X of Criminal Cards with SS Candidates (unverified)s
From above:	 70%
I-15
.	 _ ON A _
6w
(i)
	
	 % of Criminal Cards in the mix of Civil and Criminal
Carus that go to Subject Search.
1117	
x 100 - 49.56%1117+I M
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APPENDIX J
ACRONYMS
Automated Classification System
Automatad . Fingerprint Reader System
Anti-Halation Underlayor
Automated Identi fication Division System
Automated Name Search
Automated Technical Search
Automated Technical Search Pilot System
Automated Correspondence Station ( part of AIDS)
Automated Response Generation (part of AIDS)
Automation and Re.Bearch Section of Identification Division
Bit Error Rates
Blocking Out
Computerize ,4 Contributor Ab'^reviated Name
Computerized Criminal History ( part of NCIC)
Computerized Criminal Name
Computerized Criminal Name and Record (part of AIDS)
Computerized Criminal (Arreist) Reaord (part of AIDS)
Computerized (dent Response File (I)art of AIDS)
rlassificotion-A
Classification-B
Classification-C
Classification Check
Computerized Non-ldent Response File
Cutoff Age
Centrel Processing Unit'
ACS
AFRS
AHU
ATDS
ANS
ATS
ATSPS
AUTOCOR
AUTORESP
.A&R
BER
i3L0
CcA'
GCH
CCN
CCNR
C C R
CT.R
'LASS-A
ChASS-3
CLASS-G
CLCK
CNR
COA
CPU
i
J-1	 t
t
lk
f /p
romputeri.zed Record Sent File (part of AIDS)
Cathode Ray Tube
Centerline Sort,
Date Stamp, Count and Log
Data Has p Management System
Data Entry and Display Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
Data Entry
Data Entry-Cards
Data Entry-Documents
Date of Arrest (on f/p card)
Date of Birth (on f/p card)
Emitter Coupled Logic
Electromagnetic Interference
Encode. Input Data-Cards
Encode Input Data-Documents
Encode Check-Cards
Encode Check-Documents
Update Error File
Color of Eyes (on f/p card)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Front End Processor
First-In-First-Out
Film .Lab Prncessing/Computer
Film Load
Fingerprint Classification
Fingerprint Correspondence Section of the Identification
Division
Fingerprint
,I- 2
CRS
CRT
CSORT
DATE STP
DBMS
DEDS
DENT
DENT-A
DENT-B
DOA
DOB
ECL
EMI
ENC
ENCDOC
ENCK
ENDOCK
ERR
EYE
FBI
FEW
FIFO
FTaAD
FLOAD
FPC,
FPCS
GDBMS General Purpose Data Base Management System
6
GEO Geographic Location (on f/p card)
i
GPSS General Purpose Simulation System
HAI Color of Hair (on f/p card)
HGT Height (on f/p card)
i
h
IBM International Business Machines Corporation
ICI
I.
Image Comparison Identification
9
III,	
ICRQ Image .Comparison Request
ICS Image Comparison Subsystem (part of AIDS III, actually !	
3
used for irage retrieval for manual comparison)
a
ICV Image Comparison Verification }
F	 ID,	 I.D. Identification Division
IDENT Identification
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KIPS Thousands of Instructions per Second (as executed by a
computer)
LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Agency
MAIL Open Mail and Sort
MFILM Image Capture Microfilm
MIPS Millions of Instructions per Second (as executed by a
i computer)
MMF Minutiae Master File
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
l	 MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTR Master Transaction Record
MTTR Mean Time to Restore
NAM Name (on f/p card)
NASA National. Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCIC National. Crime Information Center
J-3
3
NCR National Cash Register Company
OCA Local Identification Number (on f/p card)
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ORI originating Agency Identification Number (on f/p card)
PCN Process Control Number
PICS PCN and Image Capture Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
PMT Photomultiplier Tubes
POB Place of Birth (on f/p card)
QC Quality Control
QUERY On-Line Query
RAC Race (on f/p card)
READ Quality Control Check= Read; Annotate.
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RH Relative Humidity
RVF Ridge Valley Filter
SACS Semi-Automatic Classification System
SAR Semi-Automatic Fingerprint Reader
SEAR Search Review
SEX Reported Sex of a Subject (on f/p card)
SID State Identification Humber
SKN Skin Tone (on f/p card)
SOC Social Security Number (on f/p card)
SPM Search Processor Module
SS System Supervisor Subsystem (part of AIDS III)
SSM Subject Search Module
TDFA Top Doan Functional Analysis
TFr, Technical File Conversion
TR Transnetion Record
TRO Transaction Control File
TSS Technical Search Subsystem (part of AIDS 111)
TTL Transistor- Transistor Logic
VDENT-A Verify Data Entry-Bards
VDENT-B Verify Data Entry-Documents
VUI Very Large Scale Integration
WAND Wand Out of System
